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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines Western Samoa and its bilateral 
relationship with New Zealand. The historical association 
of the two countries is considered, but the main focus is 
on the contemporary relationship, with specific mention of 
aid, trade and investment, and migration patterns and 
policies. 
Small state theory provides a framework for the 
study. Western Samoa is found to be a 'typical ' small 
developing state in all but one characteristic - its 
dependency on a single larger country not as pronounced 
as could be expected. The relationship between Western 
pamoa and New Zealand also, conforms to the theories (those 
of small state - large state relationships), although it is 
somewhat unusual in that it exemplifies Morrison and 
Suhrke's partial linkage paradigm - a virtually non-existent 
entity according to the authors. 
New Zealand, while apparently wishing to assist the 
economic and social development of the Western Samoan people, 
is shown to be somewhat hindered in the achievement of this 
objective by its failure (1) to establish clear priorities 
between Western Samoa's and its own development needs, and 
(2) to integrate, and assess the overlapping effects of, 
the various aspects of its relationship with Western Samoa. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the issue of New Zealand's 
responsibilities to its poorer South Pacific neighbours 
has featured more prominently in both government policy 
and public opinion. It is felt that the country's special 
affinity with the region places particular obligations on 
it to help the Island governments and their peoples. 
1 
The thesis takes the specific case study of Western 
Samoa and examines the extent to which it is benefited by 
its close relationship with New Zealand. Three areas of 
interaction - aid, trade and investment, and migration -
will be studied in detail in order to assess the different 
methods by which New Zealand "has ahd/or does assist 
(or hinder) the Western Samoan people. 
The theory relating to small states, and those 
states in their relationships with larger states, provides 
the framework for this study. While both countries are 
undoubtedly 'small' on a world scale, New Zealand is 
significantly larger than Western Samoa in comparative 
terms and it is in this context that Morrison and Suhrke's 
partial linkage paradigm and other models of the small 
state - large state bilateral relationship are employed. 
Overall then, the thesis will examine Western 
Samoa as an example of a small developing state, and, by 
integrating the three separate areas of study mentioned 
above, will assess the conformity of Western Samoa's 
relationship with New Zealand to the theories outlined 
2 
in this initial chapter. The integration will also 
facilitate the drawing of conclusions concerning the degree 
to which New Zealand's actual policies manifest its supposed 
desire to meet its responsibilities and obligations to 
Western Samoa. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
This brief review of the theoretical concepts 
relevant to this study will begin with an examination of 
the literature concerned with defining the characteristics 
of 'small states' as such. Economic and foreign policy 
attributes will be especially emphasized, and the definition 
will be narrowed down somewhat near the end of the 
discussion in order to produce a model which is more clearly 
identifiable with Western Samoa - that is, the model of a 
small, developing state. 
The relationship which exists between a 'small' and 
a 'large' country will provide the basis for the second part 
of this discussion of the theoretical literature. Morrison 
and Suhrke's partial linkage paradigm will be given 
particular consideration, as it allows the colonial-type 
relationship which existed between Western Samoa and New 
Zealand to be included in the analysis of the contemporary 
relationship between two such countries. 
These parts of this study are designed to place the 
3 
specific case-study of Western Samoa, and that country's 
relations with New Zealand, in the context of similar 
situations throughout the world. In this way, an analysis 
can be attempted later on, in order to determine the degree 
to which this particular case is typical of the small, 
developing ex-colony in itself, and in its relations with 
its former 'colonial' (larger, developed) power, and the 
degree to which its characteristics are unique. 
The Small State 
The initial, and most basic problem related to 
theories of small states and their relationships with larger 
ones is that of the definition of the subject matter itself. 
By what criteria can one distinguish between small and 
medium or large states? Maurice East suggests that small 
states are characte zed by one or more of the following: 1 
(1) small land area, 
(2) small total population, 
(3) small total GNP (or some other measure of productive 
capacity), and 
(4) a low level of military capabilities. 
However, these characteristics, in common with any 
others one could suggest, are subject to some scrutiny when 
specific cases are examined. For example, by GNP criteria, 
Canada is' of equal 'size' with China, while Sweden, with 
almost twice the trained military manpower of Britain, 
1 Maurice East, "Size and Foreign policy Behaviour: 
A Test of Two Models", ld Politics XXV (July 1973) P 559. 
would rank significantly higher than that country if the 
fourth criteria of size was used. 1 
other, less easily measurable, characteristics have 
been suggested to help construct some size-ranking of 
countries. For instance, " ... the capacity of the state to 
4 
withstand stress, on the one hand, and its ability to pursue 
2 
a policy of its own devising on the other .. " But, as 
Jaquet points out, while this does apply to 'small states' 
mostly, powerless big states, such as pre-World War II China 
and India, would also 11 within this definition. 3 
Therefore, in order to have some definite phenomenon 
about which these theories can be postulated, it is probably 
best to take David Vital's advice and "drop the idea of a 
fully objective indicator and frankly take common usage as 
one's guide. 1I4 He suggests that, as both the politicians 
and the general public "classify states semi-intuitivelyll5 
and therefore easily accept the existence of a 'small state', 
it is valid for theorists to do likewise. And, in developing 
their theories about the characteristics of 'small states', 
1 D. Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in 
Small Power - Great Power Conff:rct.- (London: Oxford 
University Press). 1971. p 6. For further discussion of 
this point see: T.E. Smith "Demographic Aspects of 
Smallness", in Problems of Smaller Territories, (ed.) 
Burton Benedict. (London: The Athlone Press) 1967. 
pp 11·- 2 2. 
2 Vital, p 4. 
3 L. Jaquet, liThe Role of Small States in Alliance 
Systems" in Small States in International Relations, (ed.) 
August Shou and Arne O. Brundtland. (Stockholm: Almqvist 
and Wiksell) 1971. p 17. 
in 
4 David Vital, liThe 
Shou and Brundtland. 
5 
Ibid, P 17. 
Analysis of Small Power Politics ll 
p 
5 
these writers help to further define their subject. 
Probably the most obvious similarity between most, 
'small states' is their lack of resources - both physical 
and human. This means that the level of economic deveZopment 
they are able to achieve without assistance from foreign 
capital, technology and experts, is relatively limited. 
And, in consequence, those small (and large too, in some 
cases) states which wish to advance their level of economic 
(and social) achievement, must be prepared to surrender 
their independence in some measure, to attain this goal. 
But even those small states which do not seek 
industrial growth, are usually highly susceptib to 
outside influence through their trading patterns. 
Raimo Vayrynen outlines the major characteristics. 1 
Small states: 
(1) are more dependent on foreign trade, 
(2) are more prone to having a deficit in the 
balance of trade, 
(3) export more raw materials and import more 
finished goods, 
(4) are more concentrated on one main trading 
partner, and. 
(5) are more dependent on one single commodity 
in their export. 
1 Raimo Vayrynen, "The Position of Small Powers 
in the West European Network of Economic Relations", 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 2 (1974). 
P 149. 
Some small states have tried to overcome these 
problems of lack of resources and unfavourable trading 
conditions through other economic activities. Bermuda 
and the Channel Islands for instance, have become tax 
havens and free ports (with low or non-existent customs 
and excise duties) ,1 while many other small countries have 
developed an extensive tourist industry in an effort to 
provide employment for their populations and (foreign) 
capital for the national coffers. 
This problem of providing employment opportunities 
is a common feature in many small - especially small 
developing - states. The population, although tiny in 
absolute terms, is large in comparison to the resources 
6 
available, and the slow economic growth rate cannot compete 
with the usually rapidly-increasing population. One 
solution has been emigration; an option favoured by many 
individua in the small states, as Benedict explains: 
"Lack of economic opportunities, increasing 
demand for manufactured consumer goods, the 
spread of education resulting in higher 
economic and social aspirations, increases 
in population, (and) the increase of informa-
tion about opportunities and excitements 
elsewhere, have all been factors inducing 
emigration from small territories to large 
ones." 2 
However, while this movement of population may be of 
great value to the individual emigrants themselves, it can 
have an extremely detrimental effect on the country they 
---------------------------------_._ .... _-
1 Burton Benedict, "Introduction", Problems of 
Smaller Territories. pp 4-5. 
2 Ibid, P 6. 
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leave behind. Migrant flows are usually extremely 
selective. It is the young, usually male, more highly 
skilled/educated, and enterprising members of a society 
who are most likely to seek the challenge and promises of 
overseas migration. And as a consequence there is likely 
to be a m~rked change in the sex ratio and/or the age 
structure of the remaining population - "sometimes reaching 
1 
a scale which threatens the viability of the economy." 
So once again we return to the economic aspects of 
the small state's survival. In fact some writers would 
argue that it is not the threat of a military takeover 
which typically most concerns the leaders of small states, 
but rather, it is the danger of losing their economic 
viability: 
"the small states· .•.. problem of survival 
in their trade policy ... (is) under most 
circumstances and during the longest 
periods, .... far more important than their 
security problem."2 
Even if one is not prepared to accept this statement 
as completely valid (Israel being a case in point), it does 
serve to emphasize the degree to which economic factors 
tend to dominate the foreign policies of the small states. 
As the preceding discussion may have suggested, in many 
cases, much, if not virtually all, of the investment, 
expertise, markets and other basics of economic development 
1 BUrton Benedict, "Introduction", Problems of Smaller 
Terri pp 4-5. 
2 Ole K. Pederson, quoted in Neils Amstrup, 
"The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of 
Research Efforts", ration and Conflict, XI, 1976. p 173. 
of small states is controlled by outside interests. The 
potential for political interference, or even control, by 
a foreign country (or company) is greatly enhanced by this 
economic vulnerability. 
Because the amount of resources the small state is 
usually able to dedicate to international. policy-making and 
activities is relatively small, once the economic aspects 
of foreign affairs have been covered, there is not much 
opportunity left for it to monitor, or participate in, 
other international developments. Of necessity then, it 
is forced into a "narrow functional and geographic range 
of concern in foreign policy activities." l In other words, 
"Most small states have a low level of 
international involvement ...• (They) will 
pursue a limited number of policies which 
are usually distinguished by their high 
commercial content or regional nature." 2 
Other characteristics outlined in the traditional 
model of the foreign policy behaviour of small states 
include: high levels of support for legal norms, avoidance 
of behaviour and policies which tend to alienate the more 
powerful states of the system, and frequent utilization of 
moral and normative positions on international issues. 3 
8 
Another, very important, feature is the small states' 
preference for, and high level of activity in, "organizations 
which provide a central fortlm for the conduct of diplo'matic 
1 Maurice A. East, p 557. 
2 Ronald P. Barston, liThe External Relations of Small 
States" in Shou and Brundtland. pp 41 and 49. 
3 East, p 557. 
9 
communication and competition."l While the larger, 
stronger nations will seek decisions in the most limited 
forum possible, where their predominance is less likely to 
be challenged effectively, the small states, using the same 
logic, usually prefer such intergovernmental bodies as the 
united Nations to settle any disputes: 
"The wider the forum, the more likely they 
-- (the small, weak states) are to find states 
which will take their side in opposition to 
the stronger system members. "2 
Therefore, the achievement of member status in the 
U.N., and the establishment of a permanent diplomatic 
mission in New York, is considered very important by most 
small states. Not only does this grant them 'equality' 
with the big powers of the world (on the one nation, one 
vote basis), but it also provides them with an opportunity 
to meet with the representatives of most of the countries 
of the world at very limited extra costs. Other methods of 
interaction,3 such as multilateral diplomacy, international 
conferences, regional organizations, and mUltiple diplomatic 
representation, also facilitate the resource-saving aim. 
It can be seen therefore, that there is a wide range 
of literature suggesting many and varied characteristics-
which small states have in common; and the importance of 
1 Micheal O'Leary, "Linkages Between Domestic and 
International Politics in Underdeveloped Nations," in 
~age Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National 
and International Systems (ed) James N. Rosenau. 
(New York: The Free Press). 1969. p 328. 
2 Ibid, P 328. 
3 East, p 560. 
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economic features in the writings on small states is fairly 
obvious from the above discussion. For this reason, this 
study of Western Samoa (a small, if not micro, state, by 
anyone's definition) will now specifically consider a 
slightly narrower concept of the small state - that of 
the small, developing state. 
In this way the model of a small state against which 
Western Samoa will be compared later in .this work, will be 
much more relevant, and the comparison therefore, more 
viable. By excluding such developed countries as Singapore 
and Monaco for instance, we are able to reduce the level of 
generality and vagueness in our model of a small state, and 
so greatly increase the applicability of the theory to the 
particular situation. 
Because much of the preceding discussion has already 
outlined the economic characteristics of small, developing 
nations (such as a heavy dependency on trade, limited 
resources, and a high level of dependency on foreign 
interests), and the consideration of the colonial relation-
ship later on, also mentions these features, it would be 
quite superfluous to repeat them here. In essence though, 
the small developing state has a lesser degree of 'power' 
and influence than any other political unit in the world, 
and therefore is the most vulnerable to outside domination 
and control - in whatever form (e.g. military, economic, 
political) .1 
1 See Marshall P. Singer, "The Foreign Policies of 
Small Developing States" in World Politics: An Introduction, 
(eds) James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, David Boyd. 
(New York: The Free Press). 1976. pp 263-290. 
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The Bilateral Relationship 
Let us now turn to the second aspect of this study -
that which considers the relationship which exists between 
a small (developing) state and a larger state. In this 
context, especially in the case of two such small countries 
on the international scale as Western Samoa and New Zealand, 
a slightly different definition of a 'small state! may be 
necessary, and Bj¢l's would seem to be suitable: 
"To be of any analytical use 'small state! 
should .... be considered shorthand for la 
state in its relationships with greater 
states' ."1 
And R.L. Rothstein also, believes that the size of a nation 
is related to its context: 
"the Small Power is not defined by specific 
qualities it possesses (or lacks) but rather 
by a position it occupies in its own and 
other1s eyes."2 
Under these definitions then, the relationship 
between Western Samoa and New Zealand can be regarded as 
falling within that body of literature which studies the 
interaction between small and large states. As long as one 
nation is significantly larger than the other, the 
relationship between them will almost inevitably reflect 
some aspect of this disparity. 
Bilateral relationships between small and large 
nations have been the subject of many studies and reviews 
1 E. Bj¢l, "The Small State in International Politics", 
in Shau and Brundtland, p 29. 
2 R.L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New 
York: Columbia University Press). 1968. p 7. 
12 
by political scientists, historians, economists and 
geographers alike. Some, like Bj¢l, believe that the 
concentration of a small state's resources onto one 
larger state can be beneficial to that smaller state. l 
others would argue exactly the opposite point of view. 
Bj¢l's argument runs along the following lines: the 
larger power may have a much greater diplomatic apparatus, 
but then its range of interests and relationships is very 
much greater. And, as both countries will have approximate-
ly the same number of top de sion-makers, the smal r nation 
is advantaged by the fact that its leaders can focus more 
strongly and more consistently in the single problem/country.2 
Freymond, while not agreeing that such a bilateral 
relationship is necessarily beneficial to the smaller state, 
does believe that dominance by the larger partner is not 
necessarily inevitab He argues that if the concept 
of nationalism and desire for autonomy is strong, and 
widespread enough, the greater power can be overcome. 
1 
2 
n ••• the assertion of a determination to exist 
as a nation, expressing itself in the form of 
an active resistance, even if conducted with 
primitive means of defence, is alone enough 
to create a political fact which the powers 
must take into account .... Any military 
effort, even if limited, which expresses 
national cohesion, increases the military 
and above all the political price which any 
adversary will have to pay, and helps to 
deter him from a possible risky venture. n3 
E. Bj¢l, pp 29-37. 
Ibid, P 30. This argument is also put forward by 
R.A. Dahl and E.R. Tuffe in their work Size and Democracy 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press) . 
1973. pp 118-119. 
3 Jacques Freymond, "How the Small Nations can 
Contribute to Peace", in Shou and Brundtland. p 179. 
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However most other students of the bilateral 
relationships between small and large nations do not share 
this optimistic analysis of the balance of power. They 
believe that the larger of the two countries is almost 
inevitably dominant in every aspect of the relationship, 
and that "autonomy in decision-making for the small .... state 
is relative and limited at best."l 
But this does not mean that every bilateral 
relationship between a small and a large country is 
identical. For instance, in some cases the smal r party 
is merely a pawn in the struggle between the super-powers 
for influence or dominance in a certain geographical region 
- the countries of the Midd 
2 prime examples here. 
East or Southeast Asia being 
Some small countries form an alliance with a larger 
power in order to attain some measure of security, and 
protection from other large powers~ David Vital defines 
the small state in this situation as Ita prot~g~ or client 
or satellite.,,3 Its range of options or responses to any 
situation is limited by the terms of the alliance, and the 
interests of the larger nation (not necessarily in conflict 
with those of its own) dominate its foreign policy. 
Since the Second World War however, there has been 
an increasing number of non-aligned small states. This 
development reflects the desire of these countries to 
I Marshall R. Singer, p 290. 
2 See e.g. Vital, Chapter 3 "Israel - The Contemporary 
Paradigm" in The Survival of Small States. pp 54-98. 
3 Vital, p 9. 
14 
establish a diplomatic identity distinct from the great 
1 powers and in so doing, become a relevant factor in 
international affairs, despite their lack of military and 
. 2 
economlC power. 
Another way in which one can examine the bilateral 
relationship between small and large countries is through 
the linkage paradigms proposed by Morrison and Suhrke. 3 
These authors relate their theories to the Southeast Asian 
countries' relationships with the Soviet Union, China, and 
the Uni States, but their model has much wider 
applicabi ty. 
Linkages, describing the nature of the ties between 
a particular small state and the large power environment, 
are seen to have two characteristics their intensity and 
their systemic or partial nature: 
liThe essence of a systemic linkage, as opposed 
to a partial linkage, is that the small state's 
relations with anyone large power are heavily 
influenced by that power's relations with other 
large powers ...... The intensity of the linkage 
refers to the degree of large power involvement 
with the smaller state and the saliency of large 
power policies to the foreign policy objectives 
of the smaller power ... 114 
All small states' ties with larger powers, according 
to this argument, can therefore be placed into one of four 
1 Barston, p 48. 
2 Radouan Vukadinovic, "Small States and the Policy of 
Non-Alignment", in Shou and Brundtland. p 101. 
3 C.E. 
The Foreign 
(New York: 
Morrison and A. Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: 
Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States. 
st Martin's Press). 1978. pp 289-299. 
4 Ibid, pp 289-290. 
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categories: intense/systemic, moderate/systemic, intense/ 
partial, and moderate/partial; the most significant aspect 
of these groupings being the difference ln tactics which 
are most likely to be ef ve when these states bargain 
with the large powers. 
Due to lack of space, only the partial linkage 
paradigm, the one considered to be the most relevant 
to this study, will be examined in detail at this point. 
Suffice to say that the intense/systemic linkage describes 
the situation of a small state which is merely a 'pawn' 
(see above) in the competition among the large powers -
for example Korea and Vietnam, while the moderate/systemic 
linkage is much_ the same, but with a lesser degree of 
involvement by the large powers in the small, e.g. in 
Thailand and Indone 1 a. 
In a purely partial linkage, the small state's 
relationship with a large power does not reflect the 
latter's relations with other large powers, but instead 
" .•. follows its own dynamic of history, 
geography, and ethnic or ideological 2 
affinities that pertain to the two states .. " 
Morrison and Suhrke believe that this type of linkage is 
rarely, if ever, found. 
However, it could be argued that the paradigm cannot 
be so easily dismissed, especially if it is applied to the 
relationship between two such relatively small states as 
Western Samoa and New Zealand. In a situation where the 
1 C.E. Morrison and A. Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: 
The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States. 
(New York: St Martin's Press). 1978. pp 290 and 292. 
2 Ibid, P 294. 
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'large power I is as insignificant on the international scene 
as is New Zealand, the potential for the existence of a 
partial linkage relationship would appear to be increased. 
The bargaining tactics of the small state in this 
situation are described as follows: 
II (it) .. can exploit sentiments of obligation 
or treaty commitments or CUltivate relation-
ships with specific interest groups within 
the larger power, but beyond this the small 
state must rely on what it can offer the 
larger party .... such as economic privileges, 
political support or military facilities." l 
In essence therefore, the partial linkage relation-
ship is basically independent of the internation situation, 
but highly dependent on the domestic situations in the two. 
countries concerned. It takes into account the interaction 
of the two countries over time, and in so doing, allows for 
the effect of colonialism and other historical events to be 
included in the analysis of the contemporary relationship. 
Although Western Samoa was never formally a colony 
of New Zealand, the close political control once exercised 
by the larger country in the smaller, justif a word or 
two on the theme neo-colonialism - the concept of economic 
and political dominance by a larger power remaining, even 
though formal political independence has been achieved by 
the small state. 
1 
"Colonial economic relationships have been 
turned into trade and investment patterns. 
University training has been provided for 
potential leaders. Nationals of the former 
C.E. Morrison and A. Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: 
The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States. 
(New York: St MartinIs Press). 1978. p 294. 
colonial power remain in the developing 
country to administer many of its private 
and government enterprises, (and), to 
formal diplomatic relations are added, in 
most cases, extensive economic assistance 
and propaganda activities. lll 
The degree to which New Zealand can be considered a 
colonial country will be discussed, as will the relevance 
of the neo-colonialist image to its presence in Western 
Samoa today. After over half a century of NZ being the 
administering authority in Western Samoa, it would be very 
strange indeed if some elements of the colonial type 
relationship had not evolved. 
However the very fact that New Zealand was not 
a colonial power in the true sense means that the large 
bodies of dependency and development theory are not really 
applicable to a study of its relationship with Western 
Samoa. There never was any significant migration of 
New Zealand colonists to the smaller territory, and the 
exploitative economic links which are the basis of these 
theories were never established. 
Overall however it can be seen that the state of 
Western Samoa itself, and its relationship with the larger 
country of New Zealand, can be 'tested' against irly 
applicable models: those of a small (and therefore almost 
inevitably developing) state, and that state in its 
relationship with a larger, developed country. In this 
way, as stated earl r, some attempt to assess the degree 
to which our particular case conforms to the conventional 
model can be made. 
1 O'Leary, p 336. 
17 
t 
o 2 4 6 e 10 
, t • 
miles 
~ ~ 
Hili 
Main Roods 
CultIvated VllloQ9 Lands 
Commercial Plantations 
Urban Area 
q 
~ 
Fig. 2.1 
WESTERN SAMOA 
.... 
0:: 
19 
CHAPTER TWO 
WESTERN SAMOA: THE SMALL STATE 
sical Characteristics 
Western Samoa is a small, if not minute, nation by 
any criteria. It has a total land area of 2,934 square 
kilometres l and at the t census, in 1976, had a 
population of 151,983. 2 There are two main islands, Upolu 
(1,100 km2 ) and Savai1i (1,820 km2 ) plus six small islets 
(see Figure 2.1). They are all of volcanic origin, with 
3 the most recent lava flows occurring early this century. 
The soils on both4 islands, derived from basaltic 
rocks, are mainly stony and leached, and the porosity of the 
lava means that sur water is lacking over large areas. 
Fifty-one percent of the land area has been classified as 
having soils of a "low-to-very-low natural fertility" or 
being of little use for agriculture because of poor drainage 
1 Atlas of the South Pacific. Government Printer, 
Wellington, New Zealand. 1978. p 27. 
2 Department of Statistics, Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin, 1st Quarter January-March 1979, Apia, Western 
Samoa. p 3. 
3 R. Gerard Ward, "The Environmental Context" in 
South Pacific Agricultural Survey 1979, Pacific Agriculture: 
Choices and Constraints, Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
Manila. Provisional Printing, July 1979. p 5. 
4 Only the two main islands will be discussed from 
now on. The others are too insignificant to warrant 
consideration. 
1 
or steep slopes. 
The upland soils are generally not used for 
cultivation, but lowland soils have long been used for 
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subsistence agriculture and have the potential for support-
ing a wide range of crops. The natural vegetation is thick 
tropical forest, although the shores are characterised by 
second growth woodland, coconut, pandanus and other trees, 
2 
and some areas of mangrove swamp. 
The climate is tropical with abundant rainfall, 
and the temperature ranges between 22 and 30 degrees Celsius 
all year round. There is a marked dry season from May to 
August and a wet season from December to March. Annual 
rainfall varies from over 5,000 rnrn in central Savai'i to 
under 2,500 rnrn in the north-west of both islands. 3 However 
the difference in precipitation from year to year is quite 
marked, and the unpredictability of drought periods makes 
4 
agricultural production marginal in many areas. 
on 
The smaller of the two main islands, Upolu, accounts 
for almost 72% of the population, with over 31,000 people 
(21% of the total) living in the capital, Apia. 5 
1 A.C. Wright, Soils and Land Use in Western Samoa, 
Soil Bulletin No. 22, Department of Scientffic and 
Industrial Research (DSIR), Wellington. 1963. p 73. 
2 Atlas of the South Pacific, p 27. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ward, p 10-11. 
5 Ibid. 
The population density averages 53 persons/km L , although 
most are in coastal areas, and with approximately 45% of 
the total population in North West Upolu 1 there are 
obviously some vast regional differences. The average 
natural increase in population between 1971 and 1976 was 
21 
3.02% per annum, but because of high migration figures the 
2 
net annual increase was only 0.7%. 
Over 90% of the population are full Samoans - making 
this the largest full-blooded Polynesian population in the 
3 
world, and only about 1% (Europeans, Chinese, other Pacific 
Islanders) have no Samoan ethnicity at all. 4 The Samoans do 
have their own language, but English is the language of 
commerce and is widely used in Apia and even in the 
villages. 5 
Samoans have largely kept their traditional way of 
life, especially in the more remote rural areas. The 
extended family unit (aiga) remains paramount, with the 
non-hereditary head (matai) responsible for directing the use 
of family lands and the conduct of other members of the aiga. 
1 Calculated from figures in the Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin, p 4. 
2 R. Gerard Ward and Epeli Hau'ofa "The Demographic and 
Dietary Contexts." ADB, South Pacific Agricultural Survey, 
1979, p 25. 
3 Anthony Haas, New Zealand and the South Pacific. 
A Guide to Economic Development in the Cook Islands, Fiji, 
Niue, Tonga and Western Samoa. (Wellington: Asia Pacific 
Research unit) 1977. p 103. 
4 Atlas of the South Pacific, p 27. 
5 Haas, p 103. 
22 
The church also, plays a dominant role in Samoan Ii 
The people are strongly Christian and have assimilated the 
(Western) religions into the pattern of village life. 1 
Land ownership is varied. About 80% of the total 
area is customary land held in trust by the matai for family 
groups, 10% is government-owned, 4% is freehold, and 4% is 
held by the Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation (WSTEC).2 
The economic implications of the high proportion of land 
he ld by family groups were described in the 1966 Census: 
"This insecurity of tenure which affects 
individual members of the family, including 
the 'matai' himself whom the family has 
selected and could depose, has been regarded 
... as one of the chief reasons for the lesser 
development and lower productivity of aiga 
enterprises as compared with ... other(s) ."3 
Traditionally there was no supreme leader and 
government was not centralised in Samoa. Today however,4 
the country has a Head of State, with functions similar to 
those of a constitutional monarch, and a Parliament. The 
latter is composed of a Speaker and forty-six other members 
who (with two exceptions) are elected from among the matai 
by the matai only. The other two are elected by the 
Individual Voters Roll - i.e. those over 21 years of age 
who do not hold Samoan status. 
1 Haas, p 103. 
2 Atlas of the South Pacific, p 27. 
3 Department of Economic Development, Second Five Year 
Development plan 1971-75, Apia, Western Samoa. December 
1970. p 5. 
4 All the political features mentioned here are from 
Haas, unless otherwise indicated. 
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There were no formally established political parties 
until April last year, when those opposed to the policies 
of the Prime Minister formed into a distinct opposition 
1 party, the United Human Rights Protection Party. Normally 
the Prime Minister is chosen by the members of Parliament, 
and he then selects his own Cabinet. The present Prime 
Minister, Tupuola Efi (grandson of O.F. Nelson 2 ) has been 
in power since early 1976 when he was voted in by 31 votes 
to 16. 3 His majority was substantially reduced in the 1979 
elections however, and his position as Prime Minister was 
further threatened by the first-ever court rulings on the 
traditional practice of 'bribery' at election times. 4 
Critics of Tupuola Efi say he has moved too fast in 
his four years of power for the more conservative forces in 
Western Samoa, and some accuse him of eroding fa'a Samoa, the 
5 Samoan way. He has earned these criticisms partly through 
his policy of encouraging the diversification of his 
country's international contacts through promoting aid, 
trade, investment, and tourist links with the outside 
world. 6 
1 New Zealand Herald, 6 June 1979. 
2 See Chapter Three. 
3 Katherine Findlay, "Keeping cool in a bit of a 
problem ll , The New Zealand Listener, 93 (Nov. 3, 1979 ) P 80. 
4 The Chief Justice forced four elected members to 
resign, when he "rather bravely decided where custom ended 
and bribery ... began.1I This means by-elections, and a new 
vote in Parliament for the position of Prime Minister. 
Ibid. 
5 Ibid, P 81. 
6 Haas, p 104. 
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Economy 
Many (especially foreign) observers would warmly 
commend Tupuola's attempts to build a more stable economic 
base for his country. The current position of the economy 
is somewhat adverse and, in common with many other (small, 
developing) countries whose liquidity is dependent on the 
export of primary produce, the balance of trade is heavily 
in its partners' favour. 
The economy is based on agriculture which employs 
over 60% of the labour force and generates more than 95% 
of export earnings. l And the bulk of the agricultural 
produce comes from the small, Samoan producers. In 1966 
an estimated 80% of copra, 50% of cocoa, and 60% of bananas 
was provided for the export market by this sector. 2 And in 
1977 the trend continued with the lone large plantation, 
WSTEC, supplying only 14% of the copra, 8% of the cocoa, 
and an incidental amount of bananas. 3 
Export income is derived almost entirely from copra 
and cocoa, with taro and timber making up most of the 
balance. Banana exports, which were a major item in the 
1950's and 1960's, are now insignificant - largely due to 
disease, and the 1966 hurricane which resulted in a drop of 
4 80% in the volume of bananas exported between 1965 and 1966 . 
. 1 'Western Samoa', Chapter 17 in ADB South Pacific 
Agricultural Survey 1979, p 369. 
2 I. Fairbairn, The National Income of Western Samoa 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press) 1973, p 5. , 
3 Calculated from figures in the Quarterly Statistical 
~ulletin, pp 27-29. 
4 Second Five Year Development Plan, Statistical 
Appendix, Table III. 
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This dependence on two items, which are both subject 
to severe fluctuations in domestic output, as well as in 
world prices (see Appendix A), is obviously a major problem 
for Western Samoa. For instance, if the market for these 
raw materials, or for their products, should suddenly, or 
even gradually diminish or disappear, the Samoan economy 
would be very seriously undermined. The fact that they are 
tree crops - i.e. grown on a relatively long-term basis -
aggravates the difficulty of switching to different crops. 
The same position applies to the pricing of this 
produce. High prices one year does not mean that the output 
can be significantly raised the following year, in order to 
capitalise on the good returns. And even if this were 
possible, there is absolutely no guarantee that the high 
prices would be retained from one year to the next (see 
Appendix A) . 
Similarly, Western Samoa also has no control over the 
prices it pays for its imports - these are determined by the 
larger, industrialised countries and/or world markets (in 
which small, South Pacific countries play no part). Imports 
consist largely of food (28% by value in 1977), manufactured 
goods (21%), and machinery (23%).1 The expenditure on the 
last item, which includes electrical and transport equipment, 
has risen dramatically over the last two years, as has the 
amount spent on petroleum products. However, the latter is 
due more to the greatly increased cost of the commodity, 
than to a greater volume imported. 
1 Department of Statistics, Annual statistical Abstract 
1977, Apia. 
The value of food imports too, has risen sharply, 
expanding at almost 20% annually over the last decade. l 
Much of this is due to the reduced domestic contribution 
(as opposed to substantially increased consumption) over 
recent years. With the expansion of the wage sector, 
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generated by capital inflow and foreign aid, and the inflow 
of cash remittances from overseas Samoan migrants,2 the 
incentives, or necessity, for the individual to produce his 
own (subsistence) food have been substantially reduced. 
Apart from the detrimental effect which these food 
imports have on the trade balance, this high dependency on 
foreign sources of food has led to a decline in the health 
and nutritional standards of the population. The ADB report 
argues that "many of the newer (Western) foods are 
nutritionally inferior to the more traditional foods,,3 
and because the former replace, rather than supplement, 
the latter, the general health of Samoans, as of many 
Pacific Islanders, is deteriorating. 
The drastic food shortage in Western Samoa in 1972 4 
epitomises the consequences of a poor country relying too 
heavily on food imports. Early in the year the worsening 
balance of payments situation led the government to impose 
import quotas, which resulted in a scarcity of imported food. 
1 ADB, South Pacific Agricultural Survey 1979, p 371. 
2 Sam L. Wai, IIFood Shortages in Western Samoa -
Towards a Solution" SPC Regional Conference on Population 
Problems: Urbanization, Resettlement and Rural Development. 
Suva, Fiji. 1-15th Dec. 1975. South Pacific Commission. p 5. 
3 ADB, P 37. 
4 Ibid, p. 41. 
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The low level of domestic food production was further 
reduced by a failure in the taro crop due to a dry spell. 
As a result of the subsequent food shortages the number of 
recorded births dropped by 30% and recorded deaths 
increased by 43%.1 
Some of the blame for the low level of agricultural 
production in Western Samoa must be directly attributable 
to the government itself. During the 1960s and early 70s 
the concentration of government expenditure on health, 
education and public works 2 meant that agricultural and 
general development programmes were largely non-existent. 
It was not until very recently that these two areas gained 
some priority in government planning. In 1979 expenditure' 
on development was 140% greater than in 1976, while the 
proportion of that money spent on agricultural and rural 
3 projects increased from 17 to 39 percent. 
Obviously it is still too soon to expect any 
significant increases in agricultural production either 
for export or for domestic consumption. But these 
improvements must come soon if Samoa is to establish a 
viable economy. If the people are to be actively employed, 
or even fed, the ambitious development plans put forward 
over the last decade or so must, in part anyway, be 
fulfilled. 
1 ADB, P 41. 
2 Second Five Year Development Plan, Statistical 
Appendix, Table XII, and Annual Statistical Abstract, 
1977, p 78. 
3 ADB, P 370. 
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However, as already shown, Western Samoa does face 
considerable problems in achieving its aims. The First 
Five Year Economic Development Programme pointed out the 
following factors impeding economic growth and development: l 
1) geographic isolation 
2) inefficient agriculture 
3) land control 
4) lack of capital 
5) lack of labour and entreprenurial ski 
6) over-emphas on government maintenance expenditure 
7) lack of diversification 
8) limited internal markets, and 
9) rapidly increasing population. 
From th list, one can see that Western Samoa 
shares the problems and limitations common to most small 
and/or developing states, as outlined in the discussion in 
the preceding chapter. Yet the factor of its geographic 
isolation, obvious from Figure 1, makes its range of 
options significantly narrower than those of the other 
states. For instance, its ability to become a tourist 
resort, or tax haven, is hampered by the lack of a nearby, 
relatively wealthy population, while the hundreds of square 
kilometres of sea around it make economic integration, or 
even interaction, with neighbouring states very. difficult. 
The possibility of establishing a modern, industrial 
economy in Western Samoa is therefore very limited, and the 
Second Five Year Development Plan (1971-75) implicitly 
1 d' Y D 1 t PI 3 f t t Secon Flve ear eve opmen an, P I 00 no e. 
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recognized this by strongly emphasizing the need for higher 
productivity and greater diversification in the agricultural 
sector. By 1974-75, when the current development plan was 
written, the pressing need for an increase in local 
employment opportunities and the worsening balance of 
payments situation, led the planners to actively promote 
the adoption of projects processing crops for export 
or providing import substitutes. l 
However a significant increase in the output of 
copra, cocoa and other crops is not so easily achieved. 
The ADB survey concluded that "plantation mode management 
is the key to agricultural growth in Western Samoa,,2 yet, 
as discussed earlier, the climatic and geomorphic atures 
of the country, not to mention the land tenure system, 
severely limit the expansion of large-scale production into 
the highland interior. It may be that part of the solution 
anyway, lies in an increase in agricultural production for 
local consumption - thereby saving valuable foreign exchange, 
creating more job opportunities for the rural inhabitants, 
and guaranteeing adequate food supplies. 3 
The establishment of processing and manufacturing 
industries also faces considerable problems. Apart from the 
difficulties associated with economies of scale and isolation 
from markets, the lack of domestic capital, technology, and 
1 Haas, p 108. 
2 ADB, P 374. 
3 One of the aims of the current plan emphasizes this: 
"over the next 15 to 20 years, Western Samoa aims to achieve 
self-suf ciency in meat, milk and egg production and in the 
fish catch." Haas, p 108. 
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modern equipment makes heavy dependence on foreign countries 
and compan s inevitable. And even though the industries 
may earn or save foreign exchange, the effects of this 
can be negated to a large extent by the importation of 
raw materials, machinery and other equipment, and by profit 
repatriation and a degree of salary repatriation. 
However, the creation of empZoyment opportuni ties has 
a very high priority in the Western Samoan government's 
policies, and is probably the major reason for its active 
promotion and encouragement of foreign investment. l The 
number employed in "agriculture, forestry and fisheries II 
fell by almost 3,000 (10.5%) between 1966 and 1976,2 and 
combined with the rapidly increasing population numbers, 
has resulted in a very high demand for urban-based and 
'modern' employment. It is not that there is not enough 
work available in the primary industries, rather that the 
attractions, real or imagined, of wage labour and urban 
living, in Apia or overseas, are too strong for most young 
Samoans to resist. 
This issue of employment and migration overseas leads 
us into another very important aspect of the characteris cs 
of small states - that of their political and diplomatic 
relations with other countries. The specific bilateral 
relationship between Western Samoa and New Zealand will be 
examined in later chapters, so only the general, and more 
international aspects of the smaller country's foreign 
1 For an outline of incentives, e.g. tax holidays, 
exemption from import and export duty, free repatriation of 
profits, see Haas, pp 110-111. 
2 R. Gerard Ward and Epili Haulofa, p 33. 
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policy will be discussed here. 
Foreign Policy 
It is obvious from the outline of Western Samoa's 
economic position given above that the country is heavily 
dependent on foreign interests for its economic survival -
and this dependency is especially evident when one examines 
the degree of influence Samoa has over its major trading 
partners. The sheer 'size' of these countries, especially 
in relation to Western Samoa, alone should suggest the 
insignificance of the small Pacific nation when the terms 
of trade are laid down. 
While New Zealand, the major trading partner, is not 
especially large on an international scale, some of the 
other countries are: the United States, West Germany, and 
Japan, with the Netherlands and Australia a bit lower in 
the hierarchy. And it is easy t6see that the few thousand 
dollars worth of goods which Western Samoa imports from, 
or exports to, these countries would be barely noticeable 
in their trading statistics. 
One could ask then, why Western Samoa does not trade 
with its small, South Pacific neighbours, where it would 
have some chance of achieving at least equal status in both 
trade and political negotiations? Apart from the historical 
economic t s which each of these small nations has 
1 individually developed with the larger powers, the 
similarity of the goods produced by the islands themselves 
1 See the next chapter for an account of the develop-
ment of Western Samoa's historical ties. 
has meant that inter-regional trade has been severely 
limited. 1 
However, as these small states have only recently 
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discovered, they do have many common interests and problems, 
and therefore can all greatly benefit from increased inter-
action. By acting in unison the disadvantage of their 
extremely small size, can be somewhat alleviated in their 
dealings with the larger countries of the world. Also, 
because of their relatively similar sizes, these states can 
achieve a more equal partnership with each other, than they 
ever could with larger countries. 
Rather ironically, the bas of regionalism in the 
South Pacific was laid by the colonial powers dominant 
there - in 1947 the United States, France, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand2 established 
the South Pacific Commission in order to develop some method 
of formal communication among their respective administra-
tions. The indigenous inhabitants of the islands were 
included only at the triennial South Pacific Conference 
(after 1967 held annually), or after they had achieved 
independence. Western Samoa, independent since January 1962, 
was the first island member, being admitted in October 1965. 
1 In 1977 and 1978 the only trade Western Samoa had 
'with its neighbours (apart from N.Z. and Australia) was: 
(average) 5% of its imports from Fiji, and 4% of its exports 
to American Samoa. Quarterly Statistical Bulletin 1st 
Quarter 1978, 1st Quarter 1979. 
2 The Netherlands withdrew in 1962 when they ceased to 
administer the former colony of Dutch New Guinea (now known 
as West Irian). South Pacific Commission, Regional 
Co-operation in the South Pacific, The SO":lth Pacific 
Commission: History, Aims and Activities, (Noumea, 1975) 
p 1. 
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By that year however, the spirit of independence and 
nationalism was rising rapidly among the small colonial 
states and they began to actively revolt against the 
subservient role assigned to them. As Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara, a leading island figure at this time, said in later 
years: 
'Paternalism was the keynote of the creation 
of the South Pacific Commission •... (It) went 
on benignly and benevolently, .... treating the 
South Pacific people as though they were 
children who were not capable of handling 
their own affairs."l 
The first manifestation of this new spirit was the formation 
of the Pacific Island Producers Association (PIPA) by 
Western Samoa, Fiji, Tonga and the Cook Islands in late 
1965. It was instituted to enable these island governments 
to provide a united front to the monopoly New Zealand banana 
market, which had previously played one country off against 
the other in order to lower the prices as much as possible. 
By working together the smaller countries were able to gain 
a significant degree of power in their relationship with 
New Zealand - even though the Western Samoans had to 
sacrifice some of t~eir profits in order to IIreach an 
overall beneficial price for all. 1I2 
In 1971, soon r Fiji gained its independence, 
its new Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, initiated a move to form 
a new regional organisation - the South Pacific Forum. 
1 Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, "Regional Co-operation in the 
South Pacific". New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 
24, No.5 (May 1974) p 20. 
2 Ibid, pp 25-26. 
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It included the members of PIPA, Australia and New Zealand 
(as members of the South Pacific community) and would admit 
the other smaller territories as they gained independence. 
Two years later the Forum established the South Pacific 
Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) as the main agency 
for flregional cooperative planning and implementation. 1I1 
In this way the small states of the South Pacific 
have been able to reduce, to a certain extent, some of the 
disadvantages their size characteristically gives them. 
For instance, the regionally-funded university (at Suva, 
Fiji) and Forum Shipping Line (based at Apia) are evidence 
of large-scale activities which could not be economically 
undertaken by an single island country. And, in the words' 
of Ratu Mara, the work of the Forum and SPEC flin 
co-ordinating the negotiations of Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga 
in their approach for association with the European Economic 
Community has been invaluable.,,2 
Therefore, the advantage to Western Samoa of a close 
association with its neighbours is evident in both the 
economic and political spheres. However, as is likely with 
most newly-independent countries, feelings of national pride 
and identity playa significant ro in the determination of 
foreign policy throughout the area, and consequently some-
what hinder the development of closer ties between the 
island countries. The insistence of many of the countries, on 
their own nationally-named airlines for instance, is a prime 
I W.T. Roy, "Regionalism in the Southwest Paci c. 
A New' Pattern of Islands." Paper given at the ANZASS 
49th Congress, January 1979. Auckland. p 6. 
2 Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, p 28. 
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example of economic realities being subordinated to 
. . f 1 patrl0tlc ervour. Regional co-operation therefore, 
while theoretically providing the "political (and economic) 
solution to smallness",2 is a solution not so easily reached. 
There have also been some suggestions of closer ties 
at a reduced scale. For instance, the possibility of a 
reunification with American Samoa has recently been 
advocated as a possible answer to some of Western Samoa's 
3 problems. 
"The people of Tutuila (American Samoa's main 
island) and Upolu speak the same language, they 
share the same culture, they are often related 
and it takes only fifteen minutes to fly from 
one island to the other."4 
5 However, as the author of the above statement is 
quick to point out, these similarities are basically 
irrelevant in the light of the economic differences between 
the two countries. The American Samoans, with a GNP per 
capita income of $US5380, are unlikely to give up their 
annual $US45 million grant (1977) from the united States 
for the dubious advantages of 'independence' through 
1 Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, pp 28-29; and Roy, p 11. 
2 Benedict, pp 5, 10. 
3 It was mentioned in passing by Tupuola Efi (New 
Zealand Herald, 30th Aug. 1978) as a possibility for the 
future. See also R.G. Ward, "The Consequences of Smallness 
in Polynesia", in Benedict (ed). p 95. 
4 The Press, 15th September 1978. 
5 Mike Field was editor of Savali, the official 
government newspaper, for two years, until he resigned in 
June 1979, because he was banned from printing a report of 
the court hearings related to political bribery charges. 
The Press, 5th June 1979; Interview 16th January 1980. 
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political union with Western Samoa (GNP per capita $US350).1 
They would rather retain their colonial ties with a large, 
powerful, and generous country, than join forces with their 
'independent', but small, poor, and insignificant, neighbour. 
Western Samoa, on the other hand, is keen to develop 
closer links with countries other than its former 
Administering Authority.2 While not wanting to break ties 
with New Zealand, the new Western Samoan Ie s, especially 
the Prime Minister, Tupuola Efi, are very conscious of the 
to widen their international contacts in both the 
economic and political arenas. They are determined to 
establish a "truly independent" identity their country, 
as Tupuola has stressed: 
" •• some countries look on Samoa as a ward of 
New Zealand .•. It is important that we try to 
demolish this image lest it compromises the 
position of our permanent representative (to 
the United Nations) ........ (We must) underline 
the point that Samoa is indeed independent and 
will make its decisions according to its own 
likes."3 . 
However, Western Samoa is also very much aware of the 
advantages it can derive from membership of larger, inter-
national bodies. In August 1970 for instance, Western Samoa 
formally became a member of the British Commonwealth. It 
had actually been treated as such since its independence 
in January 1962, but as the Prime Minister at the time 
1 The Press, 15th Sept. 1978. 
2 See e.g. New Zealand Herald, 3rd February 1977, and 
14th October 19 
3 Tupuola Efi's comments after his visit to the United 
Nations. Ii, 28th Oct. - 11th Nov. 1977. 
37 
(Tupua Tarnasese Lealofi) said, " ... it is not fitting that 
we should continue to enjoy the benefits without committing 
ourselves to full membership."l 
At the end of 1971 Western Samoa became the 120th 
member of the Interna tional Monetary Fund (IMF) with a quota 
of $2 million - bringing the grand total for the IMF to 
$28,807 million!2 During 1973 and 1974 the country became 
a member of the World Bank and joined the International 
Development Association and the International Finance 
. 3 Corporatlon. 
Formal relations with the People's Republic of China 
were established in November 1975. 4 The Chinese had been 
present in Samoan society since the beginning of the century, 
when the German colonial government had brought them in as 
indentured labourers, and so the early development of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries was not as 
anomalous as it might first appear. During the following 
year an agreement on economic and technical co-operation was 
signed, and the Chinese became the only country apart from 
New Zealand to have a foreign mission in Apia. S 
In 1976 also, soon after the elections, the new 
Prime Minister, Tupuola Efi, established diplomatic 
relations at the ambassadorial level with the Soviet 
1 Keesings Contemporary Archives, June 13th - 20th, 
1970. p 24036. 
2 Ibid, January 8th - 15th, 1972. p 25031. 
3 Ibid, November 10th - 16th, 1975. p 27436. 
4 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.25, No.11 
(November 1975) pp 37-38. 
S Christchurch Star, 1st April 1977. 
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Union. l In the following months, proposals for joint 
fishing ventures were aired, but the mere suggestion of 
Russian presence in any of the small South Pacific nations 
brought hosti reactions from many sides. One member of 
the Western Samoan Parliament, Mr Ulugia Nufoaiga, went so 
far as to say that if the Russians were allowed into the 
country, the rst thing they would do would be to "cut off 
all the ministers' heads.,,2 Other members were not quite so 
pessimistic (or optimistic), but many felt that "dealing 
with the Russians was a risky business."3 
However, the Prime Minister was confident that if his 
country did accept aid from the Soviet Union, and/or 
established a joint fishing venture with it, there was no 
danger of a Russian takeover of Western Samoa. In the first 
place the Communists were anti-God, and in a strongly 
Christian society such a doctrine would find few adherents; 
and secondly, he said, because, "as a people we are probably 
a bit more nationalis c than others", no other country 
4 
would be accepted as a 'protector' or 'motherland'. 
Some observers felt that the Samoans were considering 
the Soviet Union's 0 s only in order to put pressure on 
New Zealand, Austra and other Western powers to increase 
their aid commitments. S And in fact, Tupuola Efi warned NZ 
1- . Keeslngs Contemporary Archives, July 30th 1976. 
p 27868. 
2 New Zealand Herald, 7th August 1976. 
3 Ibid. 
4 New Zealand Herald, 3rd February 1977. 
S Christchurch Star, 3rd September 1976. 
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that "the consequences of not providing assistance would be 
to force Samoa to turn to the Russians for aid."l He was no 
doubt very conscious of the fact that similar Soviet 
overtures to Tonga had resulted in the NZ government almost 
immediately doubling its aid to that Pacific country.2 
Therefore it can be seen that even though Western 
Samoa is a very small country it does have some degree of 
strength and bargaining power in relation to other, larger 
countries under certain circumstances. While it may not 
have great strategic, economic or political importance in 
itself, it is a 'non-aligned' country of the South Pacific 
and as such, it will not be allowed by one great power to 
fall under the domination of another. 3 
In accordance with his policies of extending his 
country's international contacts, Tupuola Efi has looked 
much further than just China and Russia (apart from other 
Pacific countries) for new economic links and sources of 
aid. The traditional trading partners - West Germany, 
Japan, the United States and the Netherlands - have been 
encouraged to establish joint ventures in Western Samoa, 
and they have all offered various forms of aid in recent 
years. The Australians also, have established an embassy 
in Apia, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
has an office there. 4 
I New Zealand Herald, 7th August 1976. 
2 Irene Webley, "Tonga and the Soviet Union". 
~ew Zealand International Review, Vdl. 1, No.5 (Sept./Oct. 
1 976) pp 11 -1 3 . 
3 Roy, P 2. 
4 Interview with Western Samoa's Deputy High Commission-
er to N.Z., Mr T.F. Toleafoa. 17th January 1980. 
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However, the most significant event in Western 
Samoa's international relations since Tupuola's leadership 
began, was the admission of that country to the United 
Nations. On December 15th, 1976, "Samoa, as it wishes 
simply to be known in ordinary United Nations usage,,,l 
became the one-hundred and forty-seventh member of the 
world's largest and most influential inter-governmental 
organisation. And with the establishment of the rst 
Western Samoan diplomatic mission outside New Zealand 
the opportunities for d cussion and interaction with 
other nations increased dramatically. 
In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly 
in November 1977, Tupuola Efi spoke out against colonialism 
and neo-colonialism in the South Pacific and elsewhere. 2 
He said that the rule of a minority over a majority could 
not be tolerated, and for this reason his country regarded 
apartheid in South Africa as abhorrent. And he stressed 
that when Samoa talked about colonialism it was not just 
rhetoric, because opposition to colonialism was fundamental 
to his country's own experience. "Samoa achieved 
independence because the Samoan people fought for it,,,3 
he said, and recommended that the people of Zimbabwe and 
Namibia did the same. 
It is a continuation of this fight against colonialism 
and neo-colonialism - the dominance of one country by 
I New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 26, No.6 
(Oct. Dec. 1976) p 49. 
2 Socialist Action, 18th November 1977. 
3 Ibid. 
41 
another - that has inspired Tupuola Efi and his government 
to actively seek new and varied international contacts. By 
accepting aid - in the form of grants, technical assistance, 
trade preferences, or whatever - from many dif rent 
countries and organizations,l the Western Samoans have 
managed to avoid building a heavy aid dependency on anyone 
country. 
Yet, as will be discussed in a later chapter, 
the Western Samoan economy is still relatively dependent 
on its former Administering Authority, New Zealand, both 
for trading links (NZ has consistently supplied about 30% 
of Western Samoa's imports, and taken about 35% of its 
exports) and for employment opportunities for its rapidly 
expanding population. Initially the jobs were supplied 
only in New Zealand, but more recently the emphasis has 
shifted to providing jobs in Samoa itself, through the 
establishment of joint-venture industries there. 
Western Samoa - A 'Typical' Small Developing State? 
Firstly, however, an attempt will be made to develop 
some sort of assessment of Western Samoa itself - as an 
example of a small developing nation. By the criteria given 
in the first chapter, it would appear that our country fits 
the model very well. It has limited resources, a rapidly 
increasing population, and an economy highly dependent on 
foreign trade, investment and aid. Its geographical 
1 For example, 780.625 European Units of Accounts under 
the EEC Stabilization of Export Earnings Scheme; $US1.3 
million for a wood-fuel electricity generation scheme from 
UNDP, in addition to their allocation of $US5.5 million over 
the next five years. Savali, June 29th 1979. 
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isolation increases the significance of these factors 
somewhat, and it does limit the range of options open to 
western Samoa in comparison with those available to other 
small countries. 
In its international relations also, Western Samoa 
conforms very closely to the expected pattern. It is highly 
conscious of economic matters, actively wooing foreign 
investment and aid, although it is more careful than some l 
to select a wider range of sources in order to retain a 
greater degree of independence from them. This fiercely 
nationalistic attitude is evident throughout all of Western 
Samoa's dealings with other, usually larger, countries and 
reflects the people's profound belief in the superiority of 
2 fa'a Samoa, the Samoan way. 
As one would expect of a small state, Western Samoa 
devotes a significant proportion of its foreign policy 
resources to regional matte,rs, and to its diplomatic 
relations with one larger country - New Zealand. It is also 
a member of the British Commonwealth and the United Nations 
- large international bodies where the more 'insignificant' 
countries can support each other's proposals and have their 
opinions heard. 
Taking all of the above into consideration then, it 
would seem that Western Samoa is a 'typical' small develop-
1 For instance, Papua New Guinea, an "independent 
state" like Western Samoa, receives 99% of its aid from 
Australia (1976). Telo I.J. Fairbairn and Allan Bollard, 
South Pacific Economies: Statistical Summary. (Noumea, 
New Caledonia: South Pacific Commission). 1978. p 17. 
2 See New Zealand Herald, 3rd February 1977. This 
point was also stressed by Mike Field (who is married to a 
Samoan) in the personal interview. 
ing state. It has most of the characteristics which 
theorists expect it to have, and does not deviate 
signi cantly from the model. However, final judgement 
must be reserved until after the relationship between 
western Samoa (as a small state) and New Zealand (as a 
large state) has been studied - in history 
then on the contemporary scene. 
rst, and 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP 
A knowledge of the historical relationship between 
Western Samoa and New Zealand is crucial to an understanding 
of the current interaction and feelings between the two 
countries. The depth of hatred and bitterness which was 
at one time expressed against New Zealand by its 'colonial' 
population cannot be completely wiped out and forgotten in 
just a few decades. The feelings of guilt, and subsequent 
obligation, which have coloured New Zealand's attitude to 
the smaller country, contribute greatly to the relevance 
of Morrison and Suhrke's partial linkage paradigm to the 
contemporary relationship. 
Other incidents and factors of the pre-Independence 
period are i~portant as illustrations of actual manifest-
ations of some of the theories outlined in the first 
chapter. Freymond's contention for example, that strong 
feelings of nationalism, expressed in the form of active 
resistance, can greatly detract from the large power's 
influence over the smaller, is exemplified by the 
nationalist movement, the Mau, particularly in the nineteen 
twenties and thirties. Although New Zealand was never 
especially insistent on retaining its power in Western 
Samoa, the Mau certainly helped it to realise that the 
'political price' for remaining - in terms of its reputation 
as a democratic society for example - was too high to pay. 
45 
The role of the League of Nations and the united 
Nations respectively, in monitoring New Zealand's 
administration of the territory of Western Samoa, is 
important in relation to the contention that small states 
(even if not formally constituted as independent entities) 
prefer to work through large intergovernmental bodies than 
through a one-to-one situation with a larger state. The 
petitions which were presented to the two above-mentioned 
organisations by the people of Western Samoa are illustrative 
of the people's scepticism of "the effectiveness of New 
Zealand's good intentions when not prodded by an inter-
national body."l 
German Samoa 
In 1899 Samoa, or Navigator Islands as it was then 
known, was divided up, by Britain, Germany and the United 
states, into German Samoa (cpnsisting basically of two main 
islands - Upolu and Savai'i) and American Samoa (made up of 
Tutuila Island - including Pago Pago Harbour - and the 
isolated Manu'a group).2 This division has remained 
unaltered, and to a large extent, unquestioned, in the 
eighty years since its inception, and the different 
influences of New Zealand, the administering authority, 
and the United States, the coloni power, in the respective 
I F.H. Corner, "New Zealand and the South Pacific", in 
New Zealand's External Relations, (ed) T.e. Larkin. 
(Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration) . 
1962. pp 138-139. 
2 J.W. Davidson, Samoa Mo Samoa: The Emergence of the 
!ndependent State of western Samoa. (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press). 1967. P 67. 
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countries are clearly distinguishable today.l 
The fourteen-year rule of Western Samoa by the 
German administration appears to have been a period of 
prosperity and harmony.2 Plantations producing rubber and 
cocoa were 'established and the natives also, were encouraged 
to increase their output. Road-building and other public 
works were undertaken, and plans for the overall economic 
development of the country were formulated. The 
administrative policies too, appeared to be generally 
favourable despite some grumblings by the European settlers 
(mainly the British, French and Americans), concerning over-
government of themselves, and excessive leniency towards the 
t . 3 na lves. 
The native Samoans themselves were largely unaffected 
by the alien administration. The day-to-day conduct and 
decisions at the village level remained in the hands of the 
village fooo - the council oJ matai. Only the few matai 
who were chosen, and paid, by the Governor to 'represent' 
their people, were even nominally involved in policy 
formation at the nation level. There appeared to be 
little discontent among the natives with their alien rulers. 
However, some observers believe that the German 
mechanisms for Samoan administration, despite incorporating 
much of the structure of the existing native institutions, 
were successful only because of the short time period in 
1 The Press, 15th September 1978. 
2 Davidson, pp 76-78. 
3 Felix M. Keesing, 
Changing Life. (London: 
1934. pp 79-80. 
Modern Samoa: Its Government and 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd.) 
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which they operated. Keesing, for instance, believes that 
the Germans passed on to the New Zealand occupying forces 
not only a "full working system of dealing with native 
affairs", but also: 
"a heritage of frustrated ambition, under-
currents of intrigue, a considerable 
dislocation of political and ceremonial life, 
and mellowing memories of the good old day.s 
when ..• life was dictated by strength of arm 
and traditional preference rather than by the 
will of an alien invader."l 
Therefore, while no physical resistance was offered 
to the New Zealand forces which moved in and occupied 
German Samoa on August 29th, 1914,2 the beginnings of a 
nationalist movement, which was to plague the civil 
administration for forty years, lay just below the surface. 
As Boyd put it: liThe Samoan political situation ... 
resembled a dormant but not extinct volcano liable to erupt 
at the slightest pretext.,,3 
New Zealand Military Administration 
Even within the short period of military control 
from 1914 to 1920, the New Zealanders found little 
favour with either the indigenous or European popUlations. 
I Felix M. 
Changing Life. 
p 94. 
Keesing, Modern Samoa: Its Government and 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.) 1934. 
2 The German officials are rumoured to have been 
away pig-shooting. David C. Pitt and Cluny Macpherson, 
Emerging Pluralism: The Samoan Community in New Zealand. 
(Auckland: Longman Paul Ltd.) 1974. p 3. 
3 Mary Boyd, "The Record in Western Samoa to 1945", 
in Angus Ross (ed). New Zealand's Record in the Pacific 
Islands in the .. Twentieth Century. Auckland, Paul Longman 
Ltd for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. 
1969. p 123. 
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The repatriation of the majority of Chinese labourers 
(brought in by the Germans to work on the plantations) 
created acute difficulties for most planters, while the 
expropriation and liquidation of German-owned business 
firms inconvenienced many people besides the former owners. 1 
There was a general feeling of disruption. In the words of 
the first official report by the New Zealand administration 
in Western Samoa, IIEveryone suffered from a feeling of 
2 insecurity of tenure. 1I 
However it was the influenza epidemic of 1918, 
brought into Western Samoa by the passengers of a ship from 
Auckland, New Zealand, which produced the first great 
setback to Samoan confidence in New Zealand rule. An 
estimated 20% of the total population died in the epidemic,3 
and, to make it worse, many of the older chiefs and orators, 
and mos't of the trained native officials of the German 
period4 were included in the 7,542 dead. There were many 
who blamed the officers of the military administration for 
the tragedy, and a Royal Commission appointed by the New 
government in 1919 upheld these claims; it judged the 
epidemic to be a result of lack of adequate care on the part 
of the authorities, especially with regard to the 
1 Davidson, p 93. 
2 "Mandated Territory of Western Samoa (First Report of 
the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand on the 
Administration of) for the period from 1st May 1920 to 
31st March 1921", New Zealand House of Representatives 
Appendix to the Journals A-4, 1922, p 2 (Hereafter referred 
to as Report, AJHR, A-4, and relevant year). 
3 "Samoan Epidemic Commission (Report of), AJHR. 
H-31c,1919, p 4. 
4 
Keesing, pp 96-97. 
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quarantining of the ship.l 
Therefore the news, in 1920, that New Zealand was to 
be granted the League of Nations Mandate for the territory 
(it had been deemed too small and underdeveloped to exist 
alone) was not greeted with great enthusiasm by the Samoan 
people. Either Britain or the united States, the latter 
involving a reunion with American Samoa, was preferred as 
the Mandatory power by various groups within the country. 
As to New Zealand, 
"she had become too closely identified in Samoan 
minds with the petty tyrannies of wartime such 
as internment, deportation,' censorship, curfews 
and prohibition of trade with the enemy. 
Furthermore, the epidemic had left a legacy of 
deep-seated and bitter resentment over what was 
regarded as New Zealand mismanagement and 
carelessness." 2 
In New Zealand also, there was some apprehension 
concerning the acceptance of the mandate of Western Samoa. 
Some feared that the territory would become a burden to the 
New Zealand taxpayer, while others were more concerned with 
the ethics of Chinese indentured labour. 3 However, once the 
decision was made, Prime Minister Massey wanted as much 
control as possible over Samoa and would accept nothing less 
than a C class mandate. 4 This meant that the fullest powers 
of government short of direct annexation were vested in the 
mandatory (New Zealand) . 
1 Report of Samoan Epidemic Commission, pp 1-12. 
2 Boyd, 'p 123. 
3 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 185, 
17th October 1919. pp 507-509. 
4 Boyd, P 124. 




To make matters worse, the Administration and 
the New Zealand Government placed the full blame for the 
1 incident on the members of the Mau themselves, and 
decl the movement to be a 'seditious organization,.2 
A vigorous campaign to wipe out the Mau was undertaken, 
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with villages being raided and food. suppl s cut off in an 
attempt to capture the movement's followers. This resulted 
in a much deeper, and more widespread hatred of the foreign 
administration. And it was the hunt, as much as the 
shooting itself, which 
"added a new note of bitterness to the attitude 
of the Mau towards New Zealand rule and finally 
confirmed its dedication to the object of full 
self-government. "3 
The accession to power of the Labour Party in New 
Zealand in 1935 proved to be somewhat of a turning point in 
the relationship between the Samoan and New Zealand peoples. 
The new Prime Minister, Michael Joseph Savage, was quick to 
announce his government's concern about the situation in 
Samoa, and in June 1936, he sent his Minister of Lands, 
Frank Langstone, and several others, on a 'goodwill mission' 
to that country. During their month's stay the members of 
the New Zealand delegation discussed various proposals for 
reform with all sections of the Samoan community. Also, 
they announced the repeal of the Samoan Offenders Ordinance, 
1 "Coroner's Finding in the Inquest Respecting 
Fatalities in Western Samoa (28th December, 1929)". 
A-4B, 1930. pp 1 16. 
the 
AJHR, 
--
2 N.A. Rowe, Samoa Under the Sailing Gods. London: 
Putnam. 1930. P 279. 
3 Davidson, Samoa MoSamoa, p 138. 
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1 goal. However, a United Nations mission sent to Samoa 
to investigate the petition,2 endorsed the New Zealand 
government's stand and announced its approval of the plans 
3 
outlined by Walter Nash on 27th August 1947. 
These plans, for the politi advancement of 
Western Samoa, contained three major objectives: 4 
1) to establish Samoan custom and tradition as one of 
the foundations of the future politi structure; 
2) to confer a substantial measure of politi 
responsibility upon representatives of the 
Samoan people immediately; and 
3) to recognize and accept Samoan aspirations to 
complete self~government. 
So, while the Samoans were forced to accept the 
rejection of their petition, they were granted sign cant 
concessions towards their major goal of self-government. 
The changes become evident when the terms of the Trusteeship 
Agreement, which came into force in 1947, are compared to 
1 "Western Samoa 1947, Report to the Trusteeship 
Council by United Nations Mission to Western Samoa." 
AJHR, A-4B, pp 1-120. 
2 Not all of the residents, however, objected to a 
riod of transition before full self-government was granted. 
The European Citizens Committee, in their submission to the 
Nation~ Mission, requested that at least 10 years 
before self-government be granted, in order to allow 
for the full training of local people to fill high-
1 official positions. See Ibid, Annex VI, p 114. 
3 Ibid, "Annex VIII - Statement Made in the House 
of sentatives of New Zealand on 27 August, 1947, 
by Acting Prime Minister, the Right Hon. W. Nash, on 
Poli cal Advancement in Western Samoa. 1I 
4 Davidson, "The Transition to Independence ... ", p 24. 
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those of the Mandate. These changes were inherent in the 
new system of trusteeship as devised by the United Nations, 
rather than in the particular agreement signed by New 
Zealand. 
The Years of Trusteeship 1946-1961 
The first difference (exemplified in the above plans) 
is the greater stress laid upon the obligation of the 
administering authority "to promote the political development 
of the inhabitants of the trust territory."I 
The second significant difference was dicatated by 
the requirements of world security and peace: 
liTo this end the administering authority shall 
be entitled (1) to establish naval, military 
and air bases (and) ... (2) to station and 
employ armed forces in the territory."2 
The provisions the Trusteeship Agreement also changed the 
method of supervision of the territory - petitions by the 
residents could now be presented directly to the United 
Nations Trusteeship Council - "that is to say, petitions 
3 
need no longer be submitted through the Mandatory power", 
and secondly, the Council itself had the right of inspection 
through periodic visits to the trust territory. 
The implementation of measures directed towards the 
attainment of sel government greatly reduced the feeling of 
alienation between the government and 'the governed'. 
I "Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Western 
Samoa", Explanatory Note, AJHR A-2c, 1947. pp 6-10. 
2 Ibid. (See Appendix C for full text) . 
3 Ibid, Explanatory Note. 
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with the institution of the new Legislative Assembly, with 
an absolute Samoan majority, and power to legislate on most 
issues, the immediate demands of the Samoan leaders were 
largely satisfied. And although the High Commissioner 
(formerly the Administrator) retained the power of veto, 
in future " ... the government of Western Samoa would be able 
to carryon effectively only so long as it remained in 
sympathetic touch with the people's representatives. II1 
Over the next 14 years the Samoan people gradually 
gained complete control over their own government in all 
but the strictly formal sense. The Legislative Assembly 
established standing committees for finance, education, 
health, public works and broadcasting, and each of these 
worked in close association with the head of the relevant 
government department. 
There have however, been several criticisms of the 
New Zealand publio servioe in-its operations in Western 
2 Samoa: the generally low quality of civil servants working 
there, the lack of co-ordination between the administrations 
in Apia and Wellington, and the inabi ty of many New 
Zealanders to admit the validity of a culture different from 
their own,3 are some of the more important ones. But, the 
aspect of New Zealand's administration which probably 
contributed most to the misunderstandings and ill-feeling 
between the two peoples, was the policy of continued 
I Davidson, Samoa Mo Samoa, p 187. 
2 Davidson, liThe Transition to Independence ... ", p 25. 
3 For example, no Samoan language was taught in the 
schools, the girls wore gym-frocks, and the school holidays 
were December-Februarv (the rainy season). Ibid, p 142. 
rotation of officers seconded from New Zealand. 
II (While this had) certain advantages in 
stimulating energy and in breaking up 
the formation of an entrenched class of 
colonial administrators it ... (meant) 
that there never ... (was) a large 
enough group of trained administrators 
with an adequate knowledge of Samoan 
language and custom. "l 
It was within the public service also, that the 
policy of handing over control to the Samoans themselves 
was least successful. Although young Samoans had been 
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sent to New Zealand for education, at the expense of that 
country's government, they had been trained for school 
teaching or the technical trade and professions, rather 
than for administration. 2 In consequence, there was a 
critical shortage of trained and experienced Samoan 
administrative personnel; and so, in 1959, as independence 
rapidly approached, a "crash programme" of accelerated 
training for Samoan public servants was begun. 3 
But, on the whole, the transition from trusteeship 
to independence was accomplished very successfully by 
Western Samoa. The formal granting of independence on 
January 1st, 1962 was accompanied by no great upheaval 
in the political or administrative structures and personnel 
of the country. As the Hon. Fiame Mata'afa Mulinu'u II, 
the first Prime Minister of the new nation, said in 
December 1960: 
1 F.H. Corner, pp 141-142. 
2 Davidson, "The Transition to Independence ... ", p 26. 
3 Ibid. 
"Ours should be one of the smoothest of 
transitions from trusteeship to independence. 
Helped by our adual assumption of political 
responsibility over the past fourteen years, 
and by our friendly co-operation with New 
Zealand, we should experience little strain 
or difficulty when the moment for independence 
comes." 1 
Independence 
Seven months after independence was attained 
2 the newly-elected government of Western Samoa entered 
into a Treaty of Friendship with New Zealand, in which 
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the latter country undertook to retain a special interest 
in, and concern for, its former dependency. The treaty 
talked of the IIspecially intimate relationship II between 
the two countries and, in this context, the governments 
promised: 
" ... to consult each other on matters of 
mutual interest and concern (Article II) , ... 
(and) to ensure that ~itiiens of the other 
living within its territory (were) ... given 
equitable treatment and full legal protection 
and access to the Courts (Article III) ."3 
In addition, New Zealand promised to "consider sympathet-
ically requests from the Government of Western Samoa for 
technical, administrative and other assistance, and also 
undertook to "afford assistance (when requested) to the 
1 In an address to the fourth committee of the fifteeth 
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
Davidson, liThe Transition to Independence .. ", p 39. 
2 Elected by the matai only, as directed by a 
plebiscite taken just before Independence was granted. 
New 
3 "Treaty of 
Zealand and the 
A-12, 1962, P 
endship Between the Government of 
Government of Western Samoa," 
2. (See Appendix D for full text.) 
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Government of Western Samoa in the conduct of its inter-
national relations." 
This latter provision, although appearing to somewhat 
lessen the authenticity of Western Samoa's recently-attained 
independent status, was necessary for practical and economic 
reasons, and Keith Holyoake, the New Zealand Prime Minister, 
was quick to stress that 
" ... any activity undertaken by New Zealand on 
Western Samoa's behalf will be at the express 
request of that country and will in no way 
detract from Samoa's rights as an independent 
State." 1 
It is obvious therefore, that by 1962 New Zealand and 
Western Samoa were on very congenial terms. ~The speeches at 
the independence celebrations stress that although 
" ..• during the 40-odd years of New Zealand administration 
there had been some differences of opinions and errors 
experienced .. ",2 these hardships had actually "contributed 
to a deeper understanding,,3 between the two countries, and 
that out of this long association had "grown a relationship 
based upon friendship, mutual interest and deep affection.,,4 
Time and again, in press statements, in public 
addresses, and in parliamentary debates, the New Zealand 
1 NZPD, Vol .. 331, 2nd August 1962. pp 1184-5. 
2 His Highness Tupua Tamasese Mea'ole, "Independence 
Celebrations in Western Samoa", in External Affairs Review, 
Vol. XII, No.1, January 1962. p 
3 Hon. Mata'afa, Prime Minister of Western Samoa. 
Ibid. p 4. 
4 Rt. Hon. Mr Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister of 
New Zealand. Ibid. p 4. 
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politicians talked of the wonderful relationship which 
existed between the two countries, and they promised that 
their country would do everything possible to help the 
Samoans in the years ahead. The Minister of Island 
Territories, Mr F. Gotz, for instance, in moving the second 
reading of the Independent State of Western Samoa Bill on 
1st November 1961, had this to say: 
" ... I look forward .•. to the deve lopment of 
an even closer relationship between New Zealand 
and Western Samoa, a relationship which will be 
stronger than any legal bonds, ... founded on 
mutual respect, tolerance and understanding .... 
I am sure we shall exercise the greatest 
tolerance towards them (the Samoan people) ... 
and (that) we shall not fail them when their 
time of need comes." 1 
It is statements such as this, and the Treaty itself, 
based on the historical association and ties between the two 
countries, that lead us back to Morrison and Suhrke's partial 
linkage paradigm discuss in the first chapter. The 
authors outline how the relationship between a small and a 
large country, in this particular model, 1I ••• follows its 
own dynamic of history ... " and how the smaller state n •• can 
exploit sentiments of obligation or treaty commitments ... n2 
when it is bargaining with the more powerful partner. 
The applicability of this paradigm to the 
contemporary relationship between Western Samoa and 
New Zealand will be kept in mind in the next chapters 
as we study the patterns and policies related to trade, 
aid and migration between the two countries at the present 
time. 
1 NZPD, Vol. 329, 1st November 1961, p 3267. 
2 Morrison and Suhrke, p 294. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AID 
Before considering the amount and type of aid which 
western Samoa receives from New Zealand, this chapter will 
look at various definitions of the concept, and then ask 
the question "Who really benefits from aid?" This latter 
discussion will include both a differentiation between 
the several types of aid, and an examination the 
various motives which prompt donor countries to ve aid. 
The monetary assistance which Western Samoa received 
from New Zealand during its years as a mandated, and then a 
trust, territory will be considered next. Although this is 
not strictly aid in the sense that the recipient was 
virtually New Zealand territory, in the early years anyway, 
the amount of money and the way in which it was spent, make 
an interesting comparison with the post-Independence period. 
Also, it reveals something of the obligations felt by the 
power towards its smaller dependency_ 
However the real relevance of the theories pertaining 
to the relationship between small and large states cannot be 
asses un I a an examination of New Zealand's aid to 
the inde ndent state of Western Samoa has been made. The 
general pattern aid, or Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) as it is now called, will be studied, but specific 
case-stud s will also be used, in order to highlight 
certain 'good' and 'bad' points of New Zealand's 
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contemporary aid programme in Western Samoa. 
The administration of aid and factors determining 
its supply will be discussed next, expecially in relation 
to the problems both of these pose for small developing 
countries. This leads into an examination of the different 
sources of Western Samoa's aid, and finally to an overall 
assessment of the aid programme, specifically New Zealand's, 
in Western Samoa. 
finitions of 'Aid' 
The very word itself implies what is usually taken 
for granted: that 'aid' is given to 'help or promote,l 
the welfare of the people in the poorer countries. 
However, even if this were the sole reason for the 
distribution of aid (and the following discussion will 
argue otherwise), it does not necessarily follow that 
such objectives are always achieved. 
Debesh Bhattacharya defines foreign aid as 
" .. a transfer of real resources and skill from one source 
to another, which could not have taken place as a consequence 
of the normal operation of market forces .... 2 It is a 
relatively new concept in that it involves governments 
consciously attempting to direct the "traditional unorganised 
flows of money and skills,,3 into a pattern which ensures a 
1 Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 
2 Debesh Bhattacharya, "Foreign Aid and Underdevelop-
ment", Current Affairs Bulletin (1st October, 1973), P 19. 
3 R.H. Wade, IINew Zealand's External Aid Programmes", 
in New Zealand's External Relations, (ed) , T.C. Larkin, 
New-Zealand Institute of Public Administration. 
(London: Oxford University Press). 1962. p 79. 
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more equitable distribution of the world's resources. 
Another, more cynical, view of foreign aid sees it 
as n •• a process by which poor people in rich countries help 
rich people in poor coun S •• "l This argues, among other 
things, that the distribution of the benefits of aid wi thin 
the poorer country is heavily in favour of the urban, 
educ , politically- culate, elite groups. 
"Governments give aid to governments, and 
(because) the top priority of governments 
is to stay in power ... the diversion of aid 
in the interests of short-term political 
advantages is not uncommon."2 
consequently, aid projects which are highly (and quickly) 
visible, urbanized, and middle-class serving,3 often re ve 
greater priority from recipient governments than those which 
are more beneficial to the illiterate, largely non-voting 
masses. 
A third definition of- foreign d - "the net capital 
inflow which does not have to be repaid1l4 - is necessary if 
an accurate economic measurement of a donor country's aid 
contribution is to be made. Loans, even at very low interest 
rates and payable over great lengths of time, have to be 
1 P.T. Bauer, Dissent on Development: 
Debates in Development Economics. (London: 
and Nicolson). 1971. p 115. 
studies and 
Weidenfeld 
2 P.P. Finau et ala 
the South Paci c Forum. 
Co-operation. SPEC (76) 
More Effective Aid: A Report to 
South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
11. 1976. p 12. 
3 J. Stephen Hoadley, Aid, Politics, and Health 
Resource Distribution in an LLDC: New Zealand and Western 
~amoa. (Unpublished paper. Dept of Political studies, 
University of Auckland.) September 1979. 
4 Bhattacharya, p 19. 
repaid eventually, and, therefore, only their 'grant 
element,l can legitimately be included in total aid 
statistics. The net flow of capital between the two 
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countries (or country and international organisation), not 
just the flow from the richer to the poorer, is accurate 
measure of aid contributions. 
Who Really Benefits? 
The reasons for the donation of aid are about as 
varied as the definitions of it. Altruistic motives, based 
on moral and human an considerations, whi usually 
cited by donor governments as the primary inducement for 
the introduction of aid programmes, can be, in reality, 
incidental rather than paramount. Bhattacharya outlines 
the ways in which the distribution of different types of aid 
can be highly beneficial to the donor, rather than recipient, 
country, and also, how the 'aid' may actually be detrimental 
2 to the latter country. 
Contributions of food aid for instance, let the 
richer country dispose of its own excess production - so 
keeping dome c prices high, and at the same time providing 
it with a method for establishing long-term demand and 
markets in the Third World countries. The recipient country, 
on the other hand, may be significantly disadvantaged by 
1 From 
grant element 
which is es 
the resources 
Bhattacharya, 
point of view of the donor country, the 
is the real cost of providing the loan, 
by the benefit foregone by not putting 
to their best alternative use at home. 
pp 19-20. 
2 The rest of this section from Bhattacharya, pp 22-23. 
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provision of transient and spasmodic food aid. There is 
little incentive for the indigenous farmers to increase 
production when periodic inflows of staple foods keep 
the prices for these goods 10Wi and the government itself 
becomes complacent about agriculture if it knows that 
food aid will always be available in the event of domestic 
crop failure. 
Capital equipment aid also, has both advantages 
for the donor country and disadvantages for the recipient. 
Because the aid is tied1 to the purchase of equipment 
from the particular donor country, the manufacturers 
and industrialists in that country benefit from both the 
immediate sales, and the future demand for replacement parts, 
new models and so forth. The people of the recipient 
country on the other hand, may not be so fortunate. The 
tying of the aid means that it is unlikely that the cheapest 
and most suitable equipment is bought,2 while the equipment 
itself is often under-utilized due to the inability to adapt 
it to local conditions, the unskilled labour force and the 
lack of spare parts. 
Technical assistance - whether it be students of the 
poor countries studying in the advanced countries, or experts 
from the latter directing and advising the governments of 
the former - is also subject to limitations in its usefulness. 
1 See concluding chapter, p 145. 
2 For example, Western technology is evolved in 
conditions of labour scarcity and its central purpose is 
to save labour in relation to capital. This serves only 
to aggravate the gross under-utilisation of labour in the 
poor countries already. Bhattacharya, p 23. 
In the first case, the education or technical training 
received in the modern institutions may not be suitable 
or relevant to the needs of the poor countriesi and 
even if it is, there is no guarantee that the students 
wi return to impart this knowledge. And in the second 
situation, the unfamiliarity of the foreign experts 
with the local conditions and customs, severely curtails 
their ability to assess the 'best' use of resources, 
with the least disruption to native institutions and 
society. 
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Both of these forms of technical assistance provide 
the donor country with the opportunity to expose its 
views, techniques, institutions and ideologies to the 
nationals of the poor country. In an effort to attract 
the potential markets and loyalties of the developing 
world into the capitalist or socialist camps respectively, 
the Western and Communist powers have, in part, used aid 
programmes as an initial point of contact. 
However, it must be remembered here, that, in 
spite of the apparent condemnation in the above discussion 
of the self-interest of donor countries, it is not 
necessarily detrimental to the welfare of the recipient 
nations that such interests eXist.1 It is only when they 
become more important than the interests of the poorer 
partner in the aid relationship, that the dangers inherent 
in the system become a real threat. 
1 See the discussion in the concluding chapter. 
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Monetary Assistance in the Pre-Independence Period 
The initial focus of New Zealand involvement in "the 
interests of the Native population"l of Western Samoa was 
in the field of education. The Administration had set up 
two government schools in Apia and established a scholarship 
grant for Samoan boys to study at st Stephen's Maori College 
in Auckland,2 within a year of its takeover of power. 
However it soon realized that it could not undertake 
the whole responsibility for education, and so also made 
monetary grants to the various Missions which were already 
teaching in the country - the st, the London Missionary 
Society, had over 8000 children in its village schools by 
1920. 3 
By the end of the second financial year (31st March 
1922) New Zealand had contributed £16,000 to the Western 
Samoan Treasury, out of its total revenue of £135,569. 
The subsidy was 
"based on the additional cost. of the Medical 
and Educational Departments expended since the 
New Zealand Government accepted the Mandate, 
and on the cost in excess of revenue of the 
wireless station."4 
This exempli ed the distribution of NZ's subsidy for 
the next six years. The vast bulk of the expenditure was on 
the education and health services, with a small amount 
1 Report, AJHR, A-4, 1924. P 31. 
2 Report, AJHR, A-4A, 1922. pp 4-5. 
3 
"Visit of Par liamentary Party to Pacific Islands I 
February-March 1920", AJHR A-5. 1920. 
4 Report, AJHR, A-4A, 1922. p 17. 
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devoted to the Apia radio station. And in 1923-24 an extra 
£6,000 was granted in order to cover ttabnormal losses to 
roads and bridges caused by the severe and prolonged bad 
weather." 1 Of the approximate total of f 160,000 given by 
31st March 1928, about £61,000 (38%) had come from the 
Reparation Estates.2 
In 1928-29 the total subsidy more than doubled from 
the previous year (from £20,000 to £47,374).3 However this 
was arguably of no benefit to the Samoans as the extra money 
was spent on the Military Police. Over the next two years 
another £36,000 was 'expended for this purpose, taking up, 
in total, almost one quarter of all the grants given by 
New Zealand up to 31st March 1931. 4 
After that date Western Samoa received no more 
subsidies from its Administering Authority until 1946 -
the worldwide Depression of the thirties, followed by the 
onset of the Second World War being mostly responsible for 
this. In 1944 though, the New Zealand Prime Minister, 
Peter Fraser, visited Western Samoa in order to meet with 
the new nationalist leaders and to discuss their grievances 
with them. He explained that New Zealand was not prepared 
to concede to Samoan demands for immediate self-government 
as both education levels and living standards were not 
sufficient to allow this. 5 
1 Report AJHR, A-4, 1924. p 31. 
2 Report, AJHR, A-4, 1929. P 23. 
3 Ibid; and Report AJHR, A-4, 1928. 28. P 
4 Calculated from figures in Reports AJHR, A-4, 
1922-1931. 
5 Boyd, pp 186-187. 
However, in order to improve this situation, 
New Zealand would henceforth devote the surplus profits 
of the Reparation Estates, N.Z.R.E., to the furtherance 
of education (mainly through scholarships to N.Z. 
institutions), and to various other projects "for the 
benefit of the Samoan people."l Fraser was careful to 
emphasize that the Estates belonged to New Zealand as of 
right, and not to Samoa, but as his country did not want 
to receive any profits from its mandated territory, the 
scholarships would provide the ideal solution. 
Therefore, although official figures show a total 
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'New Zealand subsidy' of £528,881 to Western Samoa in the 
2 period from 1st April 1945 to 31st December 1956, the 
NZ government did not actually contribute any of its own 
internally-generated revenue to this amount. In fact, 
some of the 'subsidy' for education and broadcasting was 
even spent in New Zealand itself, without going through the 
3 Samoan Treasury at all. 
As with the subsidies of the 1920's and early '30s 
the bulk of the contributions was spent on education. 
Table 4.1 shows the exactd tribution of the decade's 
ub 'd' 4 s Sl les. 
1 
F.R.J. Davies, "The New Zealand Contribution 
to Education in the Pacific", in New Zealand's Record 
in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, (ed) 
Angus Ross (Auckland: Longman Paul Ltd) I 1969. P 294. 
2 Calculated from figures in Report, AJHR, A-4, 
1946-1956. (The financial year was changed to 
coincide with the calendar year in 1950.) 
3 Report, AJHR, A-4, 1950. P 28. 
4 Calculated from figures in Report, AJHR, A-4, 
1946-1956. 
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Table 4.1 Allocation of NZRE profits, 1945-1956. 
~o~t Percentage 
£ 
Education and Overseas scholarships 277,841 52 
Health 50,000 9 
Rhinoceros-beetle control 9,766 2 
Public works 167,510 32 
Broadcasting 23,764 5 
528,881 100% 
In 1957 the New Zealand Government transferred 
the assets of the NZRE to the Western Samoa Trust Estates 
Corporation (WSTEC) - a body especially constituted for 
this purpose.l Not only did this mean that the grants, 
or aid, now came direct from New Zealand, but also, the 
transfer itself was a significant step towards the Samoan's 
goal of sel government. 
In the following three years, the last before the 
achievement of Independence, the Administering Authority 
allocated another £141,000 of NZ funds to Western Samoa. 
While, as previously, the education vote took a significant 
proportion of this (30%), it no longer was the dominant 
feature, with half of the expenditure being devoted to 
agriculture. The rest was divided between funds for 
Government House (12%), the O.F. Nelson Memorial Library 
(4%), and the Prime Minister's Department (4%).2 
In total then, during the years that it was a 
mandated, and then a trusteeship, territory of New Zealand, 
Western Samoa received nearly one million pounds from its 
1 Davidson, Samoa Mo Samoa, p 259. 
2 Calculated from figures in Report, AJHR, A-4, 
1959 1961. 
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Administering Authority - including the grants from the 
NZRE. In the early years (1922-1931) the subsidy averaged 
about 14% of the territory's total annual income, but 
in its second phase, as the profits from the Reparation 
Estates, fluctuated between 1.2% (in 1946) and 9% (in 
1956) . In the final stages of New Zealand administration 
it remained low, with 4.6% in 1958 being the highest of 
the four years. l 
It can be seen therefore, that during the forty 
years of New Zealand rule in Western Samoa, the nancial 
assistance given by the Administering Authority to its 
'colony' was not a major feature determining the degree 
of the smaller state's dependency. It was the political 
and administrative control which the larger state exercised 
over the smal r, not the 'aid' it gave it, which set the 
tone for the relationship. (The aspect of trade will be 
examined in the next chapter.) 
And although the fact that Western Samoa was not 
an independent state at the time, precludes a discussion 
on the extent to which the pre-1962 aid relationship 
between the two countries conforms to our theories of 
small/large state relations, some general observations can 
be made. The influence of the Depression and the Second 
World War for instance, is obvious in the statistics of 
subsidies to Western Samoa in the 1930's and '40s. 
J. Calculated from figures in Report, AJHR, A-4, 
1922-1960. 
This ses the question of whether or not such 
international events can be seen in the light of a large 
country having its relationship with a small country 
determined by its own relationship with other large 
countries; or whether it is the domestic situation, e.g. 
bad economic conditions, within the larger country which 
is the determining factor. 
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The other aspect of NZ's pre-Independence expenditure 
in Western Samoa, that of the effectiveness or true b it 
of the grants to the 'average' Western Samoan, is relatively 
difficult to assess. The fact that much of the money was 
spent on education, especially at the primary level, would 
seem to suggest that the majority of the people benefited 
to some extent from the subsidies. And while this is 
basically true at the individual level, despite some 
concentration of services at Apia, the advancement of the 
nation as a whole, and s movement towards independence, 
was somewhat hindered by the lack of tertiary education 
and other advanced training among the senior Samoan public 
servants. 1 
The major assessment of the aid programme however, 
will not be undertaken until after the following examination 
of New Zealand's post-1962 aid to Western Samoa. As 
mentioned earlier, it is only after Western Samoa attained 
the status of a fully independent nation that its aid 
relationship with New Zealand can be seen in the light of 
small state -large state theories. And while the subsidies 
1 Davies, pp 297-299. 
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of the earlier years give some indication as to the degree 
of New Zealand spending in Western Samoa, the very fact that 
the former country was responsible (to the United Nations) 
for the latter, means that the incentives for giving grants 
were greatly increased. 
post-Independence Aid to Western Samoa 
On the eve of Western Samoa's independence, the 
New Zealand Government outlined a programme of educational 
and administrative assistance to its former trust territory. 
A grant of $800,000 was given for education expenditure, to 
be spent over the following five years, and a further 
$90,000 p.a. was pledged for administrative support -, mainiy 
in the form of a subsidy for New Zealand personnel. In its 
first year of independence (1961/62) Western Samoa received 
a total of $340,000 1 from New Zealand's bilateral aid 
allocations, but this figure dropped to $300,000 for the 
1962/63 financial year.2 
The allocation continued to fall for the next three 
years until it reached $206,000 in 1965/66. 3 The emphasis 
on education was maintained but, as promised, financial 
support for administrative and technical services also 
continued. The 1966/67 financial year recorded a 
significant increase in New Zealand's aid to its former 
trust teriitory - due to a $150,000 Plantation Restoration 
Loan "to help Western Samoa overcome the depredations of the 
1 NZPD, Vol. 332, P 2089, 16th October 1962. 
2 
NZPD, Vol. 335, P 1011, 1st August 1963. 
3 New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1967,.p 41. 
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hurricane. III And NZ was also instrumental in persuading 
the united Nations to allocate $388,000 -of its funds for 
2 
same cause. the 
In July 1964 the first large-scale aid to Samoa for 
economic rather than educational or administrative purposes 
was given in the form of a $2 million loan for harbour 
development at Apia and Asau (in Savai'i).3 Although the 
loan was actually raised on the New Zealand public market, 
and therefore not 'of cial' aid in the accepted sense, 
it was guaranteed by the NZ government - making the terms 
much more generous than they would have otherwise been. 4 
other loans, direct from the NZ government, for such things 
as the construction of Parliament House, and dredging of 
the Asau Channel, were included in later aid figures, 
5 inflating these figures beyond their 'true' value. 
As Figure 4.1 shows, official development assistance, 
ODA, or aid, to Western Samoa from New Zealand, has risen 
dramatically, despite some fairly severe fluctuations, since 
the time of independence celebrations. After the se in 
1966/67 to help overcome the e cts of the hurricane, the 
I 
2 
3 
NZPD, Vol. 352, p 2145, 8th August 1967. 
Ibid. 
G.J. Thompson, New Zealand's International Aid 
(Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs). 1967. pp 27-28. 
4 The interest rate was 5~%, and the principal did 
not have to be repaid until 1974 (40%) and 1984. 
Department of Economic Development, The Development of 
Western Samoa, 1971-1972. Apia, Western Samoa. p 116. 
5 For example, the $400,000 of 'aid' given in 1970/71 
included a $150,000 loan, NZPD, Vol. 371, p 281, 10th March 
1971. 
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Source: Constructed from statistics in New Zealand Official 
Yearbooks, 1965-1979. 
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Fig. 4.1 New Zealand Official Development Assistance (aDA) 
1962-1980. 
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levels dropped again for the rest of the sixties - to 
coincide with the economic recession in New Zealand. The 
later phenomenal increases occurred during the brief term 
of office of the Labour Government (1972-1975), and after 
the (National) government's decision in 1976/77 to "attach 
priority to sustaining significant growth in absolute terms 
in New Zealand bilateral aid to the countries of the South 
Paci c," 1 despite a no-growth policy of overall ODA levels, 
due to a worsening of the economic situation in New Zealand. 
Although detailed accounts of recent aid allocations 
are not available,2 the 1972/73 report of ODA figures,3 and 
various other reports of more recent projects, enable us to 
build up a relatively accurate picture of the contemporary 
focus of New Zealand aid in Western Samoa. The most obvious 
change from the early years is the present concentration of· 
expenditure on developmental and agricultural programmes. 
Short-term consumption has given way, to some exten t, to a 
more future-orientated plan of aid-money spending. 
In 1972/73 for instance, almost half of the $861,073 
grant from New Zealand was spent on a ferry terminal, with 
a harbour development study, and a road survey taking up 
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report AJHR A-1, 1977. 
p 37. The percentage of bilateral aid whi s allocated 
to the South Paci c has steadily risen from 43% in 1970/71 
-to over 66% in 1979/80. 
2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is unwilling or 
unable to provide the information in the detail required 
for a comprehensive examination of NZ's aid performance 
in Western Samoa. 
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Flow of Resources 
from New Zealand to Developing Countnes'19 72/73. 
Wellington. Feb. 1974, pp 95. 
1 
another $85,000. In a country which is as dependent on 
shipping as Western Samoa is, any expenditure on harbour 
facilities is an investment in its own economic survival. 
Agricultural production however, the over-riding basis of 
the economy, did not receive priority from New Zealand 
until a year or so later. 
The allocation of aid in 1972/73, by its type, 
is shown in Table 4.2,2 with comparative figures for the 
South Pacific's share, and the total amount of aid. 
TABLE 4.2 Type of aid on which NZ ODA was spent (by percentage) • 
Technical Cooperation 
Students 
Trainees 
Exports 
Consultants 
General Development 
Food Aid 
Relief A.:j..d 
Loans (Net) 
New Zealand Aid to: 
Western Samoa South Pacific 
(%) (%) 
16 4 
4 1 
2 2 
10 2 
68 62 
3 
6 
20 
Total 
(%) 
8 
3 
6 
10 
49 
4 
5 
15 
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This shows that none of New Zealand's aid to Western Samoa 
in that year was in the form of loans (that is, needing to 
be repaid), and that a considerably higher than average 
proportion of aid was allocated to technical assistance -
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Flow of Resources 
from New Zealand to Developing Countries 1972/73. 
Wellington. Feb. 1974. p 60. 
2 Ibid. p 52. 
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another indication of a future-oriented plan. 
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 1974 Report 
the importance of development at- the 'grass roots' level was 
emphasized for the first time. 
"Of the programmes endorsed by partner 
governments, New Zealand favours those which 
make a direct impact on social and economic 
development at the village and rural level ... 
to help raise the living standards of the 1 
ordinary peop and provide jobs for them." 
And this theme was continued in the 1975 report, 
although with a stronger emphasis on providing for the 
long-term self-help development of the economy: 
"Transfer of technology, especially in 
agriculture, lies at the heart of the 
New Zealand assistance programme. 
Priority is placed on providing ski s 
which help developing countries to become 
more self sufficient, create jobs, and 
improve living standards."2 
It is obvious therefore that New Z and aid 
administrators are well aware of the dangers of concentrating 
their efforts on large, infrastructural, urban-based projects 
alone. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the 
majority of a developing country's people can all too easily 
be ignored in aid programmes, and even have their conditions 
worsened by them. However, being aware of a potential 
situation, and successfully avoiding, or attaining, it, 
are not necessarily the same thing, as some of the following 
discussion of selected NZ aid projects in Western Samoa will 
show. 
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report AJHR, A-1, 1974. 
p 41. 
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report AJHR, A-1, 1975. 
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One project which is somewhat limited in its extent, 
geographically anyway, is the current upgrading of the ~ater 
supplies and sewage systems. 1 Although some of the work has 
been done on the rural water supply - providing pipes, pumps 
and building materials for village systems this has been 
limited to western Upolu. And the bulk of the expenditure 
has been concentrated on Apia alone. However this can be 
justified to a certain degree by the fact that the rapidly-
increasing urban population had made the town's water supply 
"inadequate to the point of being a potential public health 
2 hazard," and, in total, because of the concentration 
of population in western Upolu, about half the country's 
citizens are benefiting from the scheme. 
One of the largest development projects in New 
Zealand's current aid expenditure (1978-79) is based at 
Asau, a village in the remote north-west of Savai'i.3 Here, 
NZ officials and experts, are engaged in an extensive 
reafforestation programme, in order to guarantee the 
continuation of Western Samoa's timber industry: 
" ... the objective of the project is to provide 
timber to sust n a viable industry, increase 
export revenue for Samoa, reduce the country's 
dependence on timber imports and provide jobs 
for rural Samoans."4 
1 Development: New Zealand's Co-operation with 
Developing Countries (Wellington: External Aid Division, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Vol. 2, No.2, June 1979. 
p 7. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Development, Vol. 1, No.2, July 1978, pp 4-5. 
4 Ibid, P 5. 
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To this end, fast growing general-purpose timber -
Eucalyptus, for example - has been widely introduced, and 
nurseries have been established for the rapid and efficient 
growth of lings. Complex negotiations with matai have 
ensured the lease of a much-needed 2,400 hectares of 
customary land, and up to 150 native people have been 
engaged on the project at anyone time. In this way 
then, the practical application of New Zealand aid in this 
instance, has benefited the Samoans at both the local and 
national levels. 
The latest available sector summary of bilateral 
aid (1975-76)1 shows that the health budget took the 
largest single proportion of New Zealand aid to Western 
Samoa (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 Bilateral aid: Sector summary 1975-76 (Planned). 
Amount 
Sector ( $000) Percentage 
Health 765 29 
Public Utilities and Works 450 17 
Agriculture 358 14 
Communications 212 8 
Transport 160 6.6 
Education 100* 4 
Forestry 50 2 
Power 50 2 
Fisheries 10 0.4 
Other, and 'To be identified' 445 17 
Total 2,600 100 
.-
* Most of the scholarship/study awards are allocated from a 
separate training item of the NZ Aid Vote • 
... _---_._-----------------
1 NZPD, Vol. 399, p 2434, 25th June 1976. 
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However, the year chosen is somewhat anomalous in that 
it includes some of the expenses of New Zealand's largest 
project in the South Pacific (second only to the Indonesian 
geothermal power project in its entire aid programme) - the 
new Apia National Hospital. l 
Formal plans for the hospitaZ were drawn up by a 
western Samoan cabinet committee in December 1970, but these 
were vigorously opposed by a New Zealand Department of 
Health survey team on the grounds of excessive cost, 
inappropriate design and aesthetics, and excess capacity 
relative to rural needs. 2 A compromise plan was then drawn 
up, but was later further reduced when the deficiencies of 
the overall scheme became obvious. 
The major problem is not so much the internal design 
of the hospital itself, although this is subject to much 
criticism,3 but rather the inequalities it creates in the 
national distribution of health services. A study of the 
following figures reveals the disparities between the amount 
of resources the hospital absorbs and the number of patients 
it treats. In 1977, 69% of the internal health budget and 
75% of New Zealand's bilateral health aid were devoted to 
the hospital, while 80% of the country's doctors worked 
there. Yet only 60% of in-patients and 40% of out-patients 
used the services provided by the hospital. 4 
1 Hoadley, Aid Poli cs and Health Resource 
Distribution in an LLDC, p 10. 
2 Ibid. 
3 For example, insufficient venti tion and natural 
lighting, corridors overlong, unnecessary elaborateness. 
Ibid, pp 13, 14. 
There are fourteen district hospitals and four 
1 
'health sub-centres' scattered around the country, but 
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their standards are rapidly decreasing. From 1970 to 1977 
the number of doctors actually on duty in these hospitals 
fell by 50%, while their expenditure, on a per patient 
basis, fell to a mere 15% of that of the Apia hospital. 2 
And, just as importantly, the loss of prestige to, and 
morale in, these local health services led to the 'voluntary' 
migration of rural patients to Apia. 3 
New Zealand health officials and aid advisers have 
been severely criticised for their role in the development 
of the high level of concentration in health resources. A 
western Samoan Commission of Inquiry4 concluded that the 
undue emphasis placed on the national hospital - and its 
"lavish" nature - had directly contributed to the 
deterioration of health services for the majority of people 
who lived outside Apia. S And it excused the local medical 
officers on the grounds of inexperience, and a natural 
desire to work in a modern, fully-equipped hospital. 
Stephen Hoadley, a member of the New Zealand 
government's Advisory Committee on External Aid and 
Development, was not so forgiving of the local Samoan 
1 Hoadley, Aid, Politics and Health Resource 
Distribution in an LLDC, p 21. 
2 Ibid, pp 20-21. 
3 Ibid, P 23. 
4 Including the Chief Justice of the Cook Islands, 
a member of the Auckland Hospital Board, and the medical 
superintendent of the Rotorua Public Hospital. 
New Zealand Herald, June 20th 1978. 
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officials. l His study of the planning stages of the project 
revealed that it was the New Zealanders who favoured "modest 
decentralization" of the health services, and that it was 
the Samoans themselves who "plumped for an elaborate central 
hospital.,,2 The former only agreed to the present plan when 
the Samoans pledged to use their own resources to upgrade 
rural health services to balance the Apia Hospital 
redevelopment, and because it New Zealand government 
policy to let the aid recipients, as far as possible, spend 
their grants in the way they themselves choose. 
In essence then, although the Apia National Hospital 
can be seen to exemplify many of the detrimental aspects of 
aid allocation, especially those related to our second 
definition of aid - "a process by which poor people in rich 
countries help rich people in poor countries" - this is 
largely due to the Samoans' own cision-making process. 
As Hoadley says, the series of apparently rational 
individual decisions - such as accepting a large capital 
grant at no initial cost and only modest recurrent costs 
(as they calculated them), and in order to obtain a modern, 
prestigious medical facility - when taken collectively, 
produce a result which is somewhat irrational. 3 
1 Hoadley, Aid Politics and Health Resource 
Distribution in an LLDC. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, pp 25-26. 
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Administration of Aid 
It is cases such as this which illustrate how 
important it is to take a long-term, nationwide view when 
any individual projects or plans are being considered. 
western Samoa received over US$18 million in foreign soft-
term loans and project aid from many sources, both bilateral 
and multilateral, in 1979. 1 The degree of overall planning 
and administration which is necessary to co-ordinate and 
complement the many hundreds of individual projects within 
this allocation is immense, as can be imagined. 
And it is in the small developing countries, where 
both economic and human resources are more limited, that 
this problem of the aid programme is most difficult 'to 
overcome. The small size of the civil services in the 
South Pacific nations ~ which cannot maintain the wide range 
of specialist roles and the division of labour generally 
found in large societies, coupled with the rapid increase 
in the number of aid agencies involved in the region, has 
placed a large burden on the individual bureaucracies there. 
"The need for each (aid) agency to maintain 
contact with key areas of government, the 
statistical information requests from such 
agencies and the fact that many agencies have 
their own specialized and unique implementation 
or accounting procedures, has meant a great 
increase in the workload of the small number of 
officials concerned in each country. In some 
countries, a major cost of external aid is the 
constraint which such involvement places on the 
productivity of important sections of the civil 
service. "2 
1 "western Samoa", in ADB South Pacific Agricultural 
Survey 1979, p 370. 
2 "Aid in Development" in Ibid, p 427. 
The Rt. Hon. B.E. Talboys, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, discussed this problem in a speech to Parliament 
in September 1978. 1 He stressed that the way to a better 
aid relationship with the Pacific Islands lay not in 
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stricter demands on the recipient country - in the form of 
requests for information (in order to more accurately account 
for NZ government funds) - but in a greater fZexibility of 
approach. One option he said he was considering was 
programme, as opposed to project, aid. That is 
" •.• allocating funds to a particular sector 
of an Island economy, say, agricultural 
production, and leaving the country to 
determine for itself the precise ways in 
which the funds would be spent." 2 
The end of a separate aid training programme, 
operated on the basis of a number of study/training awards 
offered annually from a consolidated training item of the 
Aid Vote, 3 marked a step in the direction.of this 'greater 
flexibility of approach'. By now including this money in 
the total bilateral aid grant, New Zealand is giving the 
recipient countries a much greater say ln determining the 
amount of aid to be allocated to training purposes in 
relation to capital aid projects. 
However, in Western Samoa's case, there is much 
dissatisfaction with this new system. The government was 
originally told that its budget would increase from 
1 NZPD, Vol. 413, P 2761, 7th September 1978. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report AJHR, A-1, 
1979. p 32. 
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$NZ3.63 million to $NZ4.34 million in 1978/79 to cover the 
cost of the training and scholarship schemes; but when the 
actual amount was given, it turned out to be less than 
$ 4 0 . 11' 1 NZ. ml lon. As virtually all of aid'money had 
already been allocated by this time - to the National and 
District Hospitals, and forestry project (discuss 
earlier) for example, it meant, in essence, that the amount 
which could be devoted to education was reduced by almost 
one half. An article in the government newspaper summed up 
the Samoans' feelings: 
"In the final analysis the matter is one of 
good faith. If the New Zealand authorities 
wish to effect economies in the aid program, 
this will readily be respected and the fullest 
co-operation extended. Such a wish should not 
however be closed in the dUbious language of 
f xibility, especially where the futures of 2 
many of the country's young people are involved." 
What Determines the Supply of Aid? 
This example highly illustrative of another of 
the small developing countries' major aid problems -
guaranteed supplies. In these small-scale economies, the 
injection of aid funds is vitally important to the country's 
development programmes: in Western Samoa in 1979 an 
estimated WS$18 million of foreign soft-term loans and 
grant money, compared to a mere WS$1.5 million of domestic 
savings, was invested in the development projects. 3 If the 
1 Savali, 7th December 1979. 
2 Ibid. 
3 
"Western Samoa", A.D.B., p 370. 
90 
supplies of this external revenue are not committed on a 
long-term basis, the recipient countries cannot make the 
most efficient and rational use of their financial resources. 
As Hoadley says, it is wrong that 
" ... aid should be contingent on the short-term 
budgetary and balance of payments situation of 
donor countries rather than on the persisting 
needs of recipient countries." l 
And it is with this thought that we return to the problem 
posed earlier, in relation to Morrison and Suhrke' s partial 
linkage paradigm, of whether the worsening economic 
conditions in New Zealand, leading to the reduction in its 
overall programme, are a domestic or international 
phenomenon. Some would argue that the inflation, 
unemployment and other financial crises are the result 
of internal government mismanagement of the economy, while 
others would attribute these factors to the world-wide 
recession, oil price rises and so on. 
Obviously both arguments have very valid points. 
A country such as New Zealand, which is almost totally 
dependent on its overseas trade, can never act in isolation 
of its international environment. Its whole economy is 
dependent on the markets and supplies of its foreign trading 
partners, and in this sense, it can be said to have 
virtually no domestic control of its circumstances at all. 
However, this is true, to some extent, of almost all 
1 J. Stephen Hoadley, "Aid and National Security: 
The Politics of New Zealand's Development Assistance" in 
New Zealand, Foreign Policy and Defence, (eds) Erik Olssen 
and Bill Webb. (Dunedin: Dept of University Extension, 
University of Otago). 1977. p 149. 
9 1 
countries of the world - even the U.S.A. has had to accept 
the Arabs' oil prices - and author believes that it is 
not the intention of Morrison and Suhrke to make economic 
conditions a primary criterion their paradigm. 
It is mainly the politi re ionship between 
the larger states (of which aid, and investment is 
a component part) which does, or not, affect the 
individual larger state's relations with a smaller state. 
And, in essence, it is the extent to which New Zealand gives 
aid to Western Samoa because of his cal, geographical 
or ideological ties, or because "of sentiments of 
obligation or treaty commitments",l rather than because of 
its own relationship with Australia or tain for instance, 
that will mark the relationship as ally or systematic-
ly linked. 
If the other larger countries are involved at all, 
it is because of their relationship with the smaner state, 
not the larger one. 
Other Aid to Western Samoa 
are many nations and international 
organiz ons other than New Zealand, involved in 
granting aid to Western Samoa. 2 For instance, the 
United Nons Development Programme allocated US$1.3 million 
for a wood- 1 electricity generation scheme for Savai'i in 
1979; the EEC guaranteed Western Samoa an export earn 
1 See dl'SCussl'on of M' d S h k ' d' 15 orrlson an u res para 19m, p . 
2 See Appendix E. 
of not less than the average of the four preceding years' 
income for cocoa, under its Stabilization of Export 
Earnings Scheme, STABEX;l and the World Bank, in 1975, 
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granted a soft loan of US$4.4 million for the construction 
of roads and bridges in south-eastern Upolu, in order to 
stimulate the production of cash crops through better access 
. 2 to Apla. 
And other nations too, are giving bilateial aid 
to Western Samoa. In 1976, Australian aDA to the country 
was 24% higher than New Zealand's contribution,3 and an 
aid-seeking mission led by the Head of State, Malietoa 
Tanumafili, visited Japan, Korea, China, West Germany 
and Britain in the same year. 4 Since then, there has 
been a "great increase in aid from countries other than 
5 New Zealand." The possibility of the Russians giving 
aid has received a great deal of publicity, mainly due 
to adverse reactions in New Zealand and other Western 
countries concerning the strategic implications of 
Russian presence in the South pacific. 6 
The extent to which the Samoans, or other Pacific 
1 Savali, 29th June 1979. 
2 World Bank, Annual Report 1975. It has not made 
any more grants to Western Samoa since then. 
3 'Calculated from figures in Te'o I.J. Fairbairn 
and Allan Bollard, p 17. 
4 Christchurch Star, 3rd September 1976. 
5 Interview with the Western Samoan Deputy High 
Commissioner to New Zealand, Mr T.F. Toleafoa, 17th 
January 1980. 
6 Christchurch Star, 3rd September 1976. 
New Zealand Herald, 3rd February 1~77. 
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Islanders, are really considering the acceptance of Soviet 
aid - and the accompanying Russian fishing base, or ~ust 
using it "to put pressure on New Zealand to increase its 
aid commitments", 1 has been seriously questioned. However 
Western Samoa is not short of aid donors. 2 One of the 
advantages of being a small country is that a relatively 
minor injection of capital and technical assistance will 
produce a highly-visible project from which the entire 
nation can benefit - so, easily enhancing the donor 
country's image. Therefore, the Samoans do not have to beg, 
or 'blackmail' their former Administering Authority, for 
3 d money today. As the Prime Minister of Western Samoa, 
Tupuola Efi, says IIWe can now be more selective in whom 
we accept aid from and for what purposes they are allocated 
for (sic). ,,4 
An Assessment 
For some time now, New Zealand has recognised its 
special responsibility to help the peoples of the South 
Pacific region. The historical, geographical and ethnic 
ties which bind the peoples of the two countries (New 
Zealand and Western Samoa), not to mention the 'sentiments 
of obligation and treaty commitments', and humanitarian 
1 Christchurch Star, 3rd September 1976. 
2 Interview with Mr T.F. Toleafoa. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Quoted in Muliufi Hannemann, "New Zealand and the 
South Pacific: Trade Not Aid", New Zealand International 
Review, January/February 1978, p~5. 
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considerations, make New Zealand aid to Western Samoa almost 
inevitable. And the fact that the aid to Western Samoa has 
risen rapidly in the last few years, despite a slow increase, 
or even cuts, in the total ODA given by New Zealand, 
illustrates the priority given to South Pacific countries 
by NZ aid officials. 
Some of the features of aid programmes discussed at 
the beginning of the chapter can briefly be considered here. 
While New Zealand does not give food aid as such to Western 
Samoa, it does export a considerable amount of foodstuffs to 
that country, and the consequences of this can be as 
damaging as those described for food aid. (See pp 26-27.) 
As far as the tying of aid is concerned, it is impossible 
to get the figures for individual countries, so only the 
overall percentages will be given. In 1979-80 60% of 
New Zealand's bilateral, and 18% of its multilateral, aid 
allocation was tied to New Zealand goods and services. l 
This aspect of the aid programme - developing trade links 
from capital grants - will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter. And although some of the aid has been in the form 
of loans, in 1979 the New Zealand Government cancelled all 
outstanding development loans about $3.5 million owed 
by Samoa, Fiji and the Cook Islands. 2 
The value and desirability of training the people of 
the developing nations in their own environment has been 
well recognized by New Zealand aid officials. The establish-
ment of a regional university in Suva, with an agricultural 
1 NZPD, No. 21, P 2695, 4th September 1979. 
2 The Press, 26th November 1979. 
faculty in Apia - both funded from the Pacific region 
allocation of New Zealand's foreign-aid programme -
gone a long way towards achieving this objective. And 
although it is somewhat difficult to assess, New Zealand 
does try to send experts who are 
"sympathetic to the needs and aspirations 
of Pacific countries, have significant 
rst-hand experience in the region .... 
and have a deep understanding of Pacific 
attitudes, customs, economic structures 
and development aspirations."l 
This problem of the assessment of the 'true value' 
of the aid programme is evident in every sphere. Even if 
the information was available in the detail necessary for 
an extensive study, by what criteria would the aid's real 
benefit to the individual, or to the nation as a whole, 
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be judged? Different value systems, even within the region 
itself, would give quite different perspectives on the 
'ideal' aims and priorities ~hich aid projects should have. 2 
One assessment of the New Zealand programme which 
has been undertaken is that done by the government sponsored 
Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development. 3 In its 
1978-79 report it drew attention to the 'de ciencies', as 
it saw them, of New Zealand's aid to Western Samoa: 
1 Te' 0 I. J. Fairbairn, "Foreign Aid for Pacific 
Islands Development", ,!?acific Perspective, Vol. 1, 
No.6. 1977. p 34. 
2 For example, should the children of Samoan matai 
and other leaders be given priority in the scho ship 
and training schemes? Davies, pp 294-295. 
3 Comprised of up to 12 members drawn from a broad 
cross-section of the community, including the voluntary 
agencies, the universi es, the business sector and 
politics. 
"it ... (would be) desirable to make progress 
towards greater consolidation of the 
agricultural programme, with emphasis on 
reinstating growth in domestic agriculture . 
.... (T)oo much emphasis has been placed on 
infrastructural development, which raises 
questions of local ability to sustain and 
maintain the infrastructure."I 
This new focus on agricultural development is consistent 
with the Samoan government's own priorities of employment 
creation and long-term economic self-sufficiency. 
Despite the superficiality of this study of New 
Zealand's aid to Western Samoa, it is possible to draw a 
few general conclusions concerning this aspect of the 
relationship between the two countries. On the whole, 
while Western Samoa is appreciative of, and in need of, 
New Zealand aid, it is not to~ZZy dependent on this one 
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larger country for its economic assistance. There are many 
different aid donors at work in Western Samoa, and in this 
regard, the small developing nation has managed to avoid a 
high degree of economic dependence on its former 'colonial' 
authority,2 though it must be remembered that New Zealand 
makes significant contributions to the South Pacific Forum 
and other multilateral agencies from whence Western Samoa also 
receives much aid. (The economic implications of its trade 
and migration links, however, will be considered in the next 
chapters. ) 
As already discussed, the application of Morrison 
and Suhrke's paradigm to the aid relationship between 
1 p~velopme~t, Vol. 2, No.4, December 1979. p 14. 
2 Unusual in comparison to other Pacific countries. 
See Appendix E. 
western Samoa and New Zealand is somewhat difficult at 
this stage. While the larger country's donation of aid 
to the smaller is based, as the paradigm predicts, on 
historical, geographical and ethnic ties, and feelings 
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of obligation and treaty commitments (rather than on its 
political relations with other larger states), it is 
necessary to examine the relationship in its entirety before 
making any real decisions as to the suitability of the 
paradigm. To this end then, the next chapter will examine 
the trade links between the two countries, and the following, 
the migration - both short-term and permanent - of Samoans 
into New Zealand. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
This chapter will attempt to assess the degree to 
which Western Samoa's trade and investment characteri cs 
conform to the theories outlined in Chapter One. By 
examining the direction and composition of the country's 
export and import links the importance of New Zealand (as 
the former 'colonial power') in Western Samoa's contemporary 
trade pattern can be determined. 
The special concessions and provisions for trade 
with, and investment in, Western Samoa made by the New 
Zealand Government will also be examined - in order to 
assess the extent to which the larger country is really 
stimulating the economic development of the smaller~ And 
the study of the role of multi-national companies, working 
through their New Ze and branches, will provide further 
evidence of foreign influence in Western Samoa's economy_ 
It is hoped that by the end of the chapter an overall 
assessment can be made of Western Samoa's dependency on 
trade with New Zealand, and of the degree of control which 
the country holds over its own economic life and future. 
Direction of Trade 
Contrary to what might be expected of a colony, 
German Samoa, from 1900 to 1914, did not trade almost 
exclusively, or even mainly, with Germany. The first 
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available official figures show that, in 1913, approximately 
50% of the territory's exports went to Germany, 40% to 
Australia and New Zealand, and 5% to the United States. 
The bulk of the imports (60%) came from Australia and New 
Zealand, only 15% from Germany, and 9% from the Uni 
states. 1 
The advent of the First World War and the ensuing 
New Zealand takeover of German-held property and business, 
significantly changed the colony's trading pattern. All 
interaction with Germany ceased, while that with the United 
States increased dramatically. This increase, although 
somewhat incongruous at first glance, can be explained by 
the war-time shipping arrangements, as outlined in the first 
official report on New Zealand's trade with Western Samoa, 
2 the Cook Islands, and Tonga. 
Once war had started, the (British-owned) Union 
Company refused to carry copra Samoa's major export -
for transhipment, because of its highly inflammable nature. 
This action, in the words of the report, "had a most 
disastrous ef ct on British trade,"3 by allowing the 
Americans to take over the shipping, and cons uently the 
purchase and supply of Samoan trade goods. By 1918 Western 
Samoa was selling 83% of its exports to, and buying 35% of 
its imports from, the United States. 4 
1 Keesing, p 303. 
2 "Trade Between NZ and Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa and 
Cook Islands" (Report of the Commission to Inquire into the 
Conditions of). AJHR, A-4, 1920. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid, pp 44 and 46. THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERIlURV 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.!. 
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respectivelYi and Fiji, the U.K., West Germany, Hong Kong 
and Singapore collectively accounting for a further 17%.1 
The major trading partner in both imports and exports 
however, is the former Administering Authority, New Zealand. 
Western Samoa has received about one third of its imports 
from New Zealand for most of the sixty years for which 
information is available, and has sent a similar percentage 
of its exports to that country since the mid-1950's.2 
There have been fluctuations of course, some quite major, 
but as the percentages are calculated in terms of the value 
of trade, the short-term fluctuations are often explained by 
the unstable prices for individual commodities,3 rather than 
by a change in the direction of the volume of trade. 4 
Composition of Trade 
The actual composition of Western Samoa's trade 
however, has changed quite considerably. There has been 
some diversification from the traditional export crops of 
cocoa, copra and bananas, with the latter product becoming 
entirely insignificant in terms of current export receipts. 
1 Department of Statistics, Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin, 1st Quarter January-March 1979, Apia, Western 
Samoa, p 41. See Appendix F. 
2 Calculated from figures in the Annual Reports, 
the New Zealand Official Yearbooks; and Western 
Statistical Bulletins. 
3 See Appendix A. 
4 For instance, in 1975/76 NZ took 37%, and West 
Germany 35% of Western Samoa's exports. In 1976/77 
the figures were 17 and 46 percent respectively. This 
reflects the great price rise in cocoa that year - cocoa 
making up about 70% of exports to West Germany. 
Annual Statistical Abst~act 1977, pp 52 and 59. 
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The range of imports also, has widened as the demands for 
modern technology and western standards of living increase. 
1 In 1959 the total value of exports was 3.3 million, 
of which 41% was made up by copra sales, 30% by cocoa, and 
27% by bananas. The imports the year totalled 
2.5 million, with the major individual items being meat 
(10%), motor vehicles/parts etc. (6%), sugar (4%) and 
cottonpiece goods (2%); though the main expenditure overall 
was on foodstuffs. 
Today copra and cocoa are 11 Western Samoa's major 
export items - together making up 76% of the trade revenue 
(44% and 32% respectively), with taro (12%) I timber (2%), 
and bananas (1%) being the only other individual items of 
, 'f' 2 any slgnl lcance. As far as imports are concerned, 
foodstuf , while still important (29% of imports in 1978), 
are no longer paramount, and manufactured goods (20%) and 
3 
machinery (26%) have been major expenses in recent years. 
4 Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the percentage of these 
commodities which Western Samoa imports from, and exports 
to, New Zealand. See Appendix G for a d breakdown 
of trade with New Zealand. 
The favourable balance of trade of late 1950's 
did not last. In the following twenty years exports 
experienced a slow, somewhat unsteady growth, while imports, 
1 New Ze and Official Yearbook, 1961. 
2 Dept of Statistics, Annual statistical 
Apia, Western Samoa. p 58. 
3 Ibid, P 57. 
4 Calcula 
Abstract 1978. 
from figures ln Annual Statis cal 
1978, 
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Fig. 5 •. 1 Percentage of Imports from N.Z. by Commodity (1978) 
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by contrast, increased at a constant rate. The result, as 
one would expect of a small, developing country (as outlined 
by Vayrynen in the first chapter), is that today Western 
Samoa has a considerable deficit in its balance of trade: 
WS$30 million. Df this, one third is attributable to its 
with New zealand. 1 
other features which Vayrynen described as character-
istic of a small state are also found in Western Samoa's 
economy: a high dependence on a few, agricultural exports; 
a large proportion of 'finished goods' in its import list, 
an.d a high overall dependence on trade. The concentration 
on one major trading partner is not so pronounced, but when 
individual commodities are looked at, the dependency in 
certain areas is more important. 
Interdependence 
As is expected in the trading relationship between a 
small, developing country and a larger, industrialized one, 
Western Samoa's dependence on New Zealand trade is not 
reciprocated. In 1977/78 only 0.37% of New Zealand exports 
went to Western Samoa, whi an even lower proportion (0.11%) 
of its imports came from there. 2 It is only when the 
individual items are examined that any degree of dependence 
at all can be found. 
1 Calculated from figures in Annual statistics 
Abstract 1978. 
2 Calculated from figures in Dept of Statistics, 
Country Analyses of External Trade July 1977 - June 1978, 
Wellington ,-New Zealand . (Note: Western Samoan statistics 
are for calendar years.) 
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New Zealand's cocoa requirements are largely met by 
Ghana, which supplied 79% of cocoa imports in 1977/78 -
compared to Western Samoa's 1.2%.1 Twenty years earlier 
Western Samoa had supplied 33% of NZ's cocoa,2 but the 
proportion had gradually decreased from 1960 onwards. 
By contrast Western Samoa has been an important 
supplier of oil seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels to 
New Zealand markets for many years. It provided 30% of 
NZ requirements in 1977/78. 3 This commodity, which in 
Western Samoa's case is mainly copra, today makes up over 
half of NZ imports from that country, compared to about 15% 
in the immediate post-independence period. 4 
However copra really is of very little importance 
to the New Zealand economy and marketplace. And the fact 
that it is supplied by twenty-two other countries - most of 
whom would be able to increase their present supply to New 
Zealand, means that, even for this commodity, Western 
Samoa's value to New Zealand as a trading partner is very 
limited. 
Access to the New Zealand Market 
Special provisions have been made to help the entry 
of Samoan commodities onto the New Zealand market. Western 
1 Calculated from figures in Dept of Statistics, 
Country Analyses of External Trade July 1977 - June 1978, 
Wellington, New Zealand. (Note: Western Samoa statistics 
are for calendar years.) 
2 Ibid, 1964. 
3 Ibid, July 1977 - June 1978. 
4 Ibid, July 1962- June 1963. 
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Samoa is in a particularly privileged position at the moment 
in that it shares with the Cook Islands and Niue the right 
of free entry of certain classes of goods onto the New 
Zealand market. The precise details of the qualifying 
characteristics for exemption from import licensing and duty 
are given in the Department of Trade and Industry's Import 
Licensing Schedule 1979-80, but basically they refer to the 
origin of the material, and the principal location of 
1 processing or manufacture. In this way most of Western 
Samoa's exports, and certainly its major ones, are eligible 
for free access to New Zealand's markets. 
This special provision may soon be overshadowed 
however, by the proposed South Pacific Forum regional trade 
agreement. Although negotiations are still continuing (they 
began at the July 1979 Forum meeting in Honiora), it appears 
that they will soon achieve "duty free and unrestricted 
access to the markets of Australia and New Zealand over as 
wide a range of (Pacific Island) products as possible."2 
It is the 'width' of the range which will determine 
the real quality, and value to the South Pacific's small 
developing states, of the new trade agreement, although 
provision for periodic review and expansion will be a 
built-in feature. As there is an "influential body of 
opinion" which feels that increased exports from the small 
islands of the Pacific would have "negligible impact" on the 
1 See Appendix H. 
2 Asia Pacific Research Unit (APRU), Asia Pacific 
Forum: South Pacific Business Guide 1979, Wellington. p 7. 
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industries and employment situation of Australia and New 
Zealand, it is felt that a favourable agreement is likely 
to eventuate relatively soon. l 
This will put all the Forum Island countries, not 
just those still tied to New Zealand (the Cook Islands and 
Niue) and the special case of Western Samoa, in a 
preferential position in New Zealand's markets. And 
although practically all developing countries are eligible 
for special consideration under the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) 2 scheme, the New Zealand Government has 
recognised its particular responsibilities and obligations 
to its nearest neighbours - the small developing countries 
of the South Pacific. 
One commodity for which the Pacific Island countries 
have long received special access to the New Zealand market 
is bananas. The following case-study will examine why, 
despite the provisions made by the New Zealand government 
for the guaranteed purchase of this produce, the Island's 
share of the banana market today is so low. 
Exports to New .Zealand - Bananas 
The decline in the output and export of bananas since 
the mid-1960's has significantly changed the composition of 
Western Samoa's export trade, especially with New Zealand. 
In 1953 over 30% of NZ's banana imports were from Western 
1 Asia Pacific Research Unit (APRU), Asia Pacific 
Forum: South Pacific Business Guide 1979, Wellington. p 7. 
2 See Customs Department, Generalized System of 
Preferences: Information for Developing Country Exporters 
to New Zealand. Wellinqton. Mav 1979. 
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Samoa, while Fiji and Tonga supplied the remainder. 1 At 
the same time, banana exports brought in about one third 
of Samoa's trade revenue. Today however, New Zealand 
receives under 2% of its bananas from Western Samoa (a 
total of 8% from the Pacific Islands),2 and that country 
earns only 1% of its export revenue through this commodity.3 
The initial cause of this decline in banana 
production was the devastating hurricane of 1966. In that 
year the volume of banana exports dropped by 87% (62,000 
, 4 
cases compared with 1965's 482,000 cases), and its ,share 
of the export revenue fell from almost 30% in 1965 to a mere 
5% in 1966. 5 Another hurricane in 1968, widespread disease, 
6 . 
and reduced efforts on the part of the producers have made 
the revival of the banana industry in the 1970's a long, 
slow process. 
Yet it is in the export of bananas that Western Samoa 
receives its most favourable'trading terms from New Zealand. 
Since 1950 the importation of bananas into New Zealand has 
been carried out by Fruit Distributors Ltd - a company set 
up under an agreement with the Government for the purpose of 
1 Monthly Abstract of Statistics, External Trade 
1952/53. 
2 Micheal Dossor, General Mannager, Fruit Distributors 
Ltd, Wellington. Personal communique, 7th January 1980. 
3 Annual Statistical Abstract 1978, Apia. 
4 Department of Economic Development, 
Development Plan 1971-1975, Western Samoa. 
Statistic Appendix, Table III. 
Second Five Year 
November 1970 
5 Calculated from gures in Ibid, Table I. 
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Pacific Trade 197~, 
Wellington; March 1973. p 50. 
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importing fresh citrus fruits, bananas and pineapples into 
the country. And at the d ction of the Government, the 
company gives priority in its banana purchasing policy to 
Pacific Island fruit. Only when the Pacific Islands are 
unable to meet New Zealand's 
1 imported from other sources. 
uirements, are bananas 
Despite this provision however, the Pacific Islands' 
share of New Zealand banana market has fallen 
dramatically, as indicated above. At the end of the 1960's 
they were still supplying 70% (Western Samoa 30%)2 of the 
bananas, but today, only a dec later, the proportion 
has dropped to 7.9% (Western Samoa 1.9%, Tonga 3.9%, Cook 
Islands 2.1%).3 While a very small part of this trend can 
be attributed to the rejection of low quality fruit,4 and 
a higher domestic consumption of bananas, the overwhelming 
cause is simply the lower level of production - in 1975 
the total output of bananas was s 11 only 56% of the 
average production in the years 1961-65. 5 
Both New Zealand Government and Fruit Distributors 
Ltd have put cons rable effort into the development of the 
Pacific banana industry in recent years. The NZ Department 
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade 
1972, Wellington, March 1973. p 51. 
2 Ibid, P 57. 
3 Dossor, rs. comm. 
4 For examp I incident reported in The Press, 
16th January 1976, of Samoan bananas being rejected because 
of human faeces in the ship's hold, was an "isolated 
incident" - Dossor. 
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Production Yearbook 1976, Vol. 30. Rome. 1977. 
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of scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) has initiated 
an extensive programme, aimed at improving banana production, 
. 1 
at its research station ln the Cook Islands, and the recent 
emphasis in New Zealand's aid programme on agricultural 
development has naturally included the banana industry. 
Fruit Distribu~ors Ltd has given grants to assist disease 
control and hurricane relief, and it also runs scholarships 
at the School of Tropical Agriculture in Western Samoa, 
for local students. 2 
The recent Asian Development Bank survey of South 
Pacific agriculture argued that there is much potential for 
re-establishing the banana industry in Western Samoa, and 
throughout the South Pacific. 3 It would have to be built 
on fully commercial, plantation-mode management and a much 
higher level of technology than has been used to date, but 
as long as the New Zealand market was available for all 
they could produce, the Pacific Islands would be able to 
generate considerable revenue from the export of bananas -
the only proviso being that the individual island governments 
co-ordinated their banana industry schemes so as to avoid 
IIdisorderly marketing in New Zealand." 4 
The Imbalance of Trade 
While it is expected, from our previous discussion of 
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977 New Zealand Aid 
Programme Review, Wellington. p 18. 
2 Dossor, pers. comma 29th January 1980. 
3 ADB, South Pacific 
4 Ibid, P 377. 
culture 1979. pp 376-377. 
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small state theory, that a significant imbalance of trade 
is likely to exist between a small, developing country and 
a larger, modernized one, the situation is not necessarily 
inevitable, or even beyond some measure of redemption. In 
recent years the New Zealand Government has recognized the 
value of t1trade, not aid", and has also seen the necessity 
(or advantage) of creating more employment opportunities 
for the Pacific Islanders within their own cquntries. 
The interrelationship between these three variables will 
be examined more closely in the concluding chapter. 
The basic requirement of a more balanced trading 
relationship between Western Samoa and New Zealand lies 
in an increase of exports from the former country and/or 
a decrease from the latter. This second option is more 
difficult to achieve: as communications and economic wealth 
expand in Western Samoa, the knowledge of, and demand for, 
Westernized goods rises rapidly. However if some degree of 
import substitution can be achieved, along with an increase 
in export commodities, the deficit in trade can be reduced 
to some extent. One method of achieving this objective is 
through the establishment of industries in Western Samoa. 
Investment in Western Samoa - Government Incentives 
The Western Samoan Government actively seeks and 
supports foreign investment. In its Industrial Free Zone 
1 In 1977/78 Western Samoa exported $3.5 million worth 
of goods to N.Z., but imported $12 million in return. This 
equals an overall deficit of $8.5 million for the year. 
Country Analyses of External Trade. 
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Act of 1974, it outlined such incentives as: 
(1) complete exemption from import and export duty, 
(2) exemptions from taxes on profits of export business 
for 5 years, and thereafter a set 25% tax, 
(3) free r atriation of profits, and 
(4) electric power at preferential rates. 1 
Joint ventures involving local equity are encouraged 
but this is not mandatory. Preference is likely to be given 
to industries that are labour intensive, utilising some 
local materials; have potential for exporting, and are 
gener~lly adaptable to the social, cultural, and ecological 
2 
environment of Western Samoa. 
The New Zealand Government also, has recogni the 
value of manufacturing and processing industries to Western 
Samoa. 
Pacific -Islands Industri Scheme 
In November 1976 the Pacific Islands Industrial 
Development Scheme, PIIDS, was established under the 
auspices of the New Zealand Department of Trade and Industry. 
Its main objective, as outlined in the Department's 
publication, is 
"to provide financial assistance and incentives 
for New Zealand entrepreneurs developing 
approved ma:nufacturing or processing operations in 
Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, 
Niue, Kinbati, Nauru, Papua-New Guinea, the 
1 Anthony Haas, New Zealand and the South Pacific, 
p 110. 
2 Ibid, P 111. 
Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, with the aim 
of fostering economic development and 
employment opportunities. "I 
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The prime consideration for the granting of govern-
ment assistance is the degree of benefit that the proposal 
entails for the Island country, and the compliance of the 
venture with the wishes of the host government. This 
assistance is designed to provide initial encouragement for 
manufacturers to establish ventures, and is not seen as a 
continuing subsidy. The New Zealand equity interest must 
be at least 20% before PIIDS assistance is considered. 
"The incentives offered include interest-free 
suspensory loans for up to 30 percent of the 
cost of factor plant, equipment, and buildings, 
and assistance for up to 50 percent of approved 
costs of on-the-job training, transfer of plant 
and key employees, and feasibility studies."2 
About two years after its inception, PIIDS was 
broadened to include agricul~ural-based Ventures which met 
with certain provisos - such as making use of under-utilised 
land, and including the processing or manufacture before 
sale of the agricultural product. 
The Government also recognizes its obligation to 
provide "reasonable and continuing access" to the New 
Zealand market for the products of PIIDS-assisted ventures. 
Free entry for goods not produced in New Zealand is 
guaranteed, while those in competition with local 
I Dept of Trade and Industry, Pacific Islands 
Industrial Development Scheme, Wellington, N.Z. 
September 1979. p 3. 
2 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 26, No.6, 
october-December 1976. p 48. 
manufacturers are limited to "quantities which will not 
unduly disrupt New Zealand industry or employment, or be 
in violation of our international trade obligations. 1I1 
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However, many of the PIIDS ventures do not actually 
send any goods back to the New Zealand marketplace. They 
sell their produce either in their own countries, or to a 
third country - which may hold up to 25% equity in the 
venture, if the export market is guaranteed. 2 Of the six 
industries set up in Western Samoa, for example, only one, 
aproducer of foodstuffs dye (employing four people), is 
dependent on New Zealand for the sale of its commodity.3 
The other four ventures (the viability of the fifth -
4 Wisemans Bags - is somewhat in doubt) are all basically 
involved with import substitution. There is a paper 
processing industry (5 jobs created), a light engineering 
business (9 jobs), a New Zealand Industrial Gases operation 
(12 jobs - mainly involved in specialised training), and a 
cigarette-manufacturing factory (53 jobs).5 
1 Pacific Islands Industrial Deve Scheme, 
P 9. 
2 Francine Porteous, PIIDS Unit, Department of Trade 
and Industry, New Zealand. Personal interview, 16th 
January 1980. 
3 Ibid. This is about average over the whole scheme -
six out of the 30 ventures in the Pacific export their 
produce to N.Z. 
4 Ibid. Nobody was sure what the actual situation 
regarding receivership etc. was. 
S Ibid. An internal, up-dated outline and assessment 
of the PIIDS ventures was given to the author. 
115 
Multi-National Companies in Western Samoa 
The establishment of the Rothmans cigarette factory 
has aroused a major controversy in Western Samoa, and has 
caused a few ripples in New Zealand also - especially as 
it involves $200,000 of bilateral aid money as well as the 
PIIDS concessions and incentives. There have been two main 
areas of contention. One, that a large and profitable 
multi-national company like Rothmans should be allocated 
any funds at all from New Zealand's limited budget for 
aiding developing countries, and two, that the venture 
which is so benefited, should be producing such arguably 
detrimental goods as cigarettes. l 
Rothmans' representatives claim that Samoan smoking 
is increasing anyway so the people might as well smoke more 
to their own economic advantage (it will be 40% Samoan 
owned), and they argue that the savings in foreign exchange 
and the employment opportunites created make the factory a 
very bene cial venture for the whole country. Also, the 
company plans to diversify its operations - such things as 
umbrellas, tents, and coffee have been suggested - and it 
therefore will continue to advance the overall economic 
development of Western Samoa. 
Opponents of the scheme criticise it on both moral 
and economic grounds. A War on Want investigation into 
tobacco companies' activities in the developing countries 
has bluntly labelled these activities as 'death-peddling', 
1 All Rothmans material from Vernon Wright, "Tobacco 
Barons in Paradise", The New Zealand Listener, 9th December 
1978. 
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whi economists have questioned the true commercial value 
of the venture. As the tobacco leaf grown in Samoa is 
unsuitable for cigarettes, this basic component will have 
to be imported, and the cost of this, along with the 
importation of raw materials, plant and machinery, profit 
repatriation and a degree of salary repatriation, means that 
the savings in foreign exchange may easily be negated. 
Another multi-national company which is operating in 
Western Samoa through its New Zealand division is Glaxo 
Laboratories Ltd. And it too has received much criticism 
lately - both from Western Samoans themselves and from 
New Zealanders, for its actions, or lack of them, as 
described below. 
The world's major infant milk formula makers recently 
agreed to stop advertising their product in Third World 
countries because of continued reports citing bottle feeding 
as one of the prime contributing factors to the high rate of 
infant mortality there. 1 Glaxo Laboratories (N.Z.) Ltd 
however, have not followed this lead, and are continuing to 
promote their formula milk powder in Western Samoa and 
elsewhere, despite a report by a paediatrician at the 
National Hospital and a nutritionist from the Health 
Department in Samoa, that malnutrition and gastro-intestinal 
infections appear to be linked to the widespread use of 
milk powder for feeding babies. 
While the report points out that breast-milk is 
1 For example, Dr M. Latham and Mr E. Greiner of 
Cornell University did a study for the Protein Advisory 
Group of the United Nations. The Press, 7th November 1979. 
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nutritionally superior to milk-powder formula, it stresses 
that much of the problem of the artificial substitute sterns 
from improper use: 
"Until Western Samoan villages have clean good 
water supplies, refrigeration in all homes, 
sufficient education for mothers to properly 
understand how to mix arti cial milks and 
above all enough money to afford enough milk 
powder, the Health Department must strongly 
discourage all activities that might encourage 
women to feed their infants artificially."l 
In a situation where the lowest price milk formula 
on the market costs approximately one tenth of the basic 
labourer's wages when the baby is first born, and about 
one quarter of the wages when it is 6 months old, the mother 
will attempt to economise by over-diluting the formula, 
often with contaminated water. The resulting malnutrition, 
if it doesn't kill the baby, may lead to both physical and 
mental retardation. 
Glaxo, naturally enough, has defended its position. 
It has, at the request of the Samoan Health Department, 
replaced English-language labels on its baby milk powder 
tins with Samoan-language labels which warn against the 
dangers of misuse and poor hygiene, and it has promised to 
stop promoting its product if the Department insists. It 
points out, however, that its advertising does stress that 
breast milk is best, and, inasmuch as the Department itself 
can't afford to do this, Glaxo provides a valuable public 
. 2 
serVlce. 
I Quoted in The Press, 7th November 1979. 
2 Ibid. 
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Whi this particular product may be more obvious, 
and more crucial, than the rest, the real sue lies in 
the who area of imported versus indigenous foodstuffs. 1 
As long as the glamour, the ease, and the availability of 
foreign food remain, the wastage of land, labour, and other 
native resources will continue. 
Conclusion 
As the theories of small, especially small developing, 
states predict, Western Samoa is relatively dependent on 
trade for its overall economic survival, is prone to having 
a serious deficit in its balance of trade, and is very 
dependent on one or two commodities for export earnings. 
Only in the aspect of the number of trading partners does 
Western Samoa show any significant deviation from the models 
outlined in Chapter One. 
New Zealand, whi holding the dominant position in 
both the import and export fields, is by no means in total 
control of Western Samoa's trading patterns and relation-
ships. The smaller country trades with many other nations,2 
and can take advantage of the Generalised System of 
Pre rences Scheme operated by many developed countries 
whereby the Third World nations gain preferential access to 
their markets. And, in addition, We rn Samoa, as a 
Commonwealth country, has special privileges within the EEC 
since B tain joined in 1973. 
1 See pp 26-27. 
2 See Appendix F. 
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However New Zealand, by virtue of its geographical 
position and historical association, is the primary focus 
of Western Samoan trade. Most ex-colonies continue to 
direct the bulk of their trading towards their former 
colonial powers long after political independence has been 
achieved (New Zealand is a prime example), because of 
familiarity and established normSi and the physical 
proximity of New Zealand to Western Samoa, as well as the 
freight links between the two countries, serves to entrench 
1 this pattern. 
Western Samoa could probably sell more of its produce 
to other countries if the New Zealand market collapsed, but 
it would then be competing from an equal position with all' 
other developing countries, rather than from the special 
position it holds in New Zealand's trade relationships. 
That there should be a serious trade imbalance 
between the two countries is'almost inevitable. Western 
Samoa, as a small, developing nation seeking economic 
development, needs many of the goods and services provided 
by the larger modern country, yet it does not have much 
to offer in return. However, New Zealand is endeavouring to 
remedy this situation somewhat, by providing special 
incentives for its people to establish industries (both 
import substitution and export-earning) in Western Samoa. 
Investment by developed countries, or multi-national 
companies in the Third World nations, is subject to much 
1 Lack of space prohibits a discussion of transport 
links - while they are not very satisfactory, they are 
the best Western Samoa has. 
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criticism and debate. The actual economic benefit to the 
latter country is often questioned while the social and 
cultural implications of foreign interference and control 
are almost universally abhorred. 
Overall, however, in Western Samoa today, the 
strong nationalistic feelings of the people, coupled with 
historical and economic factors, have resulted in a 
relatively 'independent' economy in the sense that it 
is not subject to the control of any single country or 
company. By actively encouraging investment and aid from, 
and trade with, many dif rent countries, the Samoans have 
endeavoured to keep th r range of options open as much as 
possible. If any single country was to be named as the 
most important to Western Samoa's trade, then it would be 
New Zealand, but, as the next chapter will show, this 
country is more important in relation to the migration 
and employment-overseas of Samoans. 
CHAPTER SIX 
MIGRATION 
The importance of New Zealand as a destination 
both permanent and temporary migrants from Western Samoa 
wi~l be considered in th chapter. A history of the 
migrant flow and the approximate numbers involved will 
begin the discussion. 
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New Zealand's cial pOlicies and laws on migration 
will be outlined, followed by a special consideration of 
those related speci ly to Western Samoans entering 
the country. The 'overstayer' issue will be particularly 
emphasized in order to later (in the next ch assess 
its effect on the overall, political relationship between 
the two countr Finally, the importance of migration, 
as a method of relieving population pressure and as a 
source of remittance income, to Western Samoa as a small 
developing country, will be examined. 
A History of Samoan Migration to New Zealand 
Western Samoa experienced a net loss of migrants 
in each intercensal period from 1906 to 1956. 1 Up to the 
1940's, the outward movement included numbers of indentured 
labourers who, in accordance with government policy, were 
1 Kathleen M. Juff, "Population Expansion in Western 
Samoan, Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 70, No.4 
(December 1961). p 401. 
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being returned to their native countries. The remainder of 
the departures consisted largely of Samoans and part-Samoans 
going to New Zealand for further education or for permanent 
residence, and of Europeans who were mainly New Zealand 
seconded officers and their families returning home. l 
In the period immediately after the Second World War 
however, the numbers of migrants increased dramatically. 
The presence of American troops in the country after 1942 
had brought "boom conditions" with the ready availability 
of both jobs and money, and had introduced many Samoans to 
the attractions of Western-style living. 2 This increased 
awareness of the educational and employment opportunities 
available overseas, as well as the lure of the 'bright 
lights' of city life, induced many Samoans to travel to 
New Zealand and elsewhere in the early post-war years. 
The New Zealand Census of 1945 lists 592 persons in 
the country who were born in Western Samoa, a rise of only 
428 since the 1921 census. By 1956 however the number had 
risen to almost 3,000 - a five-fold increase in only 11 
years.3 But it is not the actual numbers so much as the 
racial composition of the post-war migrant stream which is 
the most significant factor. In 1945 the vast majority 
(92%) of those who were born in Samoa but living in New 
1 Kathleen M. Juff, "Population Expansion in Western 
Samoan, Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 7, No.4 
(December 1961). P 401. 
2 David C. Pitt and Cluny Macpherson, Emerging 
Pluralism: The Samoan Community in New Zealand. 
(Auckland: Longman Paul Ltd). 1974. p 7. 
3 Ian Fairbairn, "Samoan Migration to New Zealand: 
The General Background and Some Economic Implications for 
Samoa", Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 70, No.1 
( Ma r c h 1 9 61). P 1 9 . 
123 
Zealand were of "Mixed-blood ll status. In 1956 by contrast, 
over one-third (38%) of them were classifed as "Full-blood 
Samoans. III 
pitt and Macpherson attribute this change partly to 
the fact that before the war, it was those people who 
identified themselves as European, rather than as Samoan, 
who left the country, while afterwards, this motive for 
migration was much d . 2 ss pre omlnant. 
Another, later change in the composition of the 
migrant population arriving in New Z and was that related 
to the particular place in Western Samoa from which the 
migrants had corne. The early migrants almost all carne from 
Apia. It was here that they could acquire the language, 
education or occupational skills which made it easier to 
obtain an entry permit, and here also, they could earn the 
money for the relatively large fare. 3 
In the late 1960's the patterns of migrant places of 
origin began to change, reflecting the effects of chain 
migration. The first immigrants had needed Apia as a 
"jumping board",4 but their relatives could then easily be 
recruited from the villages. The strong family ties basic 
to Samoan society stimulated the desire to migrate and the 
family network in New Zealand helped in the actual process 
I Ian Fairbairn, "Samoan Migration to New Zealand: 
The General Background and Some Economic Implications for 
Samoa", Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 70, No.1 
(March 1961). p 19. 
2 pitt and Macpherson, 11. p 
3 Ibid, 10. P 
4 Ibid, P 11. 
of migration - with passage money and permits before 
departure, and housing or jobs on arrival. l In this way 
people from every part of Western Samoa are migrating to 
New Zealand today. 
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As well as the family-reunification reason for 
migration, education provides a major incentive for Western 
Samoans to come to New Zealand. The attainment of some type 
of formal schooling has been highly valued in Samoan society 
since the arrival of the missionaries in the 1830's,2 and 
the better facilities and opportunities for education in 
New Zealand attract many Samoans to that country. 
Another of New Zealand's major advantages in Samoan 
eyes is the potential it offers for economic rewards. For' 
the short-term migrants, on temporary work permits, this 
is virtually the only incentive for migration, whi those 
intending to reside in New Zealand permanently usually 
believe that their standards of living there will be higher 
than in their own country. The whole issue of remittances 
money sent by Samoan migrants back to their relatives at 
home - will be discuss later in the chapter. 
The excitement and 'bright lights' of modern city 
living also, appear very attractive to the young rural 
inhabitants of Western Samoa. The age-old lure of adventure 
and 'the unknown' in the larger, more sophisticated world, 
and the prestige and maturity this gives a returned 
traveller makes the movement to New Zealand, even for only 
a short period, a highly desirable option within the 
1 Pitt and Macpherson, p 13. 
2 Davidson, Samoa Mo Samoa, p 83. 
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limited range open to the majority of Samoans. 
In general, the people of Western Samoa are relative-
ly well provided for within their own country.1 There is 
little starvation or real poverty, although the shortage 
of employment opportunities is becoming a major problem. 
However, to the extent that the Samoans wish to participate 
in a modern, monetary economy and to enjoy the advantages -
real or imagined - that this lifestyle can bring, they will 
continue to wish to migrate to New Zealand and other larger 
developed countries. 
In recent years the total number of migrants from 
Western Samoa has decreased. In the early 1970's numbers 
rose rapidly - from 3996 in 1969/70, to 9222 in 1973/74 -
but they have since steadily declined to a low for the 
decade, of 3768 in 1978/79. 2 This reflects the New Zealand 
government's new policy of strictly enforcing its immigration 
laws with respect to temporary migrants, as will be discussed 
in a moment. Table 6.1 3 shows the decline in their numbers 
over the last eight years. 
Table 6.1 Numbers from Western Samoa Arriving in 
New Zealand for Temporary Employment. 
Year ended 31st March Number 
1972 1986 
1973 2277 
1974 3303 
1975 3173 
1976 564 
1977 130 
1978 116 
1979 64 
1 Pitt and Macpherson, p 12. 
2 Department of Statistics, Population and Migration 
Statistics. 1969/70 to 1978/79. 
3 Ibid. 
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However, as far as permanent migrants are concerned, 
the numbers have slowly, if erratically, risen. In 1969/70, 
210 Western Samoans (by country of birth) entered New 
Zealand as 'Immigrants intending Permanent Residence'; in 
1972/73 the number dropped to 79, but it has gradually 
increased since then to reach 756 in 1978/79. 1 While this 
would appear to be well below the New Zealand quota of 1500 
new permanent Western Samoan residents per year (see 
following discussion) the number of those who entered the 
country on temporary permits but have since been granted 
permanent residence must also be considered. In 1974/75 
for instance, in the midst of the 'overstayer' issue, only 
2 321 new migrants entered the country, yet, in total, 1394 
Western Samoans were accepted as permanent New Zealand 
residents in that year.3 Table 6.2 4 shows the number of 
Samoans (by stated ethnic or racial origins) resident in 
New Zealand over the last hundred years. The comparative 
figures for the last five censuses for those born in 
Western Samoa reveal the importance of natural increase, 
as oppos to migration, in accounting for growth in the 
Samoan community in New Zealand today_ 
1 Department of Statistics, Population and Migration 
Statistics. 1969/70 to 1978/79. 
2 Ibid. 
3 NZPD, Vol. 407, 26th October 1976, p 3310. 
4 Pitt and Macpherson, p 119. 
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Table 6.2 Samoans resident in New Zealand 
Number 
Year By ethnic origin By birthplace a 
1874 6 
1878 16 
1881 15 
1896 39 
1901 37 
1906 12 
1916 12 
1921 164 
1936 362 
1945 716 
1951 1336 
1956 3740 2996 
1961 6481 4450 
1966 11842 7447 
1971 19540b 12354 
1976 27876b 19711 
a 1976 Census of Population and Dwellings -
Birthplaces and Ethnic Origin, p 5. 
b Ibid, P 10. 
A discussion of New Zealand's general immigration 
policies and laws will come next, with a special considera-
tion of those relating specifically to Western Samoans. 
Official New Zealand Policy: Permanent Migration 
"It is universally acknowledged that every 
country has the right to choose who will 
cross its borders, the choice usually being 
dictated primarily by local economic and 
social conditions." 
With these words the Immigration Division of the 
Department of Labour begins its most recent (October 1978) 
statement of current immigration policyl and, in so doing, 
1 Immigration Division, Department of Labour, 
Immigration and New Zealand - a statement of current 
immigration. (Wellington: Government Printer) • 
October 1978. pp 1-15. 
emphasizes the importance of domestic criteria in the 
formulation of this policy. The entry of permanent 
migrants into New Zealand is controlled and selective 
in order to attain the main objective of the migration 
policies - "to promote improvement of the quality of Ii 
and living standards of all New Zealanders,1I although 
building up the country's resources of skilled labour is 
also an important goal. 
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To this end then, there are three main categories in 
which applications for permanent entry "may be favourably 
viewed". Entry on family reunification grounds provides 
for the entry of people who have close family ties with 
someone already living in New Zealand, while entry on 
humanitarian grounds allows for the acceptance of refugees 
and other people whose "circumstances are significantly 
worse'than those of others in their community." 
The third category, entry on occupational grounds, 
is the one most geared to protecting the lifesty and 
livelihood of those already resident in New Zealand. 
It gives preference to those applicants for permanent 
entry who have skills and qualifications which are in 
short supply and which are particularly advantageous to 
the development of the New Zealand economy. Most of the 
people who enter the country on occupational grounds are 
from the "traditional source" countries of Western Europe, 
the United Kingdom, the United States of America and 
Canada, where the vocational training systems .are similar 
to those of New Zealand. 
Arising out of an agreement entered into at the 
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World Employment Conference of 1976, New Zealand does not 
recruit skilled people from developing countries which 
themselves have a current or potential need of these 
people's skills. 
Generally speaking, all prospective migrants must 
be between 18 and 45 years of age and not have more than 
four dependent children. They must have suitable employment 
and long-term accommodation pre-arranged, and must all 
(i.e. the family unit) travel to New Zealand together. 
All persons over the age of 12 are required to undergo a 
full medical examination, and must be of good standing and 
character. 
Official New Zealand Policy: Temporary Migration 
Non-working visitors and tourists are generally 
permitted to enter New Zealand with a minimum of immigration 
formalities. As long as they are in good health, possess a 
valid passport and onward or return tickets to a country 
to which they have a right of entry, and produce evidence 
of sufficient funds to maintain themselves during their stay, 
they are given entry to the country for six months, or for 
up to a year with extensions. 
However, having entered New Zealand under these 
conditions, it becomes an offence for a person to undertake 
1 
employment without having specific authority to do so. 
Only those migrants who have been issued with work permits, 
either before or during their stay in New Zealand, are 
1 True only since 1 January 1978 when the Immigration 
Amendment Act 1977 came into force. 
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eligible to work. In 1977/78 only 1% of arrivals were 
cially allowed to work during their stay in the country. 
The problem of temporary migrants, particularly 
Paci c Islanders, overstaying their permitted time in 
New Zealand, and of their illegal working in the country 
will be discussed in a moment. The history of restrictions 
on the type and number of migrants from Western Samoa 
allowed into New Zealand will be considered first. 
Restrictions on Samoan Mi ion to New Zealand 
Although the Samoans have been required since 1920 1 
to have an entry permit before coming into New Zealand, it 
was not until 1955 that there was any restriction on their 
numbers. In that year the New Zealand Government instituted 
formal limits in order to "safeguard against certain 
undesirab 2 futures" which had arisen in regard to Samoan 
immigration. 
The acute housing shortage in New Zealand had led 
many Samoans and other Pacific Islanders to occupy sub-
standard housing, and overcrowding was common. Addi onally, 
the problem of winter employment,among unskilled workers in 
the country meant that Samoans often found it di icult to 
find work. The new measures taken therefore, were 
1 In 1920 the f t entry permit system was introduced 
in New Zealand. Only those of British birth and parentage 
whose ancestry was European were allowed unrestricted 
entry. Labour and Employment Gazette, 26, No.2 
(May 1976). P 5. 
2 Fairbairn, "Samoan Migration to N.Z.", P 20. 
"in no sense a change in policy in respect 
of admission of Samoans, but were taken in 
the interest of public health, employment 
and housing opportunities for the migrant."l 
The new policy divided Samoan immigrants into two 
classes. Those who came on a visit for three months or 
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less were issued visitors permits on a most liberal basis, 
subject only to the condition that they had a return 
passage booked and paid for. Those who wished to remain 
longer however, were regarded as potential permanent 
residents and therefore had to be of good health and 
character and were required to have guarantees of employment 
and of adequate and long-term accommodation. The initial 
permit was for six months, with extensions granted until, 
at the end of five years, permanent residence status was 
given if the immigrant's behaviour had been satisfactory.2 
Although it was never Officially announced at the time, a 
limit of 1500 was put on the number of Western Samoans 
entering the country as permanent migrants. 
About this number have been accepted annually under 
the Il con tinuing residence scheme" 3 in the 25 years since 
its institution, although the limit has since (1979) been 
reduced to 1100. However, in recent years, they have 
not all entered the country under the terms of the second 
permit, but rather have outstayed their initial three-month 
visas and, in winning their appeals against deportation, 
I Fairbairn, IlS amoan Migration to N.Z.", p 20. 
2 Ibid. 
3 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 21, No.9 
(September 1971). p 17. 
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have been given permanent resident status. The "overstayer" 
issue demands special consideration. 
Overstayers 
The Samoans entering New Zealand on three-month 
visitors permits had been illegally working during their 
stay there almost as long as the system had existed. 
"The objective of these visitors was to earn 
sufficient money while in New Zealand to recoup 
their costs and to take back with them savings 
which they could use themselves or apply to 
community projects. 11,1 
Gradually however, rising costs for fares and for 
accommodation and other necessities in New Zealand reached' 
the stage where the three months allowed to the visitors' 
was insufficient for them to cover their costs and have a 
reasonable amount left over to take home. Consequently 
they overstayed their permits' in increasing numbers. 
"A strongly felt sense of shame made it difficult for many, 
impossible for some, to return without something to show for 
their experience. n2 
Until the mid-1970's the New Zealand government did 
little to alter this situation. Firstly, the Immigration 
Division of the Depart~ent of Labour had always been under-
'" ,~ 
staffed, and lacked the resources to enforce the regulations, 
and s'econdly, the relatively rapid expansion of industry, 
1 Labour and Employment Gazette, p 6. 
2 B.R. Macdonald, "Pacific Immigration and the 
Po Ii ti ci an s I" ::::.C...:;0c.:::nun~e~n~t:..::_~A=i-.:::..N:...:e=-w~..::.z ..... e ..... a.;..;l=-a __ n::.:.......d~Q:::..u;;.;.a_r~t_e~r_l~y,,--..:...R_e_v~l~· ~e_w . 
No.1 (October 1977) p 11. 
in the early 1970's especially, meant that employment 
opportunities for unskilled workers were plentiful and, 
indeed, many industries admitted their dependence on 
island labour. 
"In the face of full employment and rising 
exports successive governments turned a blind 
eye and thus tacitly condoned overstaying as 
a way of life." 1 
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with the onset of the 'oil crisis' towards the end 
of 1973 and the ensuing downturn in the economy however, 
the employment situation tightened. In the face of rising 
numbers of unemployed the Labour Government saw part of its 
solution in the return of hundreds of illegal immigrants to 
their island homes. 
So, early in 1974, the police, in conjunction with 
the Immigration Division, began to arrest and obtain 
deportation orders against p~ople~ mainly Tongans and 
Samoans, who had overstayed their permits. 2 There were 
some 'dawn raids,3 but these were discontinued as a result 
of a public outcry alleging racial discrimination and a 
breach of civil liberties. On 1st April the Prime Minister, 
Norman Kirk, announced a stay of proceedings, and over-
stayers were granted a limited form of amnesty, mainly from 
1 B.K. Macdonald, "Pacific Immigration and the 
Politicians," Comment: A New Zealand Quarterly Review. 
No. 1 (October~7) p 11 . -
2 Ibid. 
3 So-called because police and immigration officials 
would calIon the homes of suspected overstayers in the 
very early hours of the morning in an effort to ensure 
that they would be at home. 
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prosecution, if they registered with the Department of 
Labour. 
In the following months hundreds of Pacific Islanders 
returned home 'voluntarily', although the departure deadline 
was extended for some of them "in order to give (New 
1 Zealand) manufacturers a chance to replace key workers." 
A number failed to leave however, and were subsequently 
. 
deported - 121 in 1974 and 250 in 1975 2 - or re-registered 
in 1976. 
While the island governments obviously disliked this 
new aspect of New Zealand's immigration policies, they 
accepted it much more readily than they did subsequently in 
1976. The personality of Norman Kirk, who was liked and 
trusted by Pacific Islanders, was partly responsible for 
this, but the Labour Government was also assisted by other 
factors: 
" ... the island economies were, in relative 
terms, enjoying an all-time 'high' and were 
thus better able to absorb the returning 
Islanders; aid from New Zealanders had 
increased rapidly in the early 1970's and 
had generated employment as well as goodwill; 
copra prices reached record levels; remittance 
income was high; and the tourist boom was on." 3 
In 1976 however, the new National Government was not 
assisted by such factors, and its methods of seeking out 
overstayers were severely criticised. The resumption of 
'dawn raids', along with the introduction of random checks 
1 Macdonald, p 11. 
2 NZPD, Vol. 406, 13th October 1976, p 3103. 
3 Macdonald, p 12. 
of Paci c Islanders on the streets, brought widespread 
protests from the whole of the South Pacific {including 
many in New Zealand).l Claims of racial selectiveness in 
the random checks were denied by the Government but as 
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Mr McCready, Minister of Police, put it n ... if you have a 
herd of Jerseys and two Friesians, the Friesians stand 
out. n2 
And as far as the dawn ds were concerned, 
the Government justified these on the grounds that many 
the overstayers, who were, after I, "illegal 
immigrants", could not be definitely found at home at any 
other time than in the early morning; and Minister of 
Immigration, Mr Gill, explained: 
nlf we waited on the convenience of the 
suspect, a good many illegal immigrants 
would never be apprehended ... We aim to 
be considerate, and we are looking for 
ways of further refining o.ur approach. 113 
However Mr Gill was not really sure why so many 
Polynesians were prosecuted as overstayers when a 1977 
computer printout of expired visitor and work permits 
showed that, of the 3641 persons who had stayed beyond their 
allotted time in the preceding 12 months, 40% of them were 
other than Pacific Islanders. 4 He cited two possible 
reasons for the high proportion of Samoan, Tongan and 
1 Macdonald, p 12. 
2 Ibid, P 13. 
jian 
3 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 26, No.2 
(February~1976) p 37. 
4 Ibid, Vol. 27, No.4. October-December 1977. 
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overstayers among those prosecuted: (1) "they tell tales on 
one another", and (2) unlike those visitors rrom Great 
Britain or the united States, the Islanders orten came to 
New Zealand with very little cashi thererore they had to 
find employment, and it was through their jobs that they 
1 
were detected. 
As in 1974, the Government granted a 'stay or 
proceedings' and opened a register for overstayers in 
April 1976. By the rollowing April, 5381 people had 
registered and had had their cases considered by a specially 
established departmental committee. Of this number, 3712, 
or nearly 70%, were provisionally accepted ror permanent 
residence in New zealand. 2 This figure included 3659 
nationals or Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa, and 55 nationals 
of other countries. The proportions of those who were 
declined were almost identical, with 1650 and 19 being the 
'. umb d 3 respectLve n ers concerne . 
While the issue of the 'overstayers' is no longer in 
the public eye, the problem itself has not disappeared, and, 
in the case of the Western Samoans, had not even diminished. 
In July 1978, of the total of 4898 persons residing in New 
Zealand whose temporary permits had expired, 1093 (22%) were 
from Western Samoa. 4 This is in spite of the New Zealand 
Government's introduction of Temporary Work Permits and 
1 NZPD, Vol. 418, 21st June 1978, p 1151. 
2 New Zealand Foreign Afrairs Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 
(April-June 1977). p 71. 
3 NZPD, Vol. 411, 20th July 1977, p 1368. 
4 NZPD, 31st August 1979, p 3094. 
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1-month visitor's permits in an attempt to reduce the 
numbers of Pacific Islanders illegally staying, and working, 
in the country. 
Temporary Work Permits 
In an effort to provide some compensation to the 
Island governments for the return of hundreds of their 
people under the stricter enforcement of the New Zealand 
immigration laws, the National Government revised and 
extended the Temporary Work Permit Scheme introduced by 
the former administration. In January 1975 the Labour 
Government had instituted a scheme whereby Tongan nationals 
could obtain permits to work in New Zealand for limited 
periods - 4 months, with a 2 month extension at the 
discretion of their employer - in response to specific job 
of (and accommodation guarantees) . 
National, in consultation with the Island governments, 
enlarged the scheme to include both Fijians (in February 
1976) and Western Samoans (June 1976), and extended 
limit to 6 months, with the possibility of an additional 
5 months if the employer agreed. 1 The Government also 
time 
established a special loan fund for employers to help them 
in advancing the air fares of workers recruited under the 
scheme, and agreed to help them find accommodation for the 
new arrivals. 
With the introduction of this scheme, the non-working 
visitors' permit arrangements with the three countries was 
1 New Zealand,Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 
(January-March 1977) p 65. 
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reduced to one month as part of a package igned to 
protect the 0 cial work schemes. l These short-term 
visitors have to produce evidence of return tickets and 
guaranteed accommodation and means of support ($250) while 
in New Zealand, in order to prevent the necessity of them 
obtaining employment there. 
Mr Gill said that he was confident that the revised 
arrangements would lead to a steady increase in the 
recruitment of Pacific Island workers, and that the extra 
earning capacity allowed by the longer permit period would 
be of great benefit to both the individual worker and his 
horne community. 
"The changes demonstrate the Government's 
des to foster the work permit schemes, 
both as a means of assisting employers 
throughout New Zealand and as indirect aid 2 
to the economies of our Pacific neighbours." 
other observers however, are much more sceptical of 
the value of the scheme and postulate that it is the New 
Zealand employers and government, rather than the Islanders, 
who are actually gaining the real benefit. By using 
temporary migrant labour in times of economic expansion, 
employers can dampen market pressure for increasing wage 
rates, while reducing the number permits issued in times 
of recession allows the government to 'artifici ly' lower 
3 the unemployment level. There were claims that 
1 Department of Labour, Report AJHR, G-1, 1976. p 11. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Joris de Bres, Rob Campbell and Peter Horns. Migrant 
Labour in the Pacific. New Zealand Resource Centre for 
World Development, CORSO. 1974. P 22. 
" .. Pacific Island workers are being used as 
scapegoats for New Zealand unemployment 
problems ... (and that) it is Government 
policy to use Island labour as a recession 
buffer."I 
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Successive governments have defended the scheme as a 
method of protecting both New Zealand and Island workers: 
lilt is the Government's policy that our 
immigration policy safeguards employment 
opportunities for New Zealanders, and in 
times of recession it can be expected that 
the number admitted to New Zealand from 
overseas is curtailed to the employment 
demand .... the Island ... (governments have) 
welcomed the formulation of arrangements for 
their people to come to New Zealand with work 
and accommodation guaranteed under a self-
regulating system."2 
However some critics believe that the New Zealand 
government and employers are benefiting through the scheme 
in another way also - a way which is unrelated to the actual 
numbers involved. By employing temporary migrants, they 
argue, the country is saved the cost of the infrastructural, 
educational, health and other services which the dependents 
of the permanent migrants would demand. In this way the 
taxes on company profits are held down and the government's 
burden somewhat relieved - at the expense of the Pacific 
I d t · 3 Is an coun rles. 
While the fact that New Zealand benefits from the 
temporary migrant worker scheme is not necessarily bad, 
and, actually, is desirable, whether or not the Fijians, 
I Mr E. Douglas, lecturer at Waikato University. 
Cited by Mr Luxton, M.P. NZPD, Vol. 400, 19 August 1975, 
p 3619. --
2 NZPD, Vol. 400, 19 August 1975, p 3619. 
3 de Bres et al., pp 9 and 10. 
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Tongans and Western Samoans are similarly advantaged is open 
to some doubt. The money that both these workers and the 
permanent migrants send home is unquestionably very well 
received, but its effect on the economy as a whole is not so 
valuable. 
The Effect of ion on Western Samoa 
In Chapter One, migration was cited as a popular 
option for the inhabitants of small, especially small 
developing nations. As the population increases and the 
pressure on land, jobs and other resources rises, both the 
government and the individual in the small state can readily 
appreciate the advantages of emigration. And if those who 
do leave send back money - remittances - to their families, 
the benefit to the country is two-fold. 
In Western Samoa's case the remittances from both 
temporary and permanent migrants in New Zealand and elsewhere 
form a significant part of the national income. Although 
exact figures are very difficult to obtain since New Zealand 
money is freely negotiable in Samoa and therefore is often 
simply, if illegally, posted directly there, some estimates 
have been made. Pitt and Macpherson quote an official 
Samoan source which valued remittances from New Zealand at 
"nearly one million dollars" for 1970,1 while a United 
Nations advisor for the Department of Economic Development 
1 From 
A Migration 
Canterbury. 
N.A. Finn, The Samoan Community in Christchurch: 
Study. Geography M.A. Thesis. university of 
1973. p 39. 
141 
in Western Samoa put the figure at $1.6 million for 1972. 1 
The Asian Development Bank's survey of Pacific 
agriculture a 0 included an estimate of Western Samoa's 
total remittance income: WS$3.77 million in 1976, as 
against commodity earnings (by far the bulk of the rest of 
the revenue) of WS$5.6 million. 2 Even if the gures are 
not exactly correct, the magnitude and importance of this 
return from Samoan migrants is immediately obvious. The 
consequences of a reduction by the New Zealand Government 
in the numbers of Samoans allowed into the country - either 
temporarily or permanently - would have disastrous effects 
at every leve 1. 
For this reason, the return to their own countries 
of hundreds of overstayers, combined with the cut in the 
allocation of entry permits to New Zealand, has created 
severe difficulties for the Island governments. Not only 
has a significant source of remittance earnings been cut 
off, but also, a large number of employment opportunities 
have disappeared. The difficulty of finding jobs for its 
young people is one of the small state's major problems, 
and emigration used to provide part of the solution. 
In 1976, at the height of the overstayer issue, 
the Prime Minister of Western Samoa was quoted as saying: 
liThe unemployment problem is very bad, so the infusion 
of even a few more people will complicate matters n ,3 
1 Linda Hamilton, The Political Integration of the 
Samoan Immigrants in New Zealand. Political Science M.A. 
Thesis. University of Canterbury. 1974. p 79. 
2 ADB, Survey of Pacif~<::Agriculture 1979, p 114. 
3 NZPD, Vol. 407. 14th October 1976, p 3115. 
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while the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition, Mr Tizard, saw 
the matter in a wider context: 
"The Pacific Islanders are very traditional 
and can see a threat to their way of life if 
large numbers of overstayers are returned at 
one time. The economy would be upset, because 
there would be few employment opportuni eSi 
their social structure would be upset by the 
dissatisfaction of the unemployed returned 
overstayersi and in some cases there would 
be" a threat to political stability." 1 
In some ways though, it is potentially beneficial to 
Western Samoa in the long term, that the level of remittance 
income from overseas is reduced. By building a dependence 
on this source of revenue into the heart of its economy, 
the ability of the country to control its own resources 
was being significantly lessened. And in times of recession, 
when the economy was suffering anyway, the cut in the number 
of temporary migrant worker permits, as well as in the 
remittances from overseas, was doubly hard to absorb. 2 
Migration has other detrimental ef cts on Western 
Samoa. Those who leave the country as permanent migrants 
tend to be the young, educated, and enterprising section 
of the economy. In 1977/78 for instance, of the 780 Western 
Samoans who entered New Zealand as permanent or long-term 
residents, half of them were in the 15-24 years age group, 
while a further 28% of them were between 25 and 44 years 
3 
old. 
1 NZPD, Vol. 406, 25 September 1976, p 2659. 
2 de Btl 15 res ea., p . 
3 lation and Mi ion Statistics 1977/78. 
Actual official figures are not produced by the 
Western Samoan Department of Statistics although it is 
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planning to draw up "a list of Samoans, living overseas, 
indicating their skillsll,l in order to gain some indication 
of how serious the problem is. However New Zealand does 
have the policy, as mentioned earlier, of not placing a 
skill or occupational requirement on its migrants from the 
developing countries in an effort to prevent this 'brain 
drain I • 
But although New Zealand has restricted the numbers 
of Western Samoans entering the country, the smaller country 
is still highly dependent on New Zealand for employment 
opportunities for its rapidly growing population. The 
temporary migrant work scheme is very important to the 
economic, and social, well-being of Samoa, while the 
permanent migration of Samoans to New Zealand provides 
both an outlet for some of the population~ and a source 
of remittances for those left at home. 
The Asian Development Bank's survey believes that 
migration is the only long-term solution for a small 
country like Western Samoa: 
IIIn the absence of migration, the natural 
resources of Western Samoa will not be 
sufficient to support the future population 
at the standards of living to which they 
currently aspire .... The export of services, 
through migration, will be a key factor in 
the government's attempts to maintain a 
viable balance of payments position without 
large amounts of external assistance." 2 
------------------_ .. __ ... _-----------
1 Western Samoa Second Five Year Development Plan, p 13. 
2 ADB, P 378. 
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In other words, only through migration - both 
permanent, to relieve population pressure in the long term, 
and temporary, to provide jobs and income immediately -
will Western Samoa be able to support is rapidly growing 
population. The survey argues that Western Samoa is too 
small to support a viable indus al economy, that the 
population is no longer content to settle for the 
traditional lifestyle and subsistence standard of living, 
and that therefore, money must be sent in from overseas in 
order to let the people attain the way of life to which 
they aspire. 
Of course this raises the vital question of whether 
or not it is realistic to attempt to provide the benefits 
of a modern, industrial life in a small, developing country, 
by ficially pumping in funds - through remittances, aid, 
investments etc. But, the alternative, to leave the poorer 
countries at their SUbsistence levels, is unacceptable to 
many who live there, and cannot justifiably be imposed on 
them by the deve~oped countries. However this is a vast 
subject and cannot be further discussed here. 
But it does serve to show how important it is that 
all of the factors discussed separately so far - aid, 
trade and investment, and migration - be considered as 
highly interrelated aspects of the one single topic. If a 
realistic assessment is to be made of Western Samoa, as a 
small state in itself, and in its relationship with a larger 
state, New Zealand, then it must be envisaged as one complete 
unit and not as a set of isolated statistics and relation-
ships. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
The first task of this conclusion is to consider 
the interrelationship which exists between the three main 
areas of this study - aid, trade and investment, and 
migration. These factors have been considered somewhat in 
isolation up to now, but they must be integrated at this 
point if any viable conclusions are to be drawn concerning 
the conformity of Western Samoa itself, and its relationship 
with New Zealand, to the small state theory outlined in the 
rst chapter. 
The association between aid and trade has already 
been referred to with regard to the tying of aid grants to 
the purchase of the donor country's goods and services. 
This is seen by some as highly undesirable and detrimental 
to the welfare of the recipient country,l while others see 
it as Uenlightened self-interest u . 2 Surely, the latter 
school argue, it is only logical that the expenditure of 
New Zealand aid money should benefit the manufacturers, 
consultants and contractors of New Zealand, rather than 
those of other developed countries. 3 
1 See p 68. 
2 uThe export of expertise", New Zealand Economist, 
May 1972. p 9. 
3 See Report of a Seminar, International Aid and the 
Business Community, (ed) Bruce Brown, Auckland, February 
1970. (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs) 1970. pp 1-50. 
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However there is another aspect of the connection 
between these two components of a country's foreign 
relations: the substitution of one for the other. 
'Trade not aid' is a phrase often used by the peoples of 
both the developed and the developing nations, and it 
reflects a wide range of feelings and objectives. 
In the first place, the value of foreign aid as 
I 
such has been seriously questioned. After all, the world's 
poorer nations have been receiving vast quantities of aid 
for over two decades now, and the living standards of most 
o£ their populations are no better than they were before. 
As Dostoievsky wrote: "Chari ty corrupts giver and taker 
alike, and what is more it does not attain its objects 
as it only increases poverty."l 
Alternatives to aid, or maybe just to the type of aid 
or sector on which it is spent, must be considered if true 
economic and social development is to occur in the 
contemporary Third World countries. The direction of 
monetary assistance must focus on the formation of 
long-term, self-help projects for these countries. Only 
in this way will they be capable of eventually aChieving 
some form of economic independence. 
As Tupuola Efi, Prime Minister of Western Samoa, says: 
"Some of our constituents say 'Let's retain 
our dignity and reject the aid' .... (but) 
realistically, it is better to draw on aid 
to ensure that we become less dependent .. 
so that within the foreseeable future we can 2 
have a fair measure of economic independence. 1I 
I Quoted in Bhattacharya, p 25. 
2 New Zealand Herald, 11th February 1977. 
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Many observers believe that for Western Samoa, and 
for other poorer nations, the way to achieve this 'economic 
independence' is through the development of trade. By 
actually earning, rather than passively receiving, the money 
entering the country, the developing nation can achieve a 
greater degree of control over its income, while at the same 
time retaining its dignity and self-respect. 
In recognition of this objective then, the New 
Zealand Government has, in recent years, focused its 
attention on the development of both agriculture and 
industry as potential export-earners. By encouraging 
New Zealand manufacturers to set up ventures in the Pacific 
Islands under PIIDS, the Government hopes to expand the 
volume and range Western Samoa's exports while at the 
same time providing some degree of import-substitution. 
However, while this expenditure may make some progress 
towards an improvement in the balance of trade situation, it 
will probably be 1 ly negated by the increased demands of 
the general population for Western commodities and services. 
The importation of modern technology and equipment is 
necessary for the development of a modern economy, but to 
the extent that the imports are orientated towards 
consumption rather than towards the production of exports 
or import-substitutes, no real overall progress will be 
achieved. 
The PIIDS scheme exemplifies the close integration 
which exists between the trade, investment and migration 
aspects of Western Samoa's relationship with New Zealand. 
The investment of money in export-producing or import-
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substituting industries helps the government of the smaller 
country not only to improve its trade balance but also to 
provide jobs for its rapidly expanding population. And 
this latter factor is seen as compensating to some degree 
for the reduction in the number of Western Samoan migrants 
allowed into New Zealand. 
Mr Adams-Schneider, as acting Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in October 1977, explained the situation thus: 
"Through our aid progranune .... and the Pacific 
Islands Industrial Development Scheme, the 
Government is working with the Island States 
to help them boost productivity, to create new 
jobs, and to expand the opportunities available 
fo~ people in their home countries, thereby 
offering people a real alternative to having to 
leave their homes in search of work."l 
However, apart from the fact that many Samoans are 
very willing to leave their own country - even if only for 
a short period, the number of jobs created under PIIDS 
ventures (83 to date) 2 and through the various aid projects, 
cannot hope to reach the numbers who formerly travelled to 
New Zealand for work. with the return of the hundreds of 
overstayers, and the reduction in the number of migrants -
both permanent and temporary - to New Zealand, the Island 
governments are faced with severe unemployment problems. 
And these restrictions on migration affect the Samoan 
economy in another way also. As outlined in Chapter Six, 
in the past, the money sent back by those Samoans residing 
overseas has played an important role in helping the 
I NZPD, Vol. 414, 6th October 1977, p 3445. 
2 See p 114. 
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individuals at home to maintain their standards of living, 
and the Government to counter its trade deficit. The recent 
reduction in remittances and in the number of temporary 
migrants returning home with their savings has resulted in 
a significant drop in the income of the majority of Samoans. 
It appears then, that despite an increase of formal 
aid commitments to Western Samoa in recent years, the New 
Zealand Government has not increased its help to the 
'average' Samoan. For, while the benefits of remittances 
were spread fairly evenly around the country, the aid 
projects, as discussed in Chapter Four, do not necessarily 
fare so well in this respect. 
And the implications of the 'overstayers' issue have' 
rebounded far beyond the economic and social pressures that 
the Western Samoans experienced as a result. The whole 
relationship between New Zealand and Western Samoa has been 
placed under severe strain by the (al dly) racialist and 
discriminatory actions on the part of police and immigration 
offici It was not the ejection of illegal immigrants 
that worried the Samoan Government so much as the method by 
which it was done. l 
Tupuola Efi's statement at the time emphasizes the 
degree to which his government considered the expUlsion of 
overstayers from New Zealand as an unforgivable action, 
which could not be compensated for by other conciliatory 
measures: 
-_ ..... _--------------------------
1 Personal interview with T.F. Toleafoa, Western Samoan 
Deputy High Commissioner to New Zealand. After all, Western 
Samoa itself has very restrictive immigration laws. 
"If New Zealand goes ahead with ejection plans 
it will lose Samoan goodwill which ... (will) 
not be recovered even if aid ... (is) increased 
one hundred percent."l 
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The idea that one aspect of New Zealand's policies 
towards Western Samoa can be used to alleviate or complement 
the other aspects is a relatively new one to official 
Government policy. In 1977 an inter-departmental committee 
of offi Is was set up following a visit to the South 
Pacific by the Minister of Immigration in the wake of the 
overstayers issue. The committee, the P fic Affairs 
Co-ordinating Committee (PACC) 
"acts as a focal point for co-ordinating 
New Zealand policies and for stimulating 
and monitoring the Government's activities 
towards the South Pacific in the Ids of 
trade, economic co-operation, immigration 
and related fields, education, health, 
defence and transport."2 
This list of acti vi ties is obvious.ly highly ambitious, 
and the committee has concentrated mainly on the problems 
related to the Island migrants residing in New Zealand. It 
has done some work towards instituting minimum price support 
schemes for copra and other agricultural commodities,3 but 
otherwise has done very little in the fields of this study -
aid, trade and investment, and migration. 
It is hoped that this discussion has emphasized the 
importance of considering Western Samoa's relationship with 
1 Quoted by Hon. M. Rata, NZPD, Vol. 406, 12th october 
1976, p 3014. 
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report AJHR A-1, 1977. 
p 10. 
3 Ibid, AJHR, A-1, 1978. pp 9-10. 
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New Zealand in its entirety before assessing its conformity 
to the theories outlined in Chapter One. While the 
individual aspects could largely be isolated in the earlier 
chapters, it was vital that they were integrated here in 
order to undertake a viable evaluation of Western Samoa as 
a 'typical' small developing state and as a small state in 
a 'typical' relationship with a larger state. 
The only doubt about whether or not Western Samoa 
falls within the definitions of a 'small state'is in the 
fact that it may be too insignificant to warrant such a 
title when the theoretical literature on such entities is 
considered. However, for the purposes of this study, it 
was decided to use the comparative sizes of the two countries 
involved, and so to define Western Samoa as a small state 
and New Zealand as a large state. There is no such doubt 
about the level of Western Samoa's development. 
Most of the discussion relating the specific case of 
Western Samoa to the theoretical concepts of the character-
istics a small developing state should possess has been 
covered in the previous chapters, so only a quick summary 
will be given here. Economically, Western Samoa provides a 
very good example of a small developing state. Only in the 
fact that it does not concentrate its economic interaction 
almost exclusively on its former colonial power does it 
'deviate significantly from the model. 
However, while Western Samoa is not solely dependent 
on New Zealand for its aid, trade and investment relation-
ships, it is in a highly vulnerable position with regard to 
all three. It has almost no control over the amount or 
extent of each, and as such, finds that long-term and 
efficient planning of allocation of resources is almost 
impossible to achieve. 
The problem of rapid population growth is serious 
in Western Samoa and, as Benedict predicts, emigration 
is favoured as a viable option. Howe'ver the irnrnigra tion 
policies of other countries, especially New Zealand, 
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have prevented a large-scale exodus and therefore,while 
the problems associated with selective migrant flows 
have been averted, those of severe unemployment have not. 
The limited amount of resources available for 
international interaction has resulted, as expected, in 
the concentration of Samoan foreign policy on the South 
Pacific, particularly New Zealand. Therefore the bilateral 
relationship which exists between these two countries is 
of great importance to Western Sa,~oa and, as such, will 
be considered next as a test df the theories concerned 
with the relationship which exists between a small and a 
large state. 
Bj¢l and Freymond both argue that the small state 
is not necessarily intrinsically disadvantaged by its size 
in its relationship with a larger state. However Bj¢l's 
contention l is not borne out by the evidence, as New Zealand 
is definitely the dominant partner in the relationship, and 
probably allocates as much absolute time and resources to 
its dealings with Western Samoa as vice versa. 
Freymond's theory2 on the other hand has been 
1 See p 12. 
2 Ibid. 
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supported by an important ature in the historical 
relationship between the two countries. As outlined in 
Chapter Three, the New Zealand Administering Authority was 
plagued almost continually throughout its rule in Western 
Samoa by the nationalist movement, the Mau. By both 
peaceful and later, more forceful tactics this movement 
seriously undermined the authority and power of its country's 
foreign rulers, and heavily increased the (political as much 
as financial) cost to them of retaining their hold of the 
territory. 
Today Western Samoa is categorised a Third World 
non-aligned state. In other words, it is a newly-
independent, developing country which does not wish to 
identify itself with ther the capitalist or communist 
camps. As such it can achieve some importance when it is 
wooed for its vote in the United Nations or other inter-
governmental bodies where it has equal status with all other 
(larger) nations. However its economic dependence on the 
Western nations, particularly New Zealand, no doubt 
influences its decisions to some extent, and so far it has 
followed New Zealand's policy lines very closely.l 
It is difficult to apply the contemporary situation 
of Western Samoa in its relationship with New Zealand to 
much of the theoretical literature2 because of the sheer 
insignificance of both of these countries on the world 
scene. Western Samoa itself has no great strategic or 
1 Personal interview with T.P. Toleafoa. 
2 See Vital's categories of small states, p 13. 
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economic importance, while New Zealand is not competing with 
any (other) power for dominance in the South Pacific region. 
However it is these very same factors which make the 
applicabili ty of Morrison and Suhrke' s partiaL linkage paradigm 1 
to the relationship between Western Samoa and New Zealand 
so likely. Because these countries are unimportant on the 
world scene their relationship with one another is largely 
independent of outside influences and so is basically 
determined by the domestic situations in both countries. 
The historical relationship between Western Samoa 
and New Zea nd2 provides an ample basis for the smaller 
country to "exploit sentiments of obligation or treaty 
commitments". New Zealand has made many firmations of 
the "intimate relationship,,3 which exists between itself 
and Western Samoa because of their long (and sometimes 
torrid) association, and is committed to aiding that country 
in its progress towards economic and social modernization. 
The geographic proximity of the two countries is also 
an important feature, as are the "ethnic ... finities" which 
their peoples. As a nation of the South Pacific 
Western Samoa holds a special place in New Zealand's foreign 
policy, while the fact that its population is almost 
exclusively Polynesian means that there are great racial and 
cultural similarities between the Western Samoans and the 
Maoris of New Zealand. 
1 See pp 14-16. 
2 See Chapter 3. 
3 Treaty of Friendship, see Appendix D. 
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The other bargaining tactics of a small state within 
a partial linkage relationship with a larger state are: 
cUltivating specific interest groups within the larger 
power, and offering economic privileges, political support 
or military facilities. Not surprisingly, Western Samoa 
has very little bargaining power in any of the latter 
categories. The government may offer to support New Zealand 
policies or initiatives at regional conferences, but its 
responsibility, and accountability, to its electorate at 
home, as well as the erce nationalistic feelings of its 
people, make such bargaining highly unlikely. 
To a limited extent the Western Samoan Government 
can appeal to specific interest groups within New Zealand. 
It attempts to cultivate the support of the Labour Party in 
general,l while the fact that about 30,000 Samoans now live 
in New Zealand provides it with a significant potential 
lever in the electoral box. 
The fact that it is the domestic, rather than the 
international situation which a cts the relationship, is 
evidenced by the fall in aid given by, and the number of 
migrants allowed into, New Zealand, in times of economic 
recession in that country. While admittedly these worsening 
economic conditions are usually initiated by international 
events, as explained earlier,2 this does not really change 
the overall situation. 
Also, the change in New Zealand's administration in 
1 Interview with T.F. Toleafoa. 
2 See pp 90-91. 
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1972 brought about an increase in aid to the Paci c and a 
sharper focus of New Zealand interests in that area, while 
the re-election of the National Government in 1975 led to 
a significant worsening of relations, with the 'overstayer' 
issue. Similarly, the accession to power of Tupuola Efi 
in Western Samoa in 1976 has led to a much more aggressive 
and critical attitude from that country, and to a 
significant increase in its willingness to co-operate and 
interact with many other countries than its former colonial 
power. 
Overall then, it can be seen that it is the domestic 
situations within the individual countries which determine 
the relationship between Western Samoa and New Zealand, 
rather than New Zealand's relationship with any other large 
country. In other words, the relationship fits Morrison and 
Suhrke's partial linkage paradigm. As mentioned in Chapter 
Four, if the international factors are to be considered at 
all, it is the association of other large countries with the 
smaller partner in the relationship that is the important 
variable. 
The final theory to be examined when considering the 
Western Samoa - New Zealand relationship is that of 
neo-colonialism. Although the smaller country was never 
formally a colony of New Zealand, it was ruled by that 
country for almost half a century and as such was subject 
to much the same conditions as many colonies. 
The characteristics of small ex-colonies as outlined 
1 by O'Leary are largely true of Western Samoa today. 
1 See pp 16 17. 
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The country's main economic links are with New Zealand, its 
Prime Minister and many other politicians and bureaucrats 
have received their education there, while the number of 
New Zealanders in Western Samoa in important administrative 
and economic positions is significant. l In addition, 
New Zealand provides a considerable amount of aid to Western 
Samoa each year and overall, plays a dominant role in the 
country's life. 
In conclusion then, it can be seen that Western Samoa 
is a 'typical' small developing state. Its only deviation 
is that it has a wider range of economic and political 
partners than most of its counterparts, but overall it is 
still basically dependent on its former 'colonial power' 
for its economic survival. 
As far as the bilateral relationship between Western 
Samoa and New Zealand is concerned, it is somewhat unusual 
in that it fits Morrison and Suhrke's partial linkage 
paradigm when the authors argue that such examples do not 
exist. However this anomaly is probably largely explained 
by the very small scale of these two states. 
The relationship between Western Samoa and New 
Zealand has undergone many changes over the seventy-odd 
years of its existence. Yet, in one respect, nothing has 
altered: New Zealand was, is, and no doubt always will be, 
the dominant partner in the relationship. It is New 
Zealand's conditions and policies, not Western Samoa's 
needs, which determine the aid, trade and migration flows 
1 Personal interview with Mike Field. 
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between the two countries; and, as long as this remains the 
case, the Western Samoans will never be free of their 
dependence on, and subordination to, New Zealand. 
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Appendix A 
QUANTITY, VALUE AND PRICES OF COPRA AND COCOA 1973-1978 
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Appendix B 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS - MANDATE FOR GERMAN SAMOA 
Article 1. 
The Territory over which a mandate is conferred upon 
His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government 
of the Dominion of New Zealand (hereinafter called the 
Mandatory) is the former Germany Colony of Samoa. 
Article 2. 
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration 
and legislation over the Territory, subject to the present 
mandate, as an integral portion of the Dominion of New 
Zealand, and may apply the laws of the Dominion of New 
Zealand to the Territory, subject to such local 
modifications as circumstances may require. 
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material 
and moral well-being and the social progress of the 
inhabitants of the Territory subject to the present mandate. 
Article 3. 
The Mandatory shall see "that the slave trade is 
prohibited, and that no forced labour is permitted, except 
for essenti public works and services, and then only for 
adequate remuneration. 
The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms 
and ammunition is controlled in accordance with principles 
analogous to those laid down in the Convention relating to 
the control of the arms traffic, signed on September 10th 
1919, or in any convention amending the same. 
The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to 
the Natives shall be prohibited. 
Article 4. 
The military training of the Natives, otherwise than 
for purposes of internal police and the lo.cal defence of the 
Territory, shall be prohibited. 
Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be 
established or fortifications erected in the Territory. 
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Article 5. 
Subject to the provisions of any local law for the 
maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory 
shall ensure in the Territory freedom of conscience and the 
free exercise of all forms of worship, and shall allow all 
missionaries, nationals of any State member of the League of 
Nations, to enter into, travel, and reside in the Territory 
for the purpose of prosecuting their calling. 
Article 6. 
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League 
of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the 
Council, containing full information with regard to the 
Territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out 
the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
Article 7. 
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations . 
is required for any modification of the terms of the present 
mandate. 
Made at Geneva the 17th day of December, 1920. 
JEAN MONNET, 
Deputy Secretary-General. 
Source: N.Z. Official Yearbook 1921-22. pp 584-585. 
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Appendix C 
TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR THE TERRITORY OF WESTERN SAMOA 
AS APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THE 
SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING OF ITS 
FIRST SESSION ON 13 DECEMBER, 1946 
AND WHEREAS the Charter of the United Nations 
signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945, provides for 
the establishment of an international trusteeship system 
for the administration and supervision of such territories 
as may be the subject of trusteeship agreements: .... 
NOW THEREFORE, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations hereby resolves to approve the following terms 
of trusteeship for Western Samoa, in substitution for the 
terms of the aforesaid mandate: 
Article I 
The territory to which this Agreement applies is the 
territory known as Western Samoa comprising the islands of 
Upolu, Savai'i, Manono, and Apolima, together with all other 
islands and rocks adjacent thereto. 
Article II 
The Government of New Zealand are hereby designated as 
the administering authority for Western Samoa. 
Article III 
The administering authority shall have full powers of 
administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the 
.terri tory, subj ect to the provisions of this agreement, 
and of the Charter of the United Nations, and may apply to 
the territory, subject to any modifications which the 
administering authority may consider desirable, such of the 
laws of New Zealand as may seem appropriate to local 
conditions and requirements. 
Article IV 
The administering authority undertakes to administer 
Western Samoa in such a manner as to achieve in that 
territory the basic objectives of the internat{onal trustee-
ship system, as expressed in Article 76 of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
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Article V 
The administering authority shall promote the develop-
ment of free political institutions suited to Western Samoa. 
To this end and as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of the territory and its peoples, the 
administering authority shall assure to the inhabitants of 
Western Samoa a progressively increasing share in the 
administrative and other services of the territory, shall 
develop the participation of the inhabitants of Western 
Samoa in advisory and legislative bodies and in the 
government of the territory, and shall take all other 
appropriate measures with a view to the political advance-
ment of the inhabitants of Western Samoa in accordance with 
Article 76 (b) of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article VI 
In pursuance of its undertaking to promote the social 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territory, and 
without in any way limiting its obligations thereunder, the 
administering authority shall: 
1. Prohibit all forms of slavery and slave-trading; 
2. Prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory labour, 
except for essential public works and services as 
specifically authorized by the local administration 
and then only in times of public emergency, with 
adequate remuneration and adequate protection of 
the welfare of the workers; 
3. Control the traffic in arms and ammunition; 
4. Control, in the interest of the inhabitants, the 
manufacture, importation and distribution of 
intoxicating spirits and beverages; and 
5. Control the production, importation, manufacture, 
and distribution of opium and narcotic drugs. 
Article VII 
The administering authority undertakes to apply in 
Western Samoa the provisions of any international 
conventions and recommendations as drawn up by the United 
Nations or its specialized agencies which are, in the 
opinion of the administering authority, appropriate to the 
needs and conditions of the trust territory, and conductive 
to the achievement of the basic objectives of the 
international trusteeship system. 
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Article VIII 
In framing the laws to be applied in Western Samoa, 
the administering authority shall take into consideration 
Samoan customs and usages and shall respect the rights and 
safeguard the interests, both present and future, of the 
Samoan population. 
In particular, the laws relating to the holding or 
transfer of land shall ensure that no native land may be 
transferred save with the prior consent of the competent 
public authority and that no right over native land in 
favour of any person not a Samoan may be created except 
with the same consent. 
Article IX 
The administering authority shall ensure in the 
territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of 
all forms of worship, and shall allow missionaries, 
nationals of any State member of the United Nations, to 
enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the 
purpose of prosecuting their calling. The provisions of 
this Article shall not, however, affect the right and duty 
of the administering authority to exercise such control as 
it may consider necessary for the maintenance of peace, 
order and good government. 
Article X 
The administering authority shall ensure that the trust 
territory of Western Samoa shall play its part, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. To this 
end the administering authority shall be entitled: 
1. To establish naval, military and air bases and to 
erect fortifications in the trust territory; 
2. To station and employ armed forces in the territory; 
3. To make use of volunteer forces, facilities and 
assistance from the trust territory in carrying out 
the obligations toward the Security Council undertaken 
in this regard by the administering authority, as well 
as for local defence and the maintenance of law and 
order within the trust territory; 
4. To take all such other measures in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations as are in the opinion of the administering 
authority necessary to the maintenance of international 
peace and security and the defence of Western Samoa. 
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Article XI 
The administering authority shall, as may be appropriat 
to the circumstances of the trust territory, continue and e 
extend a general system of education, including post-primary 
education and professional training. 
Article XII 
Subject only to the requirements of public order, the 
administering authority shall guarantee to the inh~bitants 
of the trust territory, freedom of speech, of the press, 
of assembly and of petition. 
Article XIII 
The administering authority may arrange for the 
co-operation of Western Samoa in any regional advisory 
commission, regional technical organization or other 
voluntary association of states, any specialized 
international bodies, public or private, or other forms 
of international activity not inconsistent with the Charter 
of the united Nations. 
Article XIV 
The administering authority shall make to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations an annual report on the basis 
of a questionnaire drawn up by the Trusteeship Council in 
accordance with the Charter o'f the United Nations and shall 
otherwise collaborate fully with the Trusteeship Council in 
the discharge of all the Council's functions in accordance 
with Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter. The administering 
authority shall arrange to be represented at the sessions 
of the Trusteeship Council at which the reports of the 
administering authority with regard to Western Samoa are 
considered. . 
Article XV 
The terms of this agreement shall not be altered or 
amended except as provided in Article 79 of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
Article XVI 
If any dispute should arise between the administering 
authority and another member of the United Nations, relating 
to the interpretation or application of the provisions of 
this agreement, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by 
negotiation or similar means, shall be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice. 
Source: AJHR, A-2c. 1947. 00 6-10. 
Appendix D 
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF WESTERN SAMOA 
The Government of New Zealand and the Government of 
Western Samoa, 
175 
Affirming that the relations, as Governments of 
sovereign and equal states, are founded upon respect for 
fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Recognizing that friendship, confidence, and a mutual 
endeavour to obtain for their peoples fuller opportunities 
for social progress have established a specially intimate 
relationship between them, 
And desiring to maintain and strengthen the bonds of 
amity and goodwill which have hitherto existed between them 
and to provide for continued cooperation, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Relations between New Zealand and Western Samoa shall 
continue to be governed by a spirit of close friendship. 
Article II 
Where appropriate the two Governments shall consult 
each other on matters of mutual interest and concern. 
Article III 
Each Government shall ensure that citizens of the other 
living within its territory are, in accordance with the 
normal practice between friendly states, given equitable 
treatment and full legal protection and access to the Courts. 
Article IV 
The two Governments shall continue to work together to 
promote the weI re of the people of Western Samoa. In 
particular the Government of New Zealand will consider 
sympathetically requests from the Government of Western 
Samoa for technical, administrative and other assistance. 
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Article V 
The Government of New Zealand shall, for as long as the 
Government of Western Samoa wishes, and in such manner as 
will in no way impair the right of the Government of Western 
Samoa to formulate its own foreign policies, afford 
assistance to the Government of Western Samoa in the conduct 
of its international relations. In particular the 
Government of New Zealand will: 
(a) when requested, act as the channel for communications 
between the Government of Western Samoa and other 
Governments and international organizations; 
(b) when requested, and where permissible and 
appropriate, undertake the representation of the 
Government of Western Samoa at any international 
conference at which Western Samoa is entitled to 
be represented; 
(c) when requested, supply Western Samoa with information 
concerning international a rSi 
(d) undertake the diplomatic protection of nationals of 
Western Samoa in other countries and perform consular 
functions on their behalf. 
Article VI 
Either Government may at any time give to the other 
Government written notice of its desire to terminate this 
Agreement. In such case, this Agreement shall terminate 
upon the expiration of three ,months from the date on which 
the notice is received. 
Article VII 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of 
signature. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the representative of the Government 
of New Zealand, and the representative of the Government of 
Western Samoa, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed 
this Agreement. 
DONE at Apia this 1st day of August 1962 in four 
originals, two being in the English language, and two in 
the Samoan language, the texts of both languages being 
equally authen c. 
For the Government of 
New Zealand: 
J.B. WRIGHT 
Source: AJHR, A-12, 1962. 
For the Government of 
Western Samoa: 
FlAME MATA'AFA F.M. II 
Appendix E 
SOURCE AND TOTAL AMOUNT OF aDA FOR 
SELECTED PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES 1976 
M. 
35 % 
Aust 
290/0 
N.Z. 
220/0 
WESTERN SAMOA 
A$9·24m. 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
A$16·09rn 
Key: M Multilateral 
O.B. Other Bilateral 
U.K 
38 % 
FIJI 
A$J8:94rn 
TON 
A$3·39m. 
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Source: Constructed from statistics in Fairbairn and Bollard, 1978, 
pp 16 and 17. 
Key: A 
C 
F 
I 
J 
Appendix F 
DESTINATION OF WESTERN SAMOAN EXPORTS 
(by value) 
1948 
·1965 
Australia 
Canada 
Fiji 
Indonesia 
Japan 
N. Z. 
S .A. 
Sing. 
U.K. 
U.S. 
o. 
Aust. 
18% 
1958 
New Zealand 
South Africa 
Singapore 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Other 
1978 
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Key: A 
AS 
C 
Jap. 
Neth. 
Source: 1948, 
SOURCE OF WESTERN SAMOAN IMPORTS 
(by value) 
1948 
1965 
Australia 
American 
Canada 
Japan 
U.K. 
540/0 
Samoa 
Netherlands 
1958, 1698, 1978 
1958 
1978 
N. Z. New Zealand 
W.G. West Germany 
U.K. United Kingdom 
U.S. United States 
O. Other 
Report, AJHR, A-4 
U.K. 
44% 
Annual Stati Abstract 1978 
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Appendix G 
N.Z. EXPORTS TO W.S. 
July 1977 - June 1978 
Foodstuffs 
Meat 
Dairy Prods, Eggs 
Fish 
Cereal Preparations 
Fruit & Vegetables 
Sugar 
Food Preps. 
Alcoholic Beverages 
Tobacco Man uf . 
1,532,462 
776,588 
109,628 
193,190 
200,916 
17,827 
674,916 
608,366 
1,290,255 
Animal and Vegetable Oils & Fats 
Medicinal & Pharmaceutical Prods 
Oils, perfumery, soaps 
Plastic Materials 
Chemical Materials & Prods nes 
Wood Manufactures (incl. pulp & paper) 
Textile Manufactures 
Glass & Glassware 
Furniture and Fittings 
Construction Materials 
Metals (incl. manuf. iron & steel) 
Machinery 
Transport Manufactures 
Miscellaneous 
5,404,148 
287,308 
272,744 
115,798 
267,418 
522,988 
1,121,557 
145,821 
133,527 
206,316 
218,033 
1,500,187 
1,327,209 
124,343 
11,647,392 
534,711 
$12,182,103 
Total N.Z. Exports 
July 1977 - June 1978 $3,309,113,243 F.O.B. 
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(44%) 
( 16%) 
(9%) 
( 12%) 
( 11 %) 
F.O.B. 
N.Z. IMPORTS FROM 
July 1977 - June 1978 
Fruit, Vegetables, Tubers 912,286 (26%) 
Cocoa 267,095 (8%) 
Food Preparations 263,861 
Oil Seeds/Nuts/Kernels 1,958,693 (56%) 
Manufactured Articles 32,548 
Works of Art, etc. 44,183 
3,478,666 
Miscellaneous 13,956 
$3,492,622 c.i.f. 
Total N.Z. Imports 
July 1977 June 1978 $3,269,487,167 c.i.f. 
Source: Condensed from New Zealand Department of 
Statistics, External Analyses of Country 
T July 1977 - June 1978. 
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Appendix H 
IMPORT LICENSING SCHEDULE 
Appendix 1: -The Consolidated List of Exemptions. 
The Appendix lists ••. all goods which may be imported 
into New Zealand exempt from import licence ••. 
Part IV - Goods from Cook Islands, Niue and Western Samoa 
Classes of Goods 
Goods imported from and being: 
(a) Wholly produced in the Cook Islands, Niue, or 
Western Samoa 
(b) Wholly manufactured in the Cook Islands, Niue, or 
Western Samoa from materials of one or more of the 
following classes: 
(i) Unmanufactured raw materials as illustrated 
in the Third Schedule to the Customs Regulations 
1968; 
(ii) Materials wholly manufactured in the Cook 
Islands, Niue, or Western Samoa, or in those 
areas and New Zealand. 
(c) Partly manufactured in the Cook Islands, Niue, or 
Western Samoa; and 
(i) 
(ii) 
( iii) 
The process last performed in the manufacture of 
the goods was performed in the Cook Islands, 
Niue, or Western Samoa; and 
That in respect of the goods, the expenditure -
(A) In material that is of the Cook Islands, Niue, 
or Western Samoa and/or of New Zealand origin; 
or 
(B) In labour and factory overheads incurred in 
the Cook Islands, Niue, or western Samoa 
and/or in New Zealand; or 
(C) In inner containers that are of the Cook 
Islands, Niue, or Western Samoa and/or 
New Zealand origin; or 
(D) Partly in such materials and partly in such 
other items of factory cost (including inner 
containers) as aforesaid - not less than one 
half of the factory or works cost of the goods 
in this finished state; 
That in the calculation of that proportion of 
expenditure in material, and/or in other items of 
factory or works cost incurred in the Cook Islands, 
Niue, or Western Samoa or in those areas and/or 
New Zealand, none of the following items has been 
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included or considered, viz: manufacturer's 
profit, or the profit or remuneration of any 
trader, agent, broker, or other person dealing 
in the goods in their finished condition; 
royalties payable in respect of the finished 
goods; cost of outside packages or any cost of 
packing the goods into them; administrative .and 
general office expenses; any cost of conveying, 
insuring or shipping the goods, or any charges 
incurred after their manufacture. 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, Import Licensing 
Schedule 1979-80. (Wellington: Government Printer) 
1979. Appendix 1, Part IV. p 199. 
